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<channel>
    <title>The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare</title>
    <atom:link href="https://feed.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
    <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com</link>
    <description>Exploring changes in the practice of war while the fundamental nature and principles of war are unchanging. Includes mercenaries, PMSC, Hybrid Warfare, revolution in military affairs. For in-depth information see my blog at blog.ctmayer.net</description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 21:00:47 -0500</pubDate>
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    <language>en</language>
    <spotify:countryOfOrigin>us</spotify:countryOfOrigin>
    <copyright>Copyright 2019 All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <category>Government</category>
    <ttl>1440</ttl>
    <itunes:type>episodic</itunes:type>
          <itunes:summary>Exploring how the practice of war changes while the fundamental nature and principles of war are unchanging. Host is COL Chris Mayer, USA RET, former member of the Advance Warfighting Working Group and the U.S. Government's expert on Private Military Companies. Includes Strategy, Revolution in Military Affairs, Hybrid Warfare, Cyber warfare, mercenaries, PMSC, Laws and Customs of War</itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
<itunes:category text="Government" />
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		<itunes:category text="Social Sciences" />
	</itunes:category>
<itunes:category text="Society &amp; Culture" />
    <itunes:owner>
        <itunes:name>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:name>
            </itunes:owner>
    	<itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
	<itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
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        <title>The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare</title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com</link>
        <width>144</width>
        <height>144</height>
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    <item>
        <title>The Persian Problem in Practice</title>
        <itunes:title>The Persian Problem in Practice</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-persian-problem-in-practice/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-persian-problem-in-practice/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 21:00:47 -0500</pubDate>
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                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>I keep on trying to podcast about other things and current events keep distracting me. In my previous episode in this series, “The Persian Problem, I described some conditions under which U.S. military action against Iran would meet the Jus Ad Bellum criteria of Just War Theory. That description was, at the time I posted it, theoretical. Now we have the reality of having initiated combat operations. In this episode, I will review what I said in the previous episode and compare it to what we can see so far in this current conflict.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I keep on trying to podcast about other things and current events keep distracting me. In my previous episode in this series, “The Persian Problem, I described some conditions under which U.S. military action against Iran would meet the <em>Jus Ad Bellum</em> criteria of Just War Theory. That description was, at the time I posted it, theoretical. Now we have the reality of having initiated combat operations. In this episode, I will review what I said in the previous episode and compare it to what we can see so far in this current conflict.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Holst, G. <em>The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, </em>downloaded from Internet Archive</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/esq5m4e3ztddsj5x/E129_Persian_Problem2.mp3" length="21500574" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[I keep on trying to podcast about other things and current events keep distracting me. In my previous episode in this series, “The Persian Problem, I described some conditions under which U.S. military action against Iran would meet the Jus Ad Bellum criteria of Just War Theory. That description was, at the time I posted it, theoretical. Now we have the reality of having initiated combat operations. In this episode, I will review what I said in the previous episode and compare it to what we can see so far in this current conflict.
Music:

Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>671</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>130</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E129_Persian_Problem2.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>The Persian Problem (E128)</title>
        <itunes:title>The Persian Problem (E128)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-persian-problem-e128/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-persian-problem-e128/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2026 18:27:07 -0500</pubDate>
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                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>By the time anyone reads or listens to this podcast, the situation with Iran may be completely different than when I write this. In keeping with the intent of this podcast series, however, I thought it might be worthwhile to explore the possibility of intervention in Iran in a way that is in line with the enduring principles of war. In doing this I am not advocating such an intervention. Neither do I express any opinion about whether or not it is even a good idea. My intent is to frame a possible military intervention within the framework of time proven successful strategy and Just War criteria. Given the record of U.S. military interventions following the first Gulf War, I am confident that whatever we do regarding Iran will completely ignore that framework.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By the time anyone reads or listens to this podcast, the situation with Iran may be completely different than when I write this. In keeping with the intent of this podcast series, however, I thought it might be worthwhile to explore the possibility of intervention in Iran in a way that is in line with the enduring principles of war. In doing this I am not advocating such an intervention. Neither do I express any opinion about whether or not it is even a good idea. My intent is to frame a possible military intervention within the framework of time proven successful strategy and Just War criteria. Given the record of U.S. military interventions following the first Gulf War, I am confident that whatever we do regarding Iran will completely ignore that framework.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) <em>Fanfare for the Common Man</em>. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral</em> (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/cghgdtw22yjh3w4f/E128_Persian_Problem.mp3" length="18647584" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[By the time anyone reads or listens to this podcast, the situation with Iran may be completely different than when I write this. In keeping with the intent of this podcast series, however, I thought it might be worthwhile to explore the possibility of intervention in Iran in a way that is in line with the enduring principles of war. In doing this I am not advocating such an intervention. Neither do I express any opinion about whether or not it is even a good idea. My intent is to frame a possible military intervention within the framework of time proven successful strategy and Just War criteria. Given the record of U.S. military interventions following the first Gulf War, I am confident that whatever we do regarding Iran will completely ignore that framework.
 
Music:

Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)

 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>582</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>129</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E128_Persian_Problem.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>The Morality of Strategic Bombing (E127)</title>
        <itunes:title>The Morality of Strategic Bombing (E127)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-morality-of-strategic-bombing-e127/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-morality-of-strategic-bombing-e127/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2026 12:28:23 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/141e3049-35fc-3765-8570-e57ce958cd8a</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Can strategic bombing of cities ever be justified? In the previous episode of this podcast series (E126), Col. Altieri said that the air force always considers itself revolutionary. Before I began recording, he cited strategic bombing in World War Two as both revolutionary and consistent with Clausewitz’s concept of making things so painful that the enemy will not continue to resist. I responded, saying that strategic bombing of the civilian population was a war crime and violates Just War criteria. Afterwards, I thought my response might have been hasty. In this episode, I re-look the idea of strategic bombardment, not as we might see it today, but as it was believed during WWII. In any examination of history, we need to see things as they were understood by those making decisions at that time, not from our current perspective.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Can strategic bombing of cities ever be justified? In the previous episode of this podcast series (E126), Col. Altieri said that the air force always considers itself revolutionary. Before I began recording, he cited strategic bombing in World War Two as both revolutionary and consistent with Clausewitz’s concept of making things so painful that the enemy will not continue to resist. I responded, saying that strategic bombing of the civilian population was a war crime and violates Just War criteria. Afterwards, I thought my response might have been hasty. In this episode, I re-look the idea of strategic bombardment, not as we might see it today, but as it was believed during WWII. In any examination of history, we need to see things as they were understood by those making decisions at that time, not from our current perspective.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Holst, G. <em>The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, </em>downloaded from Internet Archive</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/jvytuuzpawjxmujm/E127_Strategic_Bombing.mp3" length="18647584" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Can strategic bombing of cities ever be justified? In the previous episode of this podcast series (E126), Col. Altieri said that the air force always considers itself revolutionary. Before I began recording, he cited strategic bombing in World War Two as both revolutionary and consistent with Clausewitz’s concept of making things so painful that the enemy will not continue to resist. I responded, saying that strategic bombing of the civilian population was a war crime and violates Just War criteria. Afterwards, I thought my response might have been hasty. In this episode, I re-look the idea of strategic bombardment, not as we might see it today, but as it was believed during WWII. In any examination of history, we need to see things as they were understood by those making decisions at that time, not from our current perspective.
 
Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>582</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>128</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E127_Strategic_Bombing.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>A Revolution in Military Affairs? (E126)</title>
        <itunes:title>A Revolution in Military Affairs? (E126)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/a-revolution-in-military-affairs-e126/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/a-revolution-in-military-affairs-e126/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2026 15:30:33 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/9f63f919-7d80-36f4-b5e1-099a7bb0402c</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, described three legs that support the architecture of war: Primordial violence, the play of chance, and reason. Clausewitz aligned the element of chance the military. Every revolution brings unintended consequences -- the free play of chance. A revolution in military affairs, therefore, means exponential chance to affect the other legs of that trinity. Did the predicted revolution in military affairs come about? Are we at the threshold of one? Is that a good thing or an unacceptable risk that must be avoided? Can we avoid it? Colonels Jayson Altieri and Robert Waring, US Army Retired and instructors in our War Colleges, join me to discuss some of these questions. This is longer than my recent podcasts, but I think it will be worth your time.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Liszt, F., and the USMC Band, Les Preludes. Public Domain</li>
<li>Beatles, Revolution (1968). (Unpublished take) Downloaded from Internet Archives, Identifier# 680904f-revolution-take-1 (Fair use for education)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, described three legs that support the architecture of war: Primordial violence, the play of chance, and reason. Clausewitz aligned the element of chance the military. Every revolution brings unintended consequences -- the free play of chance. A revolution in military affairs, therefore, means exponential chance to affect the other legs of that trinity. Did the predicted revolution in military affairs come about? Are we at the threshold of one? Is that a good thing or an unacceptable risk that must be avoided? Can we avoid it? Colonels Jayson Altieri and Robert Waring, US Army Retired and instructors in our War Colleges, join me to discuss some of these questions. This is longer than my recent podcasts, but I think it will be worth your time.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Liszt, F., and the USMC Band, <em>Les Preludes</em>. Public Domain</li>
<li>Beatles, <em>Revolution </em>(1968)<em>.</em> (Unpublished take)<em> </em>Downloaded from Internet Archives, Identifier# 680904f-revolution-take-1 (Fair use for education)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ydnjqhp2btepg7hn/E126_RMA.mp3" length="50603909" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, described three legs that support the architecture of war: Primordial violence, the play of chance, and reason. Clausewitz aligned the element of chance the military. Every revolution brings unintended consequences -- the free play of chance. A revolution in military affairs, therefore, means exponential chance to affect the other legs of that trinity. Did the predicted revolution in military affairs come about? Are we at the threshold of one? Is that a good thing or an unacceptable risk that must be avoided? Can we avoid it? Colonels Jayson Altieri and Robert Waring, US Army Retired and instructors in our War Colleges, join me to discuss some of these questions. This is longer than my recent podcasts, but I think it will be worth your time.
 
Music:

Liszt, F., and the USMC Band, Les Preludes. Public Domain
Beatles, Revolution (1968). (Unpublished take) Downloaded from Internet Archives, Identifier# 680904f-revolution-take-1 (Fair use for education)

 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1581</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>127</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E126_RMA.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Predicting the future...has a rather bad track record (E125)</title>
        <itunes:title>Predicting the future...has a rather bad track record (E125)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/predicting-the-futurehas-a-rather-bad-track-record-e125/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/predicting-the-futurehas-a-rather-bad-track-record-e125/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 11:31:58 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e8b1d55c-e2df-3335-9716-3181047eee52</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The inevitable never happens. It is the unexpected always.</p>
<p>-- J.M. Keynes 1938</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Almost everyone plays with predicting the future. Persons who speak with presumed authority and say that some outlandish thing is inevitable often get a lot of media attention. The more media attention, the more people come to think that the outlandish thing really is inevitable. In warfare, I have lived through the inevitability of guerilla warfare as the model for all future warfare; the inevitable demise armored warfare, the transformation of maneuver warfare; counter-insurgency warfare as the inevitable future war form; and more recently, that drones will so dominate the battlefield, that all previous forms of warfighting will be obsolete. In my opinion, inevitability has a rather bad track record. From time to time in these podcasts, I will revisit some of these predictions and see which of these were inevitable and which were overcome by reality.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li>Pournelle, J., The Mercenary, (1977, republished 1986, ISBN 9780671655945)
<ul>
<li>Recompiled with other works of the series and published as:</li>
<li>Pournelle, J. and Stirling, M., The Prince (2002) (ISBN 0-7434-3556-7)</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Heinlein, R., Starship Troopers, (1959) ISBN 978-0450044496</li>
</ul>
<p>Music: Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The inevitable never happens</em>. It is the unexpected always.</p>
<p>-- J.M. <em>Keynes</em> 1938</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Almost everyone plays with predicting the future. Persons who speak with presumed authority and say that some outlandish thing is inevitable often get a lot of media attention. The more media attention, the more people come to think that the outlandish thing really is inevitable. In warfare, I have lived through the inevitability of guerilla warfare as the model for all future warfare; the inevitable demise armored warfare, the transformation of maneuver warfare; counter-insurgency warfare as the inevitable future war form; and more recently, that drones will so dominate the battlefield, that all previous forms of warfighting will be obsolete. In my opinion, inevitability has a rather bad track record. From time to time in these podcasts, I will revisit some of these predictions and see which of these were inevitable and which were overcome by reality.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li>Pournelle, J., <em>The Mercenary</em>, (1977, republished 1986, ISBN 9780671655945)
<ul>
<li>Recompiled with other works of the series and published as:</li>
<li>Pournelle, J. and Stirling, M., <em>The Prince</em> (2002) (ISBN 0-7434-3556-7)</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Heinlein, R., Starship Troopers, (1959) ISBN 978-0450044496</li>
</ul>
<p>Music: Kiilstofte, P. <em>Mercenaries</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/39z4jen49ndmjanu/E125_Predicting_the_future.mp3" length="15480290" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The inevitable never happens. It is the unexpected always.
-- J.M. Keynes 1938
 
Almost everyone plays with predicting the future. Persons who speak with presumed authority and say that some outlandish thing is inevitable often get a lot of media attention. The more media attention, the more people come to think that the outlandish thing really is inevitable. In warfare, I have lived through the inevitability of guerilla warfare as the model for all future warfare; the inevitable demise armored warfare, the transformation of maneuver warfare; counter-insurgency warfare as the inevitable future war form; and more recently, that drones will so dominate the battlefield, that all previous forms of warfighting will be obsolete. In my opinion, inevitability has a rather bad track record. From time to time in these podcasts, I will revisit some of these predictions and see which of these were inevitable and which were overcome by reality.
 
The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.
 
Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.
 
References:

Pournelle, J., The Mercenary, (1977, republished 1986, ISBN 9780671655945)

Recompiled with other works of the series and published as:
Pournelle, J. and Stirling, M., The Prince (2002) (ISBN 0-7434-3556-7)




Heinlein, R., Starship Troopers, (1959) ISBN 978-0450044496

Music: Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>483</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>126</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E125_Predicting_the_Future.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Greenland (E124)</title>
        <itunes:title>Greenland (E124)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/greenland-e124/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/greenland-e124/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 13:37:58 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/8ad87bba-3e7a-388b-a165-58cfaffb7408</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The idea that we would invade Greenland is about the stupidest idea I ever heard. I find it difficult to believe that anyone believed that implying the United States might use military force was anything other than a negotiating tactic. An ill-advised negotiating tactic, but still, nothing more than that. Putting aside the fear and anger generated from different sources there are concerns and questions to be addressed, particularly as Greenland continues to move on its path to independence from Denmark.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Outside References:</p>
<ul>
<li>The United States and Greenland, Part I: Episodes in Nuclear History 1947-1968 <a href='https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2025-06-03/united-states-and-greenland-part-i-episodes-nuclear-history'>https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2025-06-03/united-states-and-greenland-part-i-episodes-nuclear-history</a></li>
<li>Trump is Right About Greenland – Wrong about How to Secure It: <a href='https://www.justsecurity.org/128707/trump-right-greenland-wrong-secure/'>https://www.justsecurity.org/128707/trump-right-greenland-wrong-secure/</a></li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The idea that we would invade Greenland is about the stupidest idea I ever heard. I find it difficult to believe that anyone believed that implying the United States might use military force was anything other than a negotiating tactic. An ill-advised negotiating tactic, but still, nothing more than that. Putting aside the fear and anger generated from different sources there are concerns and questions to be addressed, particularly as Greenland continues to move on its path to independence from Denmark.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Outside References:</p>
<ul>
<li>The United States and Greenland, Part I: Episodes in Nuclear History 1947-1968 <a href='https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2025-06-03/united-states-and-greenland-part-i-episodes-nuclear-history'>https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2025-06-03/united-states-and-greenland-part-i-episodes-nuclear-history</a></li>
<li>Trump is Right About Greenland – Wrong about How to Secure It: <a href='https://www.justsecurity.org/128707/trump-right-greenland-wrong-secure/'>https://www.justsecurity.org/128707/trump-right-greenland-wrong-secure/</a></li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ygp7amf6b58xv6it/E124_Greenland.mp3" length="17933710" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The idea that we would invade Greenland is about the stupidest idea I ever heard. I find it difficult to believe that anyone believed that implying the United States might use military force was anything other than a negotiating tactic. An ill-advised negotiating tactic, but still, nothing more than that. Putting aside the fear and anger generated from different sources there are concerns and questions to be addressed, particularly as Greenland continues to move on its path to independence from Denmark.
 
Outside References:

The United States and Greenland, Part I: Episodes in Nuclear History 1947-1968 https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2025-06-03/united-states-and-greenland-part-i-episodes-nuclear-history
Trump is Right About Greenland – Wrong about How to Secure It: https://www.justsecurity.org/128707/trump-right-greenland-wrong-secure/

 
Music:

Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>560</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>125</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E124_Greenland.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Disobedience to superior orders? (E123)</title>
        <itunes:title>Disobedience to superior orders? (E123)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/disobedience-to-superior-orders-e123/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/disobedience-to-superior-orders-e123/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 19 Dec 2025 20:45:38 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/65adac72-2931-315a-864e-88ce351714c9</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Recently, there has been controversy over public statements from some politicians about the responsibility of members of the armed forces to disobey unlawful orders. In theory, there should be nothing objectionable about that. Members of the armed forces, from the lowest enlisted to the highest general or admiral, receive regular instruction on the laws and customs of war and our responsibilities under the Constitution. In this episode, I describe what that means and where the responsibility to promptly and effectively execute orders ends.</p>
<p>Music Credits:</p>
<ul>
<li>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Hagman, R., Main Theme from “She Wore a Yellow Ribbon,” from The Wild West - The Essential Western Film Music Collection, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently, there has been controversy over public statements from some politicians about the responsibility of members of the armed forces to disobey unlawful orders. In theory, there should be nothing objectionable about that. Members of the armed forces, from the lowest enlisted to the highest general or admiral, receive regular instruction on the laws and customs of war and our responsibilities under the Constitution. In this episode, I describe what that means and where the responsibility to promptly and effectively execute orders ends.</p>
<p>Music Credits:</p>
<ul>
<li>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Hagman, R., <em>Main Theme</em> from “She Wore a Yellow Ribbon,” from The Wild West - The Essential Western Film Music Collection, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ecwqtgrsnfu8xxbg/E123_Superior_Orders.mp3" length="20549299" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Recently, there has been controversy over public statements from some politicians about the responsibility of members of the armed forces to disobey unlawful orders. In theory, there should be nothing objectionable about that. Members of the armed forces, from the lowest enlisted to the highest general or admiral, receive regular instruction on the laws and customs of war and our responsibilities under the Constitution. In this episode, I describe what that means and where the responsibility to promptly and effectively execute orders ends.
Music Credits:

Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)
Hagman, R., Main Theme from “She Wore a Yellow Ribbon,” from The Wild West - The Essential Western Film Music Collection, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>642</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>124</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E123_Superior_orders.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>That Ancient Art of Modern Terrorism Part 6: State Sponsored Terrorism (E122)</title>
        <itunes:title>That Ancient Art of Modern Terrorism Part 6: State Sponsored Terrorism (E122)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/that-ancient-art-of-modern-terrorism-part-6-state-sponsored-terrorism-e122/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/that-ancient-art-of-modern-terrorism-part-6-state-sponsored-terrorism-e122/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 06 Dec 2025 14:45:47 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/508984d0-63ce-3f04-a6d5-c54f101526b3</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>This series on Terrorism is wrapping up with the problem of state sponsored terrorism. This form of international terrorism is most clearly a method of warfare, with the state using terrorist organizations as deniable proxies in armed conflict. International law, however, does not recognize that form of terrorism as war, but as criminal acts subject only criminal jurisprudence. This situation does little to stop this war form or to protect those who should be protected under the laws and customs of war.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p>Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.</p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li>Articles 2 and 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1947</li>
<li>Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1947</li>
<li>Melzer, N. and the International Committee of the red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities (2009)</li>
<li>Carter, C. “Analyzing the Criminal Justice and Military Models of Counterterrorism: Evidence from the United States” (Ph.D. Dissertation) (2017)</li>
</ul>
<p>Music credits:</p>
<ul>
<li>Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive</li>
<li>Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Requiem in D Minor, downloaded from the Internet Archive, <a href='https://archive.org'>https://archive.org</a></li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This series on Terrorism is wrapping up with the problem of state sponsored terrorism. This form of international terrorism is most clearly a method of warfare, with the state using terrorist organizations as deniable proxies in armed conflict. International law, however, does not recognize that form of terrorism as war, but as criminal acts subject only criminal jurisprudence. This situation does little to stop this war form or to protect those who should be protected under the laws and customs of war.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p>Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.</p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li>Articles 2 and 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1947</li>
<li>Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1947</li>
<li>Melzer, N. and the International Committee of the red Cross, <em>Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities</em> (2009)</li>
<li>Carter, C. “Analyzing the Criminal Justice and Military Models of Counterterrorism: Evidence from the United States” (Ph.D. Dissertation) (2017)</li>
</ul>
<p>Music credits:</p>
<ul>
<li>Holst, G. <em>The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, </em>downloaded from Internet Archive</li>
<li>Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, <em>Requiem in D Minor</em>, downloaded from the Internet Archive, <a href='https://archive.org'>https://archive.org</a></li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/k4cqigen5saz6rv9/E122_State_Sponsored_Terrorism.mp3" length="16602928" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[This series on Terrorism is wrapping up with the problem of state sponsored terrorism. This form of international terrorism is most clearly a method of warfare, with the state using terrorist organizations as deniable proxies in armed conflict. International law, however, does not recognize that form of terrorism as war, but as criminal acts subject only criminal jurisprudence. This situation does little to stop this war form or to protect those who should be protected under the laws and customs of war.
 
The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.
Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.
References:

Articles 2 and 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1947
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1947
Melzer, N. and the International Committee of the red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities (2009)
Carter, C. “Analyzing the Criminal Justice and Military Models of Counterterrorism: Evidence from the United States” (Ph.D. Dissertation) (2017)

Music credits:

Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive
Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Requiem in D Minor, downloaded from the Internet Archive, https://archive.org
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>518</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>123</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E122_AAOMT6.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Counter-terrorism In Practice (E121)</title>
        <itunes:title>Counter-terrorism In Practice (E121)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/counter-terrorism-in-practice-e121/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/counter-terrorism-in-practice-e121/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 17 Nov 2025 18:09:51 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/a351344f-1db1-3a2a-bb85-ff6f3043e7dd</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>In the last few episodes, I explained that international terrorism can be considered a war form and how it has been practiced through history. I described that, according to international law, terrorism is a crime and should be addressed as such. I also described how criminal laws are frequently inadequate to deal with terrorism used as a form of warfare. This leads to the question of how states deal with this in practice.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p>Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.</p>
<p>Music credits:</p>
<ul>
<li>Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Requiem in D Minor, downloaded from the Internet Archive, <a href='https://archive.org'>https://archive.org</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Liszt, F., and the USMC Band. Les Preludes, Public Domain</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the last few episodes, I explained that international terrorism can be considered a war form and how it has been practiced through history. I described that, according to international law, terrorism is a crime and should be addressed as such. I also described how criminal laws are frequently inadequate to deal with terrorism used as a form of warfare. This leads to the question of how states deal with this in practice.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p>Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.</p>
<p>Music credits:</p>
<ul>
<li>Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, <em>Requiem in D Minor</em>, downloaded from the Internet Archive, <a href='https://archive.org'>https://archive.org</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Liszt, F., and the USMC Band. <em>Les Preludes</em>, Public Domain</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/c6qcqehne7h8fq2f/E121_Counterterroism_practice.mp3" length="17938726" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[In the last few episodes, I explained that international terrorism can be considered a war form and how it has been practiced through history. I described that, according to international law, terrorism is a crime and should be addressed as such. I also described how criminal laws are frequently inadequate to deal with terrorism used as a form of warfare. This leads to the question of how states deal with this in practice.
 
The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.
Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.
Music credits:

Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Requiem in D Minor, downloaded from the Internet Archive, https://archive.org

Liszt, F., and the USMC Band. Les Preludes, Public Domain]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>560</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>122</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E121_Combat_Terror_Prectice.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Combatting International Terrorism (E120),</title>
        <itunes:title>Combatting International Terrorism (E120),</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/combatting-international-terrorism-the-ancient-art-of-modern-terrorism-part-3-e120/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/combatting-international-terrorism-the-ancient-art-of-modern-terrorism-part-3-e120/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2025 15:21:00 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/a18406f5-6027-3129-a02c-9b03cc2c16c2</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>If terrorism, unlawfully attacking civilian targets to achieve a political outcome, is a modern war form, a different manner of armed conflict. When terrorist attacks are planned, organized, and operate from a foreign country, or otherwise use that country as a safe haven, what are the options of the attacked State in using military force to fight this new form of armed conflict?  This episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare looks at the authority and limitations of the war making powers of a state to do that. In this episode, I do not look at the right or wrong of any particular State or any particular operation. This episode only sets the context for the potential use of military force against international terrorist organizations.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Principal Reference:</p>
<ul>
<li>Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF</li>
</ul>
<p> Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
<li>Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If terrorism, unlawfully attacking civilian targets to achieve a political outcome, is a modern war form, a different manner of armed conflict. When terrorist attacks are planned, organized, and operate from a foreign country, or otherwise use that country as a safe haven, what are the options of the attacked State in using military force to fight this new form of armed conflict?  This episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare looks at the authority and limitations of the war making powers of a state to do that. In this episode, I do not look at the right or wrong of any particular State or any particular operation. This episode only sets the context for the potential use of military force against international terrorist organizations.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Principal Reference:</p>
<ul>
<li>Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, <em>Department of Defense Law of War Manual</em> (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF</li>
</ul>
<p> Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Kiilstofte, P. <em>Mercenaries</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
<li>Liszt, <em>Les Preludes</em>, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/de435a4sicym2xxs/E120_AAOMT4.mp3" length="18267242" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[If terrorism, unlawfully attacking civilian targets to achieve a political outcome, is a modern war form, a different manner of armed conflict. When terrorist attacks are planned, organized, and operate from a foreign country, or otherwise use that country as a safe haven, what are the options of the attacked State in using military force to fight this new form of armed conflict?  This episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare looks at the authority and limitations of the war making powers of a state to do that. In this episode, I do not look at the right or wrong of any particular State or any particular operation. This episode only sets the context for the potential use of military force against international terrorist organizations.
 
The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.
 
Certified 100% natural intelligence. No artificial intelligence was used in making this podcast.
 
Principal Reference:

Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF

 Music:

Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)
Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain

 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>570</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>121</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E120_AAOMT4.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Terrorism and War (E119)</title>
        <itunes:title>Terrorism and War (E119)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/terrorism-and-war-e119/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/terrorism-and-war-e119/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2025 20:25:19 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/629e9201-d827-36a4-8bcc-4946e90db05d</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>I decided to change the trajectory of this series. Rather than continue with the history of terrorism, I am jumping ahead to how terrorism fits within the overarching philosophy of war. The manifestation of terrorism as it has evolved in the past century is not inconsistent with our understanding of war. Understanding that will help us to understand the ways and means to defeat it.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li>UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Introduction to International Terrorism, https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf</li>
<li>Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p> Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
<li>Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I decided to change the trajectory of this series. Rather than continue with the history of terrorism, I am jumping ahead to how terrorism fits within the overarching philosophy of war. The manifestation of terrorism as it has evolved in the past century is not inconsistent with our understanding of war. Understanding that will help us to understand the ways and means to defeat it.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li>UN Office of Drugs and Crime, <em>Introduction to International Terrorism</em>, https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf</li>
<li>Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, <em>Department of Defense Law of War Manual</em> (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p> Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Kiilstofte, P. <em>Mercenaries</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
<li>Liszt, <em>Les Preludes</em>, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/pesav7rkqjr7wdpy/E119_AAOMT3.mp3" length="16507633" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[I decided to change the trajectory of this series. Rather than continue with the history of terrorism, I am jumping ahead to how terrorism fits within the overarching philosophy of war. The manifestation of terrorism as it has evolved in the past century is not inconsistent with our understanding of war. Understanding that will help us to understand the ways and means to defeat it.
 
The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.
 
References:

UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Introduction to International Terrorism, https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf
Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF

 
 Music:

Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)
Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>515</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>120</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E119_AAMT3.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Is Terrorism Ancient or a Modern Development? (E118)</title>
        <itunes:title>Is Terrorism Ancient or a Modern Development? (E118)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/is-terrorism-ancient-or-a-modern-development-e118/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/is-terrorism-ancient-or-a-modern-development-e118/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 27 Sep 2025 17:41:48 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/eaaf43a3-d598-3a8c-8f82-8c6fc4db0e04</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>This continues my description of terrorism and warfare. The previous episode defined terrorism. This episode traces terroristic attacks from the Bible to the First World War and how it differed from modern terrorism. World War One had profound impacts on almost every aspects of human civilization and this included the use of terror to achieve political ends.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li>UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Introduction to International Terrorism, https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf</li>
<li>Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF</li>
</ul>
<p> Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
<li>Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This continues my description of terrorism and warfare. The previous episode defined terrorism. This episode traces terroristic attacks from the Bible to the First World War and how it differed from modern terrorism. World War One had profound impacts on almost every aspects of human civilization and this included the use of terror to achieve political ends.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li>UN Office of Drugs and Crime, <em>Introduction to International Terrorism</em>, https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf</li>
<li>Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, <em>Department of Defense Law of War Manual</em> (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF</li>
</ul>
<p> Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Kiilstofte, P. <em>Mercenaries</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
<li>Liszt, <em>Les Preludes</em>, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/yw5u734mgzygqhmh/E118_AAOMT2.mp3" length="13653808" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[This continues my description of terrorism and warfare. The previous episode defined terrorism. This episode traces terroristic attacks from the Bible to the First World War and how it differed from modern terrorism. World War One had profound impacts on almost every aspects of human civilization and this included the use of terror to achieve political ends.
 
The information in these podcasts is solely my own opinion and do not represent the position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have ever been associated with.
 
References:

UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Introduction to International Terrorism, https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf
Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF

 Music:

Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)
Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain

 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>426</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>119</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E118_AAOMT2.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>The Ancient Art of Modern Terrorism (E117)</title>
        <itunes:title>The Ancient Art of Modern Terrorism (E117)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-ancient-art-of-modern-terrorism-e117/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-ancient-art-of-modern-terrorism-e117/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 22 Sep 2025 17:48:27 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/49587efe-d11a-3c68-bc4a-5d06daeeb37d</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>What is terrorism? Is it something as old as warfare or something that has changed the nature of war? Is fighting terrorism the same as counterinsurgency? Despite more than two decades of the so-called War on Terror, we seem no closer to ending terrorism that we were when the Black September group attacked the Olympic Village in 1972. Before we can propose solutions to a problem, we must start by defining the problem. According to Socrates, the first step in defining a problem is defining terms. Defining terrorism is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li>UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Introduction to International Terrorism, https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<ul>
<li>Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p> Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
<li>Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What is terrorism? Is it something as old as warfare or something that has changed the nature of war? Is fighting terrorism the same as counterinsurgency? Despite more than two decades of the so-called War on Terror, we seem no closer to ending terrorism that we were when the Black September group attacked the Olympic Village in 1972. Before we can propose solutions to a problem, we must start by defining the problem. According to Socrates, the first step in defining a problem is defining terms. Defining terrorism is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li>UN Office of Drugs and Crime, <em>Introduction to International Terrorism</em>, https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<ul>
<li>Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, <em>Department of Defense Law of War Manual</em> (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p> Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Kiilstofte, P. <em>Mercenaries</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
<li>Liszt, <em>Les Preludes</em>, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/6kf78njrumkf7sg2/E117_AAOMT.mp3" length="16990794" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[What is terrorism? Is it something as old as warfare or something that has changed the nature of war? Is fighting terrorism the same as counterinsurgency? Despite more than two decades of the so-called War on Terror, we seem no closer to ending terrorism that we were when the Black September group attacked the Olympic Village in 1972. Before we can propose solutions to a problem, we must start by defining the problem. According to Socrates, the first step in defining a problem is defining terms. Defining terrorism is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
 
References:

UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Introduction to International Terrorism, https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf

 

Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF

 
 Music:

Kiilstofte, P. Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)
Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>530</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>118</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E117_AAOMT.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Can There be Peace in Gaza (E116)</title>
        <itunes:title>Can There be Peace in Gaza (E116)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/can-there-be-peace-in-gaza-e116/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/can-there-be-peace-in-gaza-e116/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2025 21:09:29 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/2379c342-1016-31c0-a8f3-80fc464abbff</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>I am reluctant to post much of anything about the current armed conflict in Gaza. As the saying goes, the first casualty in war is the truth, and the truth of this saying is manifest in Gaza. It is almost impossible to separate information from information operations by either side. The International Committee of the Red Cross cites allegations of grave beaches of the law of war by both sides. In previous episodes I described how war crimes make reaching peace even more difficult than it usually is. Nonetheless, if achieving peace seems insurmountable, a cease fire leading to non-kinetic conflict resolution may be possible if we listen and put pressure on each sides stated war aims.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>These podcasts do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Army War College, or any other organization I am associated with  </p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music</p>
<ul>
<li>Liszt, F. and Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, Totentanz, https://download.stream.publicradio.org/podcast/minnesota/classical/programs/free-downloads/2020/10/27/daily_download_20201027_128.mp3?listeningSessionID=0CD_382_200__6cca22efd3d270af449f392040641d0331631df3</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man, unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Requiem in D Minor, downloaded from the Internet Archive, <a href='https://archive.org'>https://archive.org</a></li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p>Photo: Palestinian News &amp; Information Agency. CC</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am reluctant to post much of anything about the current armed conflict in Gaza. As the saying goes, the first casualty in war is the truth, and the truth of this saying is manifest in Gaza. It is almost impossible to separate information from information operations by either side. The International Committee of the Red Cross cites allegations of grave beaches of the law of war by both sides. In previous episodes I described how war crimes make reaching peace even more difficult than it usually is. Nonetheless, if achieving peace seems insurmountable, a cease fire leading to non-kinetic conflict resolution may be possible if we listen and put pressure on each sides stated war aims.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>These podcasts do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Army War College, or any other organization I am associated with  </p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music</p>
<ul>
<li>Liszt, F. and Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, Totentanz, https://download.stream.publicradio.org/podcast/minnesota/classical/programs/free-downloads/2020/10/27/daily_download_20201027_128.mp3?listeningSessionID=0CD_382_200__6cca22efd3d270af449f392040641d0331631df3</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) <em>Fanfare for the Common Man</em>, unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Requiem in D Minor, downloaded from the Internet Archive, <a href='https://archive.org'>https://archive.org</a></li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p>Photo: Palestinian News &amp; Information Agency. CC</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/9yk7djtr78zi25f5/E116_Peace_in_Gaza.mp3" length="15413416" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[I am reluctant to post much of anything about the current armed conflict in Gaza. As the saying goes, the first casualty in war is the truth, and the truth of this saying is manifest in Gaza. It is almost impossible to separate information from information operations by either side. The International Committee of the Red Cross cites allegations of grave beaches of the law of war by both sides. In previous episodes I described how war crimes make reaching peace even more difficult than it usually is. Nonetheless, if achieving peace seems insurmountable, a cease fire leading to non-kinetic conflict resolution may be possible if we listen and put pressure on each sides stated war aims.
 
These podcasts do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Army War College, or any other organization I am associated with  
 
Music

Liszt, F. and Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, Totentanz, https://download.stream.publicradio.org/podcast/minnesota/classical/programs/free-downloads/2020/10/27/daily_download_20201027_128.mp3?listeningSessionID=0CD_382_200__6cca22efd3d270af449f392040641d0331631df3


Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man, unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Requiem in D Minor, downloaded from the Internet Archive, https://archive.org

 
Photo: Palestinian News &amp; Information Agency. CC]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>481</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>117</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E116_Peace_in_Gaza.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>A Modest Proposal for Peace in Ukraine (E115)</title>
        <itunes:title>A Modest Proposal for Peace in Ukraine (E115)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/a-modest-proposal-for-peace-in-ukraine-e115/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/a-modest-proposal-for-peace-in-ukraine-e115/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2025 13:00:29 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/84462207-481d-3602-a0a7-44d47add74f5</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>It seems that the time has come in Putin’s war on Ukraine that both sides indicate a willingness to negotiate. But negotiate what? This episode moves on from what is necessary for a sustainable peace, what Putin’s real goals are in his war on Ukraine, and propose a possible path forward. I introduced this possible path in In Episode 104. This episode sets that idea in the context of the previous two episodes and the recent political and military developments.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man, unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Requiem in D Minor, downloaded from the Internet Archive, <a href='https://archive.org'>https://archive.org</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Reference Book: Walsh, M. (2025). A rage to conquer: Twelve battles that changed the course of Western history (First edition). St. Martin’s Press.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It seems that the time has come in Putin’s war on Ukraine that both sides indicate a willingness to negotiate. But negotiate what? This episode moves on from what is necessary for a sustainable peace, what Putin’s real goals are in his war on Ukraine, and propose a possible path forward. I introduced this possible path in In Episode 104. This episode sets that idea in the context of the previous two episodes and the recent political and military developments.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) <em>Fanfare for the Common Man</em>, unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Requiem in D Minor, downloaded from the Internet Archive, <a href='https://archive.org'>https://archive.org</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Reference Book: Walsh, M. (2025). <em>A rage to conquer: Twelve battles that changed the course of Western history</em> (First edition). St. Martin’s Press.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/nsmytdea4knubnvj/E115_Modest_proposal_Ukr.mp3" length="14890967" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[It seems that the time has come in Putin’s war on Ukraine that both sides indicate a willingness to negotiate. But negotiate what? This episode moves on from what is necessary for a sustainable peace, what Putin’s real goals are in his war on Ukraine, and propose a possible path forward. I introduced this possible path in In Episode 104. This episode sets that idea in the context of the previous two episodes and the recent political and military developments.
Music:

Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man, unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
Mozart, W.A. and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Requiem in D Minor, downloaded from the Internet Archive, https://archive.org

Reference Book: Walsh, M. (2025). A rage to conquer: Twelve battles that changed the course of Western history (First edition). St. Martin’s Press.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>465</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>116</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E115_Proposal_for_Peace_Ukr.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>What does Putin want? (E114)</title>
        <itunes:title>What does Putin want? (E114)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/what-does-putin-want-e114/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/what-does-putin-want-e114/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 24 Aug 2025 13:17:51 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/d2f07ff1-76da-3542-bd37-43d72e7cc7f0</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Although diplomacy should not end when fighting begins, there are two conditions in war where one or more parties will seek to negotiate peace. One is when victory looks improbable, the other is when it looks certain. Which of these conditions is emerging in Ukraine? More importantly, which of these two conditions does Putin perceive as operative? In either condition, is negotiation leading to a sustainable peace realistic? Answering that question requires understanding what Putin really wants from his war, and what he will accept to get out of it.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference: Samuel Charap, Khrystyna Holynska, Russia’s War Aims in Ukraine, <a href='http://www.rand.org/t/RRA2061-6'>http://www.rand.org/t/RRA2061-6</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Holst, “The Planets: Mars Bringer of War,” downloaded from the Internet Archive <a href='https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles'>https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles</a></p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Although diplomacy should not end when fighting begins, there are two conditions in war where one or more parties will seek to negotiate peace. One is when victory looks improbable, the other is when it looks certain. Which of these conditions is emerging in Ukraine? More importantly, which of these two conditions does Putin perceive as operative? In either condition, is negotiation leading to a sustainable peace realistic? Answering that question requires understanding what Putin really wants from his war, and what he will accept to get out of it.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference: Samuel Charap, Khrystyna Holynska, <em>Russia’s War Aims in </em><em>Ukraine,</em> <a href='http://www.rand.org/t/RRA2061-6'>http://www.rand.org/t/RRA2061-6</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Holst, “The Planets: Mars Bringer of War,” downloaded from the Internet Archive <a href='https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles'>https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/efznsi3ugjtptgfa/E114_What_Does_Putin_Want.mp3" length="16269397" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Although diplomacy should not end when fighting begins, there are two conditions in war where one or more parties will seek to negotiate peace. One is when victory looks improbable, the other is when it looks certain. Which of these conditions is emerging in Ukraine? More importantly, which of these two conditions does Putin perceive as operative? In either condition, is negotiation leading to a sustainable peace realistic? Answering that question requires understanding what Putin really wants from his war, and what he will accept to get out of it.
 
Reference: Samuel Charap, Khrystyna Holynska, Russia’s War Aims in Ukraine, http://www.rand.org/t/RRA2061-6
 
Music: Holst, “The Planets: Mars Bringer of War,” downloaded from the Internet Archive https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>508</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>115</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E114_What_Does_Putin_Want.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Pope Leo and Ending War</title>
        <itunes:title>Pope Leo and Ending War</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/pope-leo-and-ending-war/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/pope-leo-and-ending-war/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2025 20:20:09 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/07ad6cd2-e67f-3126-baaa-fb0f60299d01</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Recently, Pope Leo XIV used the anniversary of the atomic bombing that ended WW2 to call for the rejection of war as a means to resolve conflicts. In ending war, or keeping war from breaking out, we must remember that war is a tool for resolving pre-existing conflicts. Ending war requires identifying and resolving those conflicts so that they do not become the seeds for future wars.</p>
<p>Music: Liszt, Les Preludes, US Marine Corp Band (Public Domain)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently, Pope Leo XIV used the anniversary of the atomic bombing that ended WW2 to call for the rejection of war as a means to resolve conflicts. In ending war, or keeping war from breaking out, we must remember that war is a tool for resolving pre-existing conflicts. Ending war requires identifying and resolving those conflicts so that they do not become the seeds for future wars.</p>
<p>Music: Liszt, <em>Les Preludes</em>, US Marine Corp Band (Public Domain)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/2beypcim4s7qwqd5/E113_Pope_Leo_and_Ending_War.mp3" length="15984348" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Recently, Pope Leo XIV used the anniversary of the atomic bombing that ended WW2 to call for the rejection of war as a means to resolve conflicts. In ending war, or keeping war from breaking out, we must remember that war is a tool for resolving pre-existing conflicts. Ending war requires identifying and resolving those conflicts so that they do not become the seeds for future wars.
Music: Liszt, Les Preludes, US Marine Corp Band (Public Domain)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>499</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>114</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E113_Pope_Leo.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Putin's Sledgehammer (E112)</title>
        <itunes:title>Putin's Sledgehammer (E112)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/putins-sledgehammer-e112/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/putins-sledgehammer-e112/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2025 20:43:34 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/829b8a49-72a1-35a7-aabd-fa8c6ef3d79c</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Putin’s Sledgehammer: The Wagner Group and Russia’s Collapse into Mercenary Chaos, by Professor Candace Rondeaux is a must read for anyone interested learning how Russia came to rely on mercenary-like organizations in its global strategy and how it has used them. This book is not just about Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner, not even about Russia's other quasi-mercenary actors. It is an excellent summary of how Russia has come to be what it is since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The opening section alone is worth the cover price of the book. This is an extensive who is who of Russian oligarchs, generals, and mercenaries. Putin’s Sledgehammer is not what one might consider a dry academic thesis. Professor Rondeaux tells this story better than any spy-thriller, better because it is true. Like most true stories, it seems more fantastical than any political fantasy. It tells why Russia intervened in Syria, Africa, Ukraine, and elsewhere, who are the players in developing that strategy, and how they implemented it. In shining the spotlight on Russia, the United States and the West in general is not let off the hook. The West did not simply stand aside while Russia pursued a global strategy through mercenary means. Western political leaders, however, made the mistake of thinking that Russia would turn away from its disruptive approach and accept the Western rules-based order if only given the proper incentives and sanctions. The West failed and continues to fail to understand Russia just as Russian leaders continue to misinterpret and misapply ways and means employed by the U.S. and its allies. In summary, Putin’s Sledgehammer is an outstanding single source for anyone interested in Russian imperial aspirations and the unconventional means it uses in pursuit of those goals.</p>
<p>References:</p>
<p>Rondeaux, C. (2025). Putin’s sledgehammer: The Wagner Group and Russia’s collapse into mercenary chaos (First edition). PublicAffairs.</p>
<p>The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare:</p>
<ul>
<li>Episode 2: “What Are Russian Private Military Companies?” (2019)</li>
<li>Episode 4: “The Difference Between Russian Quasi-Mercenary Organizations and Western PMSCs” (2019)</li>
<li>Episode 6: “Meeting the Challenge” (2019)</li>
<li>Episodes 35-39: On Mercenary Warfare (2021)</li>
<li>Episode 54: “Russian Mercenaries” (2022)</li>
<li>Episode 63: “Why Wagner” (2023) (Which contains one guess that may have been true at the time, but was ultimately unreliable.)</li>
<li>Episode 75: “Wagner Decapitated?” (2023)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Putin’s Sledgehammer: The Wagner Group and Russia’s Collapse into Mercenary Chaos</em>, by Professor Candace Rondeaux is a must read for anyone interested learning how Russia came to rely on mercenary-like organizations in its global strategy and how it has used them. This book is not just about Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner, not even about Russia's other quasi-mercenary actors. It is an excellent summary of how Russia has come to be what it is since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The opening section alone is worth the cover price of the book. This is an extensive who is who of Russian oligarchs, generals, and mercenaries. <em>Putin’s Sledgehammer</em> is not what one might consider a dry academic thesis. Professor Rondeaux tells this story better than any spy-thriller, better because it is true. Like most true stories, it seems more fantastical than any political fantasy. It tells why Russia intervened in Syria, Africa, Ukraine, and elsewhere, who are the players in developing that strategy, and how they implemented it. In shining the spotlight on Russia, the United States and the West in general is not let off the hook. The West did not simply stand aside while Russia pursued a global strategy through mercenary means. Western political leaders, however, made the mistake of thinking that Russia would turn away from its disruptive approach and accept the Western rules-based order if only given the proper incentives and sanctions. The West failed and continues to fail to understand Russia just as Russian leaders continue to misinterpret and misapply ways and means employed by the U.S. and its allies. In summary, <em>Putin’s Sledgehammer</em> is an outstanding single source for anyone interested in Russian imperial aspirations and the unconventional means it uses in pursuit of those goals.</p>
<p>References:</p>
<p>Rondeaux, C. (2025). <em>Putin’s sledgehammer: The Wagner Group and Russia’s collapse into mercenary chaos</em> (First edition). PublicAffairs.</p>
<p>The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare:</p>
<ul>
<li>Episode 2: “What Are Russian Private Military Companies?” (2019)</li>
<li>Episode 4: “The Difference Between Russian Quasi-Mercenary Organizations and Western PMSCs” (2019)</li>
<li>Episode 6: “Meeting the Challenge” (2019)</li>
<li>Episodes 35-39: On Mercenary Warfare (2021)</li>
<li>Episode 54: “Russian Mercenaries” (2022)</li>
<li>Episode 63: “Why Wagner” (2023) (Which contains one guess that may have been true at the time, but was ultimately unreliable.)</li>
<li>Episode 75: “Wagner Decapitated?” (2023)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/i4wrasraedxqquma/E112_Putins_Sledgehammer.mp3" length="11989494" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Putin’s Sledgehammer: The Wagner Group and Russia’s Collapse into Mercenary Chaos, by Professor Candace Rondeaux is a must read for anyone interested learning how Russia came to rely on mercenary-like organizations in its global strategy and how it has used them. This book is not just about Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner, not even about Russia's other quasi-mercenary actors. It is an excellent summary of how Russia has come to be what it is since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The opening section alone is worth the cover price of the book. This is an extensive who is who of Russian oligarchs, generals, and mercenaries. Putin’s Sledgehammer is not what one might consider a dry academic thesis. Professor Rondeaux tells this story better than any spy-thriller, better because it is true. Like most true stories, it seems more fantastical than any political fantasy. It tells why Russia intervened in Syria, Africa, Ukraine, and elsewhere, who are the players in developing that strategy, and how they implemented it. In shining the spotlight on Russia, the United States and the West in general is not let off the hook. The West did not simply stand aside while Russia pursued a global strategy through mercenary means. Western political leaders, however, made the mistake of thinking that Russia would turn away from its disruptive approach and accept the Western rules-based order if only given the proper incentives and sanctions. The West failed and continues to fail to understand Russia just as Russian leaders continue to misinterpret and misapply ways and means employed by the U.S. and its allies. In summary, Putin’s Sledgehammer is an outstanding single source for anyone interested in Russian imperial aspirations and the unconventional means it uses in pursuit of those goals.
References:
Rondeaux, C. (2025). Putin’s sledgehammer: The Wagner Group and Russia’s collapse into mercenary chaos (First edition). PublicAffairs.
The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare:

Episode 2: “What Are Russian Private Military Companies?” (2019)
Episode 4: “The Difference Between Russian Quasi-Mercenary Organizations and Western PMSCs” (2019)
Episode 6: “Meeting the Challenge” (2019)
Episodes 35-39: On Mercenary Warfare (2021)
Episode 54: “Russian Mercenaries” (2022)
Episode 63: “Why Wagner” (2023) (Which contains one guess that may have been true at the time, but was ultimately unreliable.)
Episode 75: “Wagner Decapitated?” (2023)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>374</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>113</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E112_PUTINS_SLEDGEHAMMER.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Nations, States, and Countries (E111)</title>
        <itunes:title>Nations, States, and Countries (E111)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/nations-states-and-countries-e111/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/nations-states-and-countries-e111/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Wed, 21 May 2025 15:48:51 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/ba7f9c5e-61f4-3f21-9d4a-b2f5604f2077</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>I am picking up my podcast series where I left off, addressing the challenges of peace. War is an act of violence among nations or states, affecting entire countries. These terms, nations, states, and countries are not synonymous. Confusing these terms leads to misunderstanding, misinterpretation, or can be used to create misperceptions. In this episode I try to clarify the difference among nations, states, and countries. Understanding the differences and relationships among these terms is important to analyzing the actual and claimed objectives of warring parties and to identify emotion driven propaganda that obstructs the path to peace.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts represents only my own thoughts, and not those of any organization I am, or have ever been associated with. (Some of what I say may be completely opposed to official position of some of the organizations.)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am picking up my podcast series where I left off, addressing the challenges of peace. War is an act of violence among nations or states, affecting entire countries. These terms, nations, states, and countries are not synonymous. Confusing these terms leads to misunderstanding, misinterpretation, or can be used to create misperceptions. In this episode I try to clarify the difference among nations, states, and countries. Understanding the differences and relationships among these terms is important to analyzing the actual and claimed objectives of warring parties and to identify emotion driven propaganda that obstructs the path to peace.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The information in these podcasts represents only my own thoughts, and not those of any organization I am, or have ever been associated with. (Some of what I say may be completely opposed to official position of some of the organizations.)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) <em>Fanfare for the Common Man</em>. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/e7q4tz229dpjbcrt/E111_NationStates.mp3" length="16602928" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[I am picking up my podcast series where I left off, addressing the challenges of peace. War is an act of violence among nations or states, affecting entire countries. These terms, nations, states, and countries are not synonymous. Confusing these terms leads to misunderstanding, misinterpretation, or can be used to create misperceptions. In this episode I try to clarify the difference among nations, states, and countries. Understanding the differences and relationships among these terms is important to analyzing the actual and claimed objectives of warring parties and to identify emotion driven propaganda that obstructs the path to peace.
 
The information in these podcasts represents only my own thoughts, and not those of any organization I am, or have ever been associated with. (Some of what I say may be completely opposed to official position of some of the organizations.)
 
Music:

Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain
Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>518</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>112</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E111_Nationstates.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Moving Forward with the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare (E110)</title>
        <itunes:title>Moving Forward with the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare (E110)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/moving-forward-with-the-ancient-art-of-modern-warfare-e110/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/moving-forward-with-the-ancient-art-of-modern-warfare-e110/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 04 Mar 2025 11:07:31 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/eddca7e9-e66e-3b9c-b4cc-53338f6bd843</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Now that I have laid the groundwork for what I think everyone needs to know about war, I can digress and address current topics of interest, placing them in the framework of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. In this podcast I build on the topic of peace in the last episode to address current developments regarding Ukraine. Russia is the aggressor. Putin cannot be rewarded for his violations of international law, the laws and customs of war, both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and threatening the peace and security of all of Europe. However, without a Western commitment to apply overwhelming force against Russian aggression, a cease fire is in order. The death and destruction of war without any serious prospects for victory violates Just War principles of proportionality and reasonable probability of success. Even Clausewitz would agree.</p>
<p>As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with.</p>
<p>Music: Wagner, R. and US Marine Corps Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March and Finale (Götterdammerung) from “Music of Richard Wagner” (1981) (Public Domain)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Now that I have laid the groundwork for what I think everyone needs to know about war, I can digress and address current topics of interest, placing them in the framework of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. In this podcast I build on the topic of peace in the last episode to address current developments regarding Ukraine. Russia is the aggressor. Putin cannot be rewarded for his violations of international law, the laws and customs of war, both <em>jus ad bellum</em> and <em>jus in bello</em>, and threatening the peace and security of all of Europe. However, without a Western commitment to apply overwhelming force against Russian aggression, a cease fire is in order. The death and destruction of war without any serious prospects for victory violates Just War principles of proportionality and reasonable probability of success. Even Clausewitz would agree.</p>
<p>As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with.</p>
<p>Music: Wagner, R. and US Marine Corps Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral March and Finale (Götterdammerung)</em> from “Music of Richard Wagner” (1981) (Public Domain)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/m7vzqtfwhercc9ys/E110_Moving_Forward.mp3" length="17268319" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Now that I have laid the groundwork for what I think everyone needs to know about war, I can digress and address current topics of interest, placing them in the framework of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. In this podcast I build on the topic of peace in the last episode to address current developments regarding Ukraine. Russia is the aggressor. Putin cannot be rewarded for his violations of international law, the laws and customs of war, both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and threatening the peace and security of all of Europe. However, without a Western commitment to apply overwhelming force against Russian aggression, a cease fire is in order. The death and destruction of war without any serious prospects for victory violates Just War principles of proportionality and reasonable probability of success. Even Clausewitz would agree.
As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with.
Music: Wagner, R. and US Marine Corps Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March and Finale (Götterdammerung) from “Music of Richard Wagner” (1981) (Public Domain)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>539</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>111</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E110_Moving_Forward.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E109: Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace</title>
        <itunes:title>E109: Peace, Peace, When There Is No Peace</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e109-peace-peace-when-there-is-no-peace/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e109-peace-peace-when-there-is-no-peace/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 04 Feb 2025 13:15:44 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/16b4a046-5262-3a1b-b318-29740c9954bf</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>In my closing podcast summarizing the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare I review key points from Episodes 91-96 about peace, with an application to current events. When we are trying to figure out conflict termination the take-away should be that peace after war depends on:</p>
<ol>
<li> Jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The material evils of war are only justified to correct an injustice so great that the continued harm of that injustice is worse than the harm caused by that war. The cure cannot be worse than the disease. Jus in bello limits those harms and makes the restoration of peace easier.</li>
<li> Being feared but not hated. This goes with Jus in Bello. Deliberate actions that cause unnecessary death and destruction, particularly to the civilian population and cultural/religious works, can inflame passion and hatred among the civilian population. The result can both extend the conflict and instill long-lasting resentments which plant the seeds of future war.</li>
<li> Jus post bellum: Establishing or re-establishing justice. Victory is not peace. It does not correct the injustices that justified the war. Victory, or the point where both sides are so exhausted that they accept a truce, is merely a necessary pre-condition for building a peace that addresses the root causes of the injustices that led to armed conflict.</li>
</ol>
<p>Sadly, these are largely ideals, rarely practiced throughout history. They are derived from the numerous examples in the history of warfare which disregarded these concepts and the far fewer examples in which they were practiced, leading to a more sustainable peace.</p>
<p>Although this is the last episode covering the fundamentals that I think every citizen should know about war, the podcast will continue, but more on that next week.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Copeland, A., and the US Marine Corps Band, Fanfare for the Common Man (2000), Library of Congress recording</p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In my closing podcast summarizing the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare I review key points from Episodes 91-96 about peace, with an application to current events. When we are trying to figure out conflict termination the take-away should be that peace after war depends on:</p>
<ol>
<li><em> </em><em>Jus ad bellum</em> and <em>jus in bello</em>. The material evils of war are only justified to correct an injustice so great that the continued harm of that injustice is worse than the harm caused by that war. The cure cannot be worse than the disease. <em>Jus in bello</em> limits those harms and makes the restoration of peace easier.</li>
<li><em> </em>Being feared but not hated. This goes with <em>Jus in Bello</em>. Deliberate actions that cause unnecessary death and destruction, particularly to the civilian population and cultural/religious works, can inflame passion and hatred among the civilian population. The result can both extend the conflict and instill long-lasting resentments which plant the seeds of future war.</li>
<li><em> </em><em>Jus post bellum</em>: Establishing or re-establishing justice. Victory is not peace. It does not correct the injustices that justified the war. Victory, or the point where both sides are so exhausted that they accept a truce, is merely a necessary pre-condition for building a peace that addresses the root causes of the injustices that led to armed conflict.</li>
</ol>
<p>Sadly, these are largely ideals, rarely practiced throughout history. They are derived from the numerous examples in the history of warfare which disregarded these concepts and the far fewer examples in which they were practiced, leading to a more sustainable peace.</p>
<p>Although this is the last episode covering the fundamentals that I think every citizen should know about war, the podcast will continue, but more on that next week.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Copeland, A., and the US Marine Corps Band, <em>Fanfare for the Common Man</em> (2000), Library of Congress recording</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/cixr558jvvv64yyk/E109_Peace_Summary.mp3" length="15889054" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[In my closing podcast summarizing the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare I review key points from Episodes 91-96 about peace, with an application to current events. When we are trying to figure out conflict termination the take-away should be that peace after war depends on:

 Jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The material evils of war are only justified to correct an injustice so great that the continued harm of that injustice is worse than the harm caused by that war. The cure cannot be worse than the disease. Jus in bello limits those harms and makes the restoration of peace easier.
 Being feared but not hated. This goes with Jus in Bello. Deliberate actions that cause unnecessary death and destruction, particularly to the civilian population and cultural/religious works, can inflame passion and hatred among the civilian population. The result can both extend the conflict and instill long-lasting resentments which plant the seeds of future war.
 Jus post bellum: Establishing or re-establishing justice. Victory is not peace. It does not correct the injustices that justified the war. Victory, or the point where both sides are so exhausted that they accept a truce, is merely a necessary pre-condition for building a peace that addresses the root causes of the injustices that led to armed conflict.

Sadly, these are largely ideals, rarely practiced throughout history. They are derived from the numerous examples in the history of warfare which disregarded these concepts and the far fewer examples in which they were practiced, leading to a more sustainable peace.
Although this is the last episode covering the fundamentals that I think every citizen should know about war, the podcast will continue, but more on that next week.
 
Music: Copeland, A., and the US Marine Corps Band, Fanfare for the Common Man (2000), Library of Congress recording
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>496</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>110</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E109_Peace_There_is_no_peace.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>War is a Political Instrument</title>
        <itunes:title>War is a Political Instrument</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/war-is-a-political-instrument/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/war-is-a-political-instrument/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jan 2025 16:26:06 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e1b3d1e7-8cf9-3455-921c-fe3b7083a44c</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>After taking a Christmas break, I am picking up on my summaries of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. In the previous episode, I described the nature of war as violence intended to compel an opponent to submit to your will. Although this idea is described by Carl von Clausewitz in his magnum opus, On War, the Prussian philosopher of war is best known for the aphorism that war is a continuation of politics by other means. It is a catchy phrase, but that translation leaves a lot to be desired and misses key points Clausewitz wanted to make. As I see it, the key take-aways from this idea are:</p>
<p>War must be viewed as an instrument of national policy – one among many. War is not the policy; war is inserted to the ongoing political engagement to achieve the policy objective. </p>
<ol>
<li>Therefore, it is important to know what that policy is – the objective the policy intends to achieve. That is, to understand what a nation intends to achieve by war, before embarking upon it.</li>
<li>It follows then, that the use of force in war must be consistent with the aims of that policy.</li>
<li>Not all wars have the policy objective of overthrowing the enemy.</li>
<li>A suspension of active warfare does not necessarily mean abandoning the strategic policy objective.</li>
<li>If you want to end a war, achieve or change the policy objective.</li>
</ol>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference: v. Clausewitz, C., On War, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret Ed. And Tansl.) © 1976 Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, <a href='https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709'>https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709</a></p>
<p>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain(</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After taking a Christmas break, I am picking up on my summaries of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. In the previous episode, I described the nature of war as violence intended to compel an opponent to submit to your will. Although this idea is described by Carl von Clausewitz in his magnum opus, <em>On War</em>, the Prussian philosopher of war is best known for the aphorism that war is a continuation of politics by other means. It is a catchy phrase, but that translation leaves a lot to be desired and misses key points Clausewitz wanted to make. As I see it, the key take-aways from this idea are:</p>
<p>War must be viewed as an instrument of national policy – one among many. War is not the policy; war is inserted to the ongoing political engagement to achieve the policy objective. </p>
<ol>
<li>Therefore, it is important to know what that policy is – the objective the policy intends to achieve. That is, to understand what a nation intends to achieve by war, before embarking upon it.</li>
<li>It follows then, that the use of force in war must be consistent with the aims of that policy.</li>
<li>Not all wars have the policy objective of overthrowing the enemy.</li>
<li>A suspension of active warfare does not necessarily mean abandoning the strategic policy objective.</li>
<li>If you want to end a war, achieve or change the policy objective.</li>
</ol>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference: v. Clausewitz, C., <em>On War</em>, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret Ed. And Tansl.) © 1976 Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, <a href='https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709'>https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709</a></p>
<p>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain(</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/7ai3vmreb6dit97c/E108_War_as_Policy.mp3" length="16031996" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[After taking a Christmas break, I am picking up on my summaries of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. In the previous episode, I described the nature of war as violence intended to compel an opponent to submit to your will. Although this idea is described by Carl von Clausewitz in his magnum opus, On War, the Prussian philosopher of war is best known for the aphorism that war is a continuation of politics by other means. It is a catchy phrase, but that translation leaves a lot to be desired and misses key points Clausewitz wanted to make. As I see it, the key take-aways from this idea are:
War must be viewed as an instrument of national policy – one among many. War is not the policy; war is inserted to the ongoing political engagement to achieve the policy objective. 

Therefore, it is important to know what that policy is – the objective the policy intends to achieve. That is, to understand what a nation intends to achieve by war, before embarking upon it.
It follows then, that the use of force in war must be consistent with the aims of that policy.
Not all wars have the policy objective of overthrowing the enemy.
A suspension of active warfare does not necessarily mean abandoning the strategic policy objective.
If you want to end a war, achieve or change the policy objective.

 
Reference: v. Clausewitz, C., On War, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret Ed. And Tansl.) © 1976 Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA
Music:
Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain(]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>500</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>109</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E108_War_is_Political.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E107: The Unchanging Nature of War</title>
        <itunes:title>E107: The Unchanging Nature of War</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e107-the-unchanging-nature-of-war/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e107-the-unchanging-nature-of-war/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 13 Dec 2024 21:56:33 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/509045a0-8838-30bf-8c57-a50dc00d428d</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>In this second episode of my summary series, I address the Nature of War. That nature is violence directed at an opponent to coerce him to submit to your will. This violence has always been the nature of war and it will always be so. Further, this violence must be so painful to your opponent that he will prefer submitting to your will rather than continuing to resist. How you apply that violence and where the pain must be applied changes with time, technology, and culture. Further, the tools to apply this pain are not just kinetic, or direct military action. Economic pain can be just as important as military force. So too is information directed towards increasing fear of pain in the opponents’ population, its leaders, and your opponents’ friends. What makes war different from other forms of violence is its political nature. This violence is directed towards achieving a political end state. Without directing military force to a clearly defined political objective military success is still possible but will, more than likely, end in strategic failure.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>For more information refer to Episode 7 of this series, “What is War;” Episode 8: “The Natural Laws of War;” Episode 42: “All Successful Wars Are Alike;” and Episode 43: “Ways to Lose a War.”</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference:</p>
<ol>
<li>Clausewitz, C., On War, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret Ed. And Tansl.) © 1976 Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA</li>
</ol>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, <a href='https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709'>https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709</a></li>
<li>Wagner, R. and USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March, Public Domain</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this second episode of my summary series, I address the Nature of War. That nature is violence directed at an opponent to coerce him to submit to your will. This violence has always been the nature of war and it will always be so. Further, this violence must be so painful to your opponent that he will prefer submitting to your will rather than continuing to resist. How you apply that violence and where the pain must be applied changes with time, technology, and culture. Further, the tools to apply this pain are not just kinetic, or direct military action. Economic pain can be just as important as military force. So too is information directed towards increasing fear of pain in the opponents’ population, its leaders, and your opponents’ friends. What makes war different from other forms of violence is its political nature. This violence is directed towards achieving a political end state. Without directing military force to a clearly defined political objective military success is still possible but will, more than likely, end in strategic failure.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>For more information refer to Episode 7 of this series, “What is War;” Episode 8: “The Natural Laws of War;” Episode 42: “All Successful Wars Are Alike;” and Episode 43: “Ways to Lose a War.”</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference:</p>
<ol>
<li>Clausewitz, C., <em>On War</em>, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret Ed. And Tansl.) © 1976 Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA</li>
</ol>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, <a href='https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709'>https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709</a></li>
<li>Wagner, R. and USMC Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral March</em>, Public Domain</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/7hntkqy9vpnjjyy5/E107_The_Nature_of_War.mp3" length="17268319" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[In this second episode of my summary series, I address the Nature of War. That nature is violence directed at an opponent to coerce him to submit to your will. This violence has always been the nature of war and it will always be so. Further, this violence must be so painful to your opponent that he will prefer submitting to your will rather than continuing to resist. How you apply that violence and where the pain must be applied changes with time, technology, and culture. Further, the tools to apply this pain are not just kinetic, or direct military action. Economic pain can be just as important as military force. So too is information directed towards increasing fear of pain in the opponents’ population, its leaders, and your opponents’ friends. What makes war different from other forms of violence is its political nature. This violence is directed towards achieving a political end state. Without directing military force to a clearly defined political objective military success is still possible but will, more than likely, end in strategic failure.
 
For more information refer to Episode 7 of this series, “What is War;” Episode 8: “The Natural Laws of War;” Episode 42: “All Successful Wars Are Alike;” and Episode 43: “Ways to Lose a War.”
 
Reference:

Clausewitz, C., On War, (Michael Howard and Peter Paret Ed. And Tansl.) © 1976 Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA

 
Music:

Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709
Wagner, R. and USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March, Public Domain

 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>539</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>108</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E107_The_Nature_of_War.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E106: Summarizing the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare, Part 1</title>
        <itunes:title>E106: Summarizing the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare, Part 1</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e106-summarizing-the-ancient-art-of-modern-warfare-part-1/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e106-summarizing-the-ancient-art-of-modern-warfare-part-1/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 07 Dec 2024 14:32:00 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/ee89a9af-3adf-3f78-b5d6-2a270c9e92a9</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>For a little more than five years and 105 episodes, I have been podcasting on what I believe everyone can and should know about war and sometimes more specifically the characteristics of the persistent conflict we see in the world around us. Almost every week, something develops that want to explain by placing it within the context of the enduring nature of war – and the pursuit of peace. That said, I think that I have just about said everything that needs to be said explaining what war is, how it is unchanging in nature, and how even the changing characteristics of war demonstrate war’s unchanging nature. In trying to respond to emerging events, this description was not laid out in any sort of logical framework. So, in the next few episodes I will try to summarize the key points, or takeaways, of the past hundred plus episodes, in a way that does provide that logical framework.  </p>
<p>The opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kilstoffe, Jens, The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For a little more than five years and 105 episodes, I have been podcasting on what I believe everyone can and should know about war and sometimes more specifically the characteristics of the persistent conflict we see in the world around us. Almost every week, something develops that want to explain by placing it within the context of the enduring nature of war – and the pursuit of peace. That said, I think that I have just about said everything that needs to be said explaining what war is, how it is unchanging in nature, and how even the changing characteristics of war demonstrate war’s unchanging nature. In trying to respond to emerging events, this description was not laid out in any sort of logical framework. So, in the next few episodes I will try to summarize the key points, or takeaways, of the past hundred plus episodes, in a way that does provide that logical framework.  </p>
<p>The opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) <em>Fanfare for the Common Man</em>. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>The Army Strings, <em>GarryOwen</em> (Traditional) (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kilstoffe, Jens, <em>The Cavalry</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/29ey9tssx5xg4f7u/E106_Summary_part1.mp3" length="15318957" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[For a little more than five years and 105 episodes, I have been podcasting on what I believe everyone can and should know about war and sometimes more specifically the characteristics of the persistent conflict we see in the world around us. Almost every week, something develops that want to explain by placing it within the context of the enduring nature of war – and the pursuit of peace. That said, I think that I have just about said everything that needs to be said explaining what war is, how it is unchanging in nature, and how even the changing characteristics of war demonstrate war’s unchanging nature. In trying to respond to emerging events, this description was not laid out in any sort of logical framework. So, in the next few episodes I will try to summarize the key points, or takeaways, of the past hundred plus episodes, in a way that does provide that logical framework.  
The opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with.
Music:

Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)
Kilstoffe, Jens, The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>478</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>107</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E106_AAOMWSumP1.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E104 Plan B: Rejecting Peace</title>
        <itunes:title>E104 Plan B: Rejecting Peace</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e104-plan-b-rejecting-peace/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e104-plan-b-rejecting-peace/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Wed, 20 Nov 2024 15:34:24 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/9cac9c8c-7064-3e27-a185-97dab5fb7bc7</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>In a recent episode of my podcast series of “The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare” (E104) I described possibilities for an end to the fighting in Ukraine. Of course, any end to any armed conflict requires the agreement of both (or all) parties to the conflict. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no different. It is entirely possible, perhaps likely, that one party does not want an end to the fighting. The other party, on the other hand, is not willing to accept peace, or even an armistice that rewards an invasion of their nation. I do not have any answers. This short episode is an addendum to Episode 104 in which I bring up some issues I think we should consider before any armistice or peace proposal is rejected.</p>
<p>As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Wagner, R. and US Marine Corps Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March and Finale (Götterdammerung) from “Music of Richard Wagner” (1981) (Public Domain)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In a recent episode of my podcast series of “The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare” (E104) I described possibilities for an end to the fighting in Ukraine. Of course, any end to any armed conflict requires the agreement of both (or all) parties to the conflict. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no different. It is entirely possible, perhaps likely, that one party does not want an end to the fighting. The other party, on the other hand, is not willing to accept peace, or even an armistice that rewards an invasion of their nation. I do not have any answers. This short episode is an addendum to Episode 104 in which I bring up some issues I think we should consider before any armistice or peace proposal is rejected.</p>
<p>As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Wagner, R. and US Marine Corps Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral March and Finale (Götterdammerung)</em> from “Music of Richard Wagner” (1981) (Public Domain)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/nmvawc3u4w8uc6em/E104B.mp3" length="9944838" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[In a recent episode of my podcast series of “The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare” (E104) I described possibilities for an end to the fighting in Ukraine. Of course, any end to any armed conflict requires the agreement of both (or all) parties to the conflict. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no different. It is entirely possible, perhaps likely, that one party does not want an end to the fighting. The other party, on the other hand, is not willing to accept peace, or even an armistice that rewards an invasion of their nation. I do not have any answers. This short episode is an addendum to Episode 104 in which I bring up some issues I think we should consider before any armistice or peace proposal is rejected.
As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with.
 
Music: Wagner, R. and US Marine Corps Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March and Finale (Götterdammerung) from “Music of Richard Wagner” (1981) (Public Domain)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>310</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>106</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E104B.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E105 Contractors on the Battlefield</title>
        <itunes:title>E105 Contractors on the Battlefield</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e105-contractors-on-the-battlefield/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e105-contractors-on-the-battlefield/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 17 Nov 2024 18:15:08 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/567e4f94-0db8-3870-86f4-7d682135f69e</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Last week, I attended the annual “Summit” meeting of the International Stability Operations Association, or #ISOA. This association includes 200 private corporations that support U.S. and friendly government engagement across the spectrum of stability, conflict, and post conflict operations. Presentations included speakers from the US Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Commerce, and USAID. Other speakers included representatives of the Ukrainian government, experts in cyber technology and artificial intelligence, and speakers representing companies currently providing private sector support in hostile environments, such as #Ukraine. The subject material was fascinating for what was said, and sometimes what was not said. A continuous stream of thought was why we were there. Why was it that these government agencies use private sector support in armed conflict, post-conflict, and disaster relief. That is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense, ISOA, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.</p>
<p>Reference: Kramer, F., The sixth domain: The role of the private sector in warfare, Atlantic Council (October 2024); <a href='https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-sixth-domain-the-role-of-the-private-sector-in-warfare/'>https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-sixth-domain-the-role-of-the-private-sector-in-warfare/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Holst, G, The Planets, Mars Bringer of War Internet Archives, <a href='https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709'>https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709</a></li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last week, I attended the annual “Summit” meeting of the International Stability Operations Association, or #ISOA. This association includes 200 private corporations that support U.S. and friendly government engagement across the spectrum of stability, conflict, and post conflict operations. Presentations included speakers from the US Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Commerce, and USAID. Other speakers included representatives of the Ukrainian government, experts in cyber technology and artificial intelligence, and speakers representing companies currently providing private sector support in hostile environments, such as #Ukraine. The subject material was fascinating for what was said, and sometimes what was not said. A continuous stream of thought was why we were there. Why was it that these government agencies use private sector support in armed conflict, post-conflict, and disaster relief. That is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense, ISOA, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.</p>
<p>Reference: Kramer, F., <em>The sixth domain: The role of the private sector in warfare</em>, Atlantic Council (October 2024); <a href='https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-sixth-domain-the-role-of-the-private-sector-in-warfare/'>https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-sixth-domain-the-role-of-the-private-sector-in-warfare/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul>
<li>Holst, G, <em>The Planets, Mars Bringer of War</em> Internet Archives, <a href='https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709'>https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709</a></li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry,</em> Machinimasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/9h5fyutydumwy8zs/E105_Contractors_on_the_Battlefield.mp3" length="16758409" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Last week, I attended the annual “Summit” meeting of the International Stability Operations Association, or #ISOA. This association includes 200 private corporations that support U.S. and friendly government engagement across the spectrum of stability, conflict, and post conflict operations. Presentations included speakers from the US Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Commerce, and USAID. Other speakers included representatives of the Ukrainian government, experts in cyber technology and artificial intelligence, and speakers representing companies currently providing private sector support in hostile environments, such as #Ukraine. The subject material was fascinating for what was said, and sometimes what was not said. A continuous stream of thought was why we were there. Why was it that these government agencies use private sector support in armed conflict, post-conflict, and disaster relief. That is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
 
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense, ISOA, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.
Reference: Kramer, F., The sixth domain: The role of the private sector in warfare, Atlantic Council (October 2024); https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-sixth-domain-the-role-of-the-private-sector-in-warfare/
 
Music:

Holst, G, The Planets, Mars Bringer of War Internet Archives, https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>523</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>105</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E105_COB.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E104: The Potential for Peace</title>
        <itunes:title>E104: The Potential for Peace</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e104-the-potential-for-peace/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e104-the-potential-for-peace/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 08 Nov 2024 17:33:59 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e6a09304-f3d3-3803-ba6e-7c7e1b19db2c</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Is a negotiated peace possible, or even desirable between Russia and Ukraine? How can this be done without validating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and encouragement of future aggression? These are critical questions to address as the incoming U.S. administration states that negotiating an end to that war and our involvement in it as one of its first priorities.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with. (Although, if the Advanced Warfighting Working Group was still in existence, I would probably have convinced the members to endorse this.)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>PS: Apologies for the sound of my voice as I am recovering from something or other.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man, unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, P., Freedom Fighters, Machinimasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Is a negotiated peace possible, or even desirable between Russia and Ukraine? How can this be done without validating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and encouragement of future aggression? These are critical questions to address as the incoming U.S. administration states that negotiating an end to that war and our involvement in it as one of its first priorities.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with. (Although, if the Advanced Warfighting Working Group was still in existence, I would probably have convinced the members to endorse this.)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>PS: Apologies for the sound of my voice as I am recovering from something or other.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) <em>Fanfare for the Common Man</em>, unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>The Army Strings, <em>GarryOwen</em> (Traditional) (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, P., <em>Freedom Fighters,</em> Machinimasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/wxm9wtatqi5h3ttd/E104_The_Potential_for_Peace.mp3" length="14462977" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Is a negotiated peace possible, or even desirable between Russia and Ukraine? How can this be done without validating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and encouragement of future aggression? These are critical questions to address as the incoming U.S. administration states that negotiating an end to that war and our involvement in it as one of its first priorities.
 
As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with. (Although, if the Advanced Warfighting Working Group was still in existence, I would probably have convinced the members to endorse this.)
 
PS: Apologies for the sound of my voice as I am recovering from something or other.
 
Music:
Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man, unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, P., Freedom Fighters, Machinimasound (Licensed)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>451</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>104</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E104_PeacePotential.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E103: Proportionality in Contemporary War</title>
        <itunes:title>E103: Proportionality in Contemporary War</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e103-proportionality-in-contemporary-war/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e103-proportionality-in-contemporary-war/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 18 Oct 2024 14:39:45 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e402a8f1-2952-3a06-9930-e94d64a94dc3</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>We often hear that this or that military attack caused disproportionate civilian casualties. Most often, these accusations are directed against Israel, when they are not directed against the United States.  I will be generous and presume that most of these accusations are based on a misconception of what proportionality in armed conflict means, and how it is different from proportionate use of force civil or human rights law circumstances. Proportionality in war is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.  </p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference:</p>
<ul><li>Although a main reference for almost all episodes is On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, a primary reference for this episode is Chapter 5.12 of the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, 2016 edition.</li>
</ul>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive</li>
<li>Kilstoffe, Jens, The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We often hear that this or that military attack caused disproportionate civilian casualties. Most often, these accusations are directed against Israel, when they are not directed against the United States.  I will be generous and presume that most of these accusations are based on a misconception of what proportionality in armed conflict means, and how it is different from proportionate use of force civil or human rights law circumstances. Proportionality in war is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.  </p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference:</p>
<ul><li>Although a main reference for almost all episodes is <em>On War</em>, by Carl von Clausewitz, a primary reference for this episode is Chapter 5.12 of the <em>Department of Defense Law of War Manual</em>, 2016 edition.</li>
</ul>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G. <em>The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, </em>downloaded from Internet Archive</li>
<li>Kilstoffe, Jens, <em>The Cavalry</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/zawqui2z9uj3g75x/E103_Proportionality.mp3" length="20739888" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[We often hear that this or that military attack caused disproportionate civilian casualties. Most often, these accusations are directed against Israel, when they are not directed against the United States.  I will be generous and presume that most of these accusations are based on a misconception of what proportionality in armed conflict means, and how it is different from proportionate use of force civil or human rights law circumstances. Proportionality in war is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.  
 
Reference:
Although a main reference for almost all episodes is On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, a primary reference for this episode is Chapter 5.12 of the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, 2016 edition.
Music:
Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive
Kilstoffe, Jens, The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>647</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>103</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E103_Proportionality.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E102: Catching Up</title>
        <itunes:title>E102: Catching Up</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e102-catching-up/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e102-catching-up/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 29 Sep 2024 14:54:05 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/58616704-7a2d-32f4-890f-ed4b3389f961</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>What is the common theme to mercenaries, natural resources, hypersonic missiles, Gaza, and exploding pagers? I can think of several, but in a recent conversation with a colleague of mine, that common thread was challenges to the Law of War, or International Humanitarian Law. Can the notion of the law of war even survive in modern manifestations of armed conflict? I think it can, and it is just as important, if not more so, than in the mythical era of conventional war.</p>
<p>As usual, the views in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, any other organization, or any person I am or ever have been associated with.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Liszt, Les Preludes, the USMC Band. (Public Domain)</li>
<li>GarryOwen (Traditional), the Army Strings (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What is the common theme to mercenaries, natural resources, hypersonic missiles, Gaza, and exploding pagers? I can think of several, but in a recent conversation with a colleague of mine, that common thread was challenges to the Law of War, or International Humanitarian Law. Can the notion of the law of war even survive in modern manifestations of armed conflict? I think it can, and it is just as important, if not more so, than in the mythical era of conventional war.</p>
<p>As usual, the views in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, any other organization, or any person I am or ever have been associated with.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Liszt, <em>Les Preludes</em>, the USMC Band. (Public Domain)</li>
<li><em>GarryOwen</em> (Traditional), the Army Strings (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/g3r4dpa5ep55qy4r/E102_Catching_up.mp3" length="16317044" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[What is the common theme to mercenaries, natural resources, hypersonic missiles, Gaza, and exploding pagers? I can think of several, but in a recent conversation with a colleague of mine, that common thread was challenges to the Law of War, or International Humanitarian Law. Can the notion of the law of war even survive in modern manifestations of armed conflict? I think it can, and it is just as important, if not more so, than in the mythical era of conventional war.
As usual, the views in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, any other organization, or any person I am or ever have been associated with.
Music:
Liszt, Les Preludes, the USMC Band. (Public Domain)
GarryOwen (Traditional), the Army Strings (Public Domain)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>509</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>102</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E102_Catching_Up.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E101: Second Battle of Kursk, Part 2</title>
        <itunes:title>E101: Second Battle of Kursk, Part 2</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e101-second-battle-of-kursk-part-2/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e101-second-battle-of-kursk-part-2/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 05 Sep 2024 19:47:16 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/b0d24e03-b8a5-3e3f-a03a-d175a91bd2de</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The fighting in the Kursk Oblast is still ongoing, and it would be much to soon to derive any lessons to be learned from this event. This episode picks up from the previous episode, examining how this campaign might offer examples of concepts presented in previous podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. Ukraine continues maneuver warfare at the tactical level, although as of this writing, nothing approaching the level of decisive action. Russia continues its World War I style offensive in the east, while the south has some interesting long-range strikes. The contrast between attrition warfare in the east and maneuver warfare in the north, combined with drones, deep fires, and partisan activity in Russian occupied areas all indicate that no prior form of warfare is obsolescent and all can exist simultaneously with modern techno-warfare.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)</li>
<li>The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kilstoffe, P., Freedom Fighters from Machinimasound</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The fighting in the Kursk Oblast is still ongoing, and it would be much to soon to derive any lessons to be learned from this event. This episode picks up from the previous episode, examining how this campaign might offer examples of concepts presented in previous podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. Ukraine continues maneuver warfare at the tactical level, although as of this writing, nothing approaching the level of decisive action. Russia continues its World War I style offensive in the east, while the south has some interesting long-range strikes. The contrast between attrition warfare in the east and maneuver warfare in the north, combined with drones, deep fires, and partisan activity in Russian occupied areas all indicate that no prior form of warfare is obsolescent and all can exist simultaneously with modern techno-warfare.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, <em>On War</em>, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G., <em>The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War</em> (Internet Archives)</li>
<li>The Army Strings, <em>GarryOwen</em> (Traditional) (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kilstoffe, P., <em>Freedom Fighters </em>from Machinimasound</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/v5rxhwejbn4b88j3/E101_Kursk_pt2.mp3" length="17030918" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The fighting in the Kursk Oblast is still ongoing, and it would be much to soon to derive any lessons to be learned from this event. This episode picks up from the previous episode, examining how this campaign might offer examples of concepts presented in previous podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. Ukraine continues maneuver warfare at the tactical level, although as of this writing, nothing approaching the level of decisive action. Russia continues its World War I style offensive in the east, while the south has some interesting long-range strikes. The contrast between attrition warfare in the east and maneuver warfare in the north, combined with drones, deep fires, and partisan activity in Russian occupied areas all indicate that no prior form of warfare is obsolescent and all can exist simultaneously with modern techno-warfare.
 
Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984
Music:
Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)
The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)
Kilstoffe, P., Freedom Fighters from Machinimasound
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>532</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>101</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E101_2dKurskP2.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E100: The Second Battle of Kursk</title>
        <itunes:title>E100: The Second Battle of Kursk</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e100-the-second-battle-of-kursk/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e100-the-second-battle-of-kursk/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 16 Aug 2024 20:22:02 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/21a04181-019a-3940-ab2a-faf9f657273e</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The war in Ukraine has taken a very interesting, and I think, exciting turn of events. The advent of combined arms maneuver warfare reminiscent of armored offensives in that region eight decades ago. It is impossible to conduct an in-depth analysis at this time. There is too much going on and we really know little about order of battle or Ukrainian objectives. StilI, I felt the need to talk about this ongoing battle for a several reasons. Most important of these is that it is an example of the type of maneuver warfare that is possible and should be a feature of this war.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The war in Ukraine has taken a very interesting, and I think, exciting turn of events. The advent of combined arms maneuver warfare reminiscent of armored offensives in that region eight decades ago. It is impossible to conduct an in-depth analysis at this time. There is too much going on and we really know little about order of battle or Ukrainian objectives. StilI, I felt the need to talk about this ongoing battle for a several reasons. Most important of these is that it is an example of the type of maneuver warfare that is possible and should be a feature of this war.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, <em>On War</em>, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G., <em>The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War</em> (Internet Archives)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry,</em> Machinimasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/cw5qh88y34iuy5bw/E100_2d_Kursk.mp3" length="16697387" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The war in Ukraine has taken a very interesting, and I think, exciting turn of events. The advent of combined arms maneuver warfare reminiscent of armored offensives in that region eight decades ago. It is impossible to conduct an in-depth analysis at this time. There is too much going on and we really know little about order of battle or Ukrainian objectives. StilI, I felt the need to talk about this ongoing battle for a several reasons. Most important of these is that it is an example of the type of maneuver warfare that is possible and should be a feature of this war.
 
Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984
Music:
Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>521</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>100</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E100_2d_Kursk.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E99: Applying Friction and the Trinity for contemporary War and Peace</title>
        <itunes:title>E99: Applying Friction and the Trinity for contemporary War and Peace</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e99-applying-friction-and-the-trinity-for-contemporary-war-and-peace/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e99-applying-friction-and-the-trinity-for-contemporary-war-and-peace/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 11 Aug 2024 14:50:24 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/06d57aa1-889f-39b6-9d45-d97625e388f0</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Clausewitz’s descriptions of friction, taken with the often antagonistic interplay among his trinity of passion, policy, and probability, keep war in theory separate from war in practice. How does this look in real war? In this episode, I make my best guess about how friction and chaotic trinity might affect Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.</p>
<p>If you missed the previous two episodes, I recommend that you take the time to do so before listening to this one.</p>
<ul><li>E97: Friction in War</li>
</ul>
<p><a href='../episodes/form/00XlnMhGdsld'>https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/00XlnMhGdsld</a></p>
<ul><li>E98: The Paradoxical Trinity of War (and Peace)</li>
</ul>
<p><a href='../episodes/form/zpdgaRh85TV2'>https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/zpdgaRh85TV2</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference:</p>
<ul><li>Clausewitz, C. On War, Book One, Chapter One</li>
</ul>
<p>(Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: </p>
<ul><li>Liszt, F. Totentanz; Nebolsin, Eldar(piano), Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra (Orchestra), Petrenko, Vasily (Conductor) <a href='https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517'>https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517  </a>(Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.)</li>
</ul>
<ul><li>The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Clausewitz’s descriptions of friction, taken with the often antagonistic interplay among his trinity of passion, policy, and probability, keep war in theory separate from war in practice. How does this look in real war? In this episode, I make my best guess about how friction and chaotic trinity might affect Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.</p>
<p>If you missed the previous two episodes, I recommend that you take the time to do so before listening to this one.</p>
<ul><li>E97: Friction in War</li>
</ul>
<p><a href='../episodes/form/00XlnMhGdsld'>https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/00XlnMhGdsld</a></p>
<ul><li>E98: The Paradoxical Trinity of War (and Peace)</li>
</ul>
<p><a href='../episodes/form/zpdgaRh85TV2'>https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/zpdgaRh85TV2</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference:</p>
<ul><li>Clausewitz, C. <em>On War</em>, Book One, Chapter One</li>
</ul>
<p>(Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: </p>
<ul><li>Liszt, F. <em>Totentanz</em>; Nebolsin, Eldar(piano), Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra (Orchestra), Petrenko, Vasily (Conductor) <a href='https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517'>https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517  </a>(Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.)</li>
</ul>
<ul><li>The Army Strings, <em>GarryOwen</em> (Traditional) (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/x6daj8j7exqkmjhr/E99_Friction_and_Trinity_in_Practice.mp3" length="17933710" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Clausewitz’s descriptions of friction, taken with the often antagonistic interplay among his trinity of passion, policy, and probability, keep war in theory separate from war in practice. How does this look in real war? In this episode, I make my best guess about how friction and chaotic trinity might affect Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.
If you missed the previous two episodes, I recommend that you take the time to do so before listening to this one.
E97: Friction in War
https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/00XlnMhGdsld
E98: The Paradoxical Trinity of War (and Peace)
https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/zpdgaRh85TV2
 
Reference:
Clausewitz, C. On War, Book One, Chapter One
(Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)
 
Music: 
Liszt, F. Totentanz; Nebolsin, Eldar(piano), Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra (Orchestra), Petrenko, Vasily (Conductor) https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517  (Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.)
The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>560</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>99</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E99_Application.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>The Paradoxical Trinity of War (and Peace)</title>
        <itunes:title>The Paradoxical Trinity of War (and Peace)</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-paradoxical-trinity-of-war-and-peace/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-paradoxical-trinity-of-war-and-peace/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 19 Jul 2024 13:05:54 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/b0bc52f7-aefd-3a5a-b4d8-d5fca732e42b</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Clausewitz wrote that there are three forces at work when a nation goes to war: “unbridled passion,” reason, and the play of chance and probability. Things only work well when each of these is held in equilibrium by the other two. The people, the government, and the military represent these forces and the government should, in theory, maintain that equilibrium. In practice, this never happens. Instead, the interplay among these is random and seemingly chaotic. Each aspect of the nation and the force it represents, must deal with friction within their group and friction from and within the other groups. The pendulum that swings among these power centers is also influenced by external forces including, but certainly not limited to, the enemy. This, with the friction described in the previous episode, adds to the apparent irrationality of war and generates diversions along the path to peace.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference:</p>
<ul><li>Clausewitz, C. On War, Book One, Chapter One</li>
</ul>
<p>(Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)</p>
<ul><li>Randomly Oscillating Magnetic Pendulum (from the clausewitz.com website.): https://www.clausewitz.com/MP4/romp2.mp4</li>
</ul>
<p>Music: (Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.)</p>
<ul><li>Liszt, F. Totentanz; Nebolsin, Eldar (piano), Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra (Orchestra), Petrenko, Vasily (Conductor) <a href='https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517'>https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517</a></li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Clausewitz wrote that there are three forces at work when a nation goes to war: “unbridled passion,” reason, and the play of chance and probability. Things only work well when each of these is held in equilibrium by the other two. The people, the government, and the military represent these forces and the government should, in theory, maintain that equilibrium. In practice, this never happens. Instead, the interplay among these is random and seemingly chaotic. Each aspect of the nation and the force it represents, must deal with friction within their group and friction from and within the other groups. The pendulum that swings among these power centers is also influenced by external forces including, but certainly not limited to, the enemy. This, with the friction described in the previous episode, adds to the apparent irrationality of war and generates diversions along the path to peace.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reference:</p>
<ul><li>Clausewitz, C. <em>On War</em>, Book One, Chapter One</li>
</ul>
<p>(Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)</p>
<ul><li>Randomly Oscillating Magnetic Pendulum (from the clausewitz.com website.): https://www.clausewitz.com/MP4/romp2.mp4</li>
</ul>
<p>Music: (Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.)</p>
<ul><li>Liszt, F. <em>Totentanz</em>; Nebolsin, Eldar (piano), Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra (Orchestra), Petrenko, Vasily (Conductor) <a href='https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517'>https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517</a></li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/mcvz6sg3xdr5sue2/E98_Trinity.mp3" length="15746948" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Clausewitz wrote that there are three forces at work when a nation goes to war: “unbridled passion,” reason, and the play of chance and probability. Things only work well when each of these is held in equilibrium by the other two. The people, the government, and the military represent these forces and the government should, in theory, maintain that equilibrium. In practice, this never happens. Instead, the interplay among these is random and seemingly chaotic. Each aspect of the nation and the force it represents, must deal with friction within their group and friction from and within the other groups. The pendulum that swings among these power centers is also influenced by external forces including, but certainly not limited to, the enemy. This, with the friction described in the previous episode, adds to the apparent irrationality of war and generates diversions along the path to peace.
 
Reference:
Clausewitz, C. On War, Book One, Chapter One
(Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)
Randomly Oscillating Magnetic Pendulum (from the clausewitz.com website.): https://www.clausewitz.com/MP4/romp2.mp4
Music: (Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.)
Liszt, F. Totentanz; Nebolsin, Eldar (piano), Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra (Orchestra), Petrenko, Vasily (Conductor) https://www.naxos.com/CatalogueDetail/?id=8.570517
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>491</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>98</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E98_Trinity.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E97: Friction in War</title>
        <itunes:title>E97: Friction in War</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e97-friction-in-war/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e97-friction-in-war/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 13 Jul 2024 19:17:56 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/da60aabe-3283-3b7d-ad34-b042162f04da</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>War is really very simple, but Clausewitz cautioned that by saying that in war, even the simplest thing is difficult, sometime insurmountable. This idea, which he called “Friction” he maintained was the one thing that made war in theory different from war in practice. The elements that create friction in war also apply to the effort to move from war to peace; and the primary source of friction? Human nature.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)</p>
<p>The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Kilstoff, Jan, The Cavalry (Licensed)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>War is really very simple, but Clausewitz cautioned that by saying that in war, even the simplest thing is difficult, sometime insurmountable. This idea, which he called “Friction” he maintained was the one thing that made war in theory different from war in practice. The elements that create friction in war also apply to the effort to move from war to peace; and the primary source of friction? Human nature.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral</em> (Public Domain)</p>
<p>The Army Strings, <em>GarryOwen</em> (Traditional) (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Kilstoff, Jan, <em>The Cavalry</em> (Licensed)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/5v8qn7jwij7irw32/E97_Friction.mp3" length="15604006" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[War is really very simple, but Clausewitz cautioned that by saying that in war, even the simplest thing is difficult, sometime insurmountable. This idea, which he called “Friction” he maintained was the one thing that made war in theory different from war in practice. The elements that create friction in war also apply to the effort to move from war to peace; and the primary source of friction? Human nature.
 
Music:
Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)
The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)
Kilstoff, Jan, The Cavalry (Licensed)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>487</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>97</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E97Friction.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E96: What is Peace?</title>
        <itunes:title>E96: What is Peace?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e96-what-is-peace/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e96-what-is-peace/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 28 Jun 2024 15:30:32 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/a126198f-f470-3312-8c4c-09ae260b0c7e</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>If the only acceptable outcome of war is a peace, and the only sustainable peace is a just peace, then it is essential to answer the question, “what is peace?” This is a simple question, but without a simple answer. It has been debated from Plato up until the present day. This lack of definition may be one reason why the transition from war to peace is so difficult.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G: The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War (Internet Archive: <a href='https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709'>https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709</a>)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Wagner, R. and USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March, Public Domain.</li>
</ul>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own analysis and opinion and does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or any organization I am or have been affiliated with.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If the only acceptable outcome of war is a peace, and the only sustainable peace is a just peace, then it is essential to answer the question, “what is peace?” This is a simple question, but without a simple answer. It has been debated from Plato up until the present day. This lack of definition may be one reason why the transition from war to peace is so difficult.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G: <em>The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War </em>(Internet Archive: <a href='https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709'>https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709</a>)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Wagner, R. and USMC Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral March</em>, Public Domain.</li>
</ul>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own analysis and opinion and does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or any organization I am or have been affiliated with.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/2jub3ayjjb87yjbs/E96_What_is_Peace.mp3" length="15756979" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[If the only acceptable outcome of war is a peace, and the only sustainable peace is a just peace, then it is essential to answer the question, “what is peace?” This is a simple question, but without a simple answer. It has been debated from Plato up until the present day. This lack of definition may be one reason why the transition from war to peace is so difficult.
Music:
Holst, G: The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War (Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Wagner, R. and USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March, Public Domain.
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own analysis and opinion and does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or any organization I am or have been affiliated with.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>492</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>96</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E96whatispeace.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E95: Justum Pacem</title>
        <itunes:title>E95: Justum Pacem</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e95-justum-pacem/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e95-justum-pacem/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2024 14:03:19 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/c8a3360f-4b32-34de-b9b9-5e1e00bc795d</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The subject of Just War, or Justum Bellum, is a frequent topic in these podcasts. If, however, the only acceptable justification for any war is to establish a more just and lasting peace, shouldn’t there be a similar framework for Just Peace, or Justum Pacem? Just War theory goes back to Plato and Aristotle, but Just Peace thinking is a product of the last century. Despite a lack of concrete formulation, past examples of successful post-conflict transitions included efforts to establish a just peace. Sadly, there are more examples of unjust peace, which -- as Immanuel Kant noted -- plants the seeds of future war.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Mozart, W. A. and Karajan, K., The Requiem Mass In D Minor, Introitus, K.626, (1941), downloaded from The Internet Archive https://archive.org/details/12-bruno-kittel-mozart-requiem-agnus-dei-polydor-1941_202308</li>
</ul>
<p>Photo:</p>
<p>Perpetual Peace Lily, Aganpanthus Africanus (Wikimedia Commons)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The subject of Just War, or <em>Justum Bellum</em>, is a frequent topic in these podcasts. If, however, the only acceptable justification for any war is to establish a more just and lasting peace, shouldn’t there be a similar framework for Just Peace, or <em>Justum Pacem</em>? Just War theory goes back to Plato and Aristotle, but Just Peace thinking is a product of the last century. Despite a lack of concrete formulation, past examples of successful post-conflict transitions included efforts to establish a just peace. Sadly, there are more examples of unjust peace, which -- as Immanuel Kant noted -- plants the seeds of future war.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Mozart, W. A. and Karajan, K., <em>The Requiem Mass In D Minor, Introitus, K.626, </em>(1941), downloaded from The Internet Archive https://archive.org/details/12-bruno-kittel-mozart-requiem-agnus-dei-polydor-1941_202308</li>
</ul>
<p>Photo:</p>
<p>Perpetual Peace Lily, <em>Aganpanthus Africanus</em> (Wikimedia Commons)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/e8m5pxmgeeqa3y66/E95_Justem_in_Pacem.mp3" length="15413416" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The subject of Just War, or Justum Bellum, is a frequent topic in these podcasts. If, however, the only acceptable justification for any war is to establish a more just and lasting peace, shouldn’t there be a similar framework for Just Peace, or Justum Pacem? Just War theory goes back to Plato and Aristotle, but Just Peace thinking is a product of the last century. Despite a lack of concrete formulation, past examples of successful post-conflict transitions included efforts to establish a just peace. Sadly, there are more examples of unjust peace, which -- as Immanuel Kant noted -- plants the seeds of future war.
 
Music:
Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Mozart, W. A. and Karajan, K., The Requiem Mass In D Minor, Introitus, K.626, (1941), downloaded from The Internet Archive https://archive.org/details/12-bruno-kittel-mozart-requiem-agnus-dei-polydor-1941_202308
Photo:
Perpetual Peace Lily, Aganpanthus Africanus (Wikimedia Commons)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>481</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>95</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E95JustumPacem.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E94: Fighting a War that leads to Peaace</title>
        <itunes:title>E94: Fighting a War that leads to Peaace</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e94-fighting-a-war-that-leads-to-peaace/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e94-fighting-a-war-that-leads-to-peaace/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:50:54 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/433056f1-936c-3cfc-9bb1-8be72e97d922</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>In Chapter 17 of the Prince, Nicolo Machiavelli wrote that a prince ought to desire to be thought of as clement and not cruel. It is more important, he said, to generate a respectful fear which, in then end, is actually more merciful than those who pursue reputations of mercy. Under no circumstances, however, should the prince become hated. This concept also applies to war, moving from war to peace, and the justice sustained peace requires.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>Verdelot, P. and Machiavelli, N. O Dolce Nocte (1547) downloaded from ChoralWiki/CPDL</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In Chapter 17 of the Prince, Nicolo Machiavelli wrote that a prince ought to desire to be thought of as clement and not cruel. It is more important, he said, to generate a respectful fear which, in then end, is actually more merciful than those who pursue reputations of mercy. Under no circumstances, however, should the prince become hated. This concept also applies to war, moving from war to peace, and the justice sustained peace requires.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
<li>Verdelot, P. and Machiavelli, N. <em>O Dolce Nocte</em> (1547) downloaded from ChoralWiki/CPDL</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/i8d5qczbb6qb5smv/E94_Fighting_a_war_That_leads_to_Peace.mp3" length="13395509" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[In Chapter 17 of the Prince, Nicolo Machiavelli wrote that a prince ought to desire to be thought of as clement and not cruel. It is more important, he said, to generate a respectful fear which, in then end, is actually more merciful than those who pursue reputations of mercy. Under no circumstances, however, should the prince become hated. This concept also applies to war, moving from war to peace, and the justice sustained peace requires.
Music:
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
Verdelot, P. and Machiavelli, N. O Dolce Nocte (1547) downloaded from ChoralWiki/CPDL
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>418</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>94</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E94_Fight_to_Peace.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E93 Starting on the Path to Peace</title>
        <itunes:title>E93 Starting on the Path to Peace</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e93-starting-on-the-path-to-peace/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e93-starting-on-the-path-to-peace/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 02 Jun 2024 21:15:25 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/842d2b5e-1e21-3fc3-9e3b-f4f170a23872</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Just as it takes two parties to agree to fight a war, it takes both parties to agree to peace. Getting both warring parties to agree to peace sometimes requires a third party. This third party provides “good offices” to help both sides agree on what peace should look like. It also helps when each party understands the political objectives of the others – and the “disinterested” third party has its political objectives, too!</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Wagner, R. and USMC Band, Siegfried Funeral and Goetterdammurung (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p>Image: Bakhmut, Ukraine; Ukrainian Army Photo</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just as it takes two parties to agree to fight a war, it takes both parties to agree to peace. Getting both warring parties to agree to peace sometimes requires a third party. This third party provides “good offices” to help both sides agree on what peace should look like. It also helps when each party understands the political objectives of the others – and the “disinterested” third party has its political objectives, too!</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Wagner, R. and USMC Band, <em>Siegfried Funeral and</em> <em>Goetterdammurung</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p>Image: Bakhmut, Ukraine; Ukrainian Army Photo</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/3d3v5saigcgrjyx4/E93_Starting_the_Path_to_Peace.mp3" length="15508711" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Just as it takes two parties to agree to fight a war, it takes both parties to agree to peace. Getting both warring parties to agree to peace sometimes requires a third party. This third party provides “good offices” to help both sides agree on what peace should look like. It also helps when each party understands the political objectives of the others – and the “disinterested” third party has its political objectives, too!
 
Music:
Wagner, R. and USMC Band, Siegfried Funeral and Goetterdammurung (Public Domain)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
 
Image: Bakhmut, Ukraine; Ukrainian Army Photo]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>484</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>93</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E93_Pathe_to_Peace.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E92 Deciding to End War</title>
        <itunes:title>E92 Deciding to End War</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e92-deciding-to-end-war/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e92-deciding-to-end-war/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 26 May 2024 18:33:13 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/6095fc6a-1457-386f-9a74-f00ce6de34c6</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Ending a war begins when one side or the other believes that the cost of continuing to fight exceeds any expectations of success. This could be a simple cost benefit calculation, it could be that continuing to fight after a major defeat is unlikely to bring success, or that the war aims have already been achieved and any further violence is unjustified. In each case, one side or another has to make the decision to seek peace, or at least to end the fighting. That decision, however necessary, is only one step on the difficult path to bring peace out of war (and it isn’t even the first step.)</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>The United States Army Old Guard Fife and Drum Corps, Soldiers Farewell Fanfare/Montezuma/March of War/Windsor Park, (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
<p>Image: Bakhmut, Ukraine; Ukrainian Army Photo</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ending a war begins when one side or the other believes that the cost of continuing to fight exceeds any expectations of success. This could be a simple cost benefit calculation, it could be that continuing to fight after a major defeat is unlikely to bring success, or that the war aims have already been achieved and any further violence is unjustified. In each case, one side or another has to make the decision to seek peace, or at least to end the fighting. That decision, however necessary, is only one step on the difficult path to bring peace out of war (and it isn’t even the first step.)</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>The United States Army Old Guard Fife and Drum Corps, <em>Soldiers Farewell Fanfare/Montezuma/March of War/Windsor Park</em>, (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
<p>Image: Bakhmut, Ukraine; Ukrainian Army Photo</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/pjq4ie5gtwzgzwqu/E92_Deciding_to_end_war_6j5gz.mp3" length="15413416" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Ending a war begins when one side or the other believes that the cost of continuing to fight exceeds any expectations of success. This could be a simple cost benefit calculation, it could be that continuing to fight after a major defeat is unlikely to bring success, or that the war aims have already been achieved and any further violence is unjustified. In each case, one side or another has to make the decision to seek peace, or at least to end the fighting. That decision, however necessary, is only one step on the difficult path to bring peace out of war (and it isn’t even the first step.)
Music:
The United States Army Old Guard Fife and Drum Corps, Soldiers Farewell Fanfare/Montezuma/March of War/Windsor Park, (Public Domain)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Image: Bakhmut, Ukraine; Ukrainian Army Photo]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>481</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>92</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E92_Deciding_on_Peace.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E91 From War to Peace</title>
        <itunes:title>E91 From War to Peace</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e91-from-war-to-peaace/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e91-from-war-to-peaace/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2024 20:15:11 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/3ea2b177-6870-3af9-b012-28ddb491ccfa</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>My podcasts on The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare presented the elements of war that I think every citizen should know in holding our elected representatives responsible for decisions about going to and prosecuting war. The time has come in this series to move from war to peace. The most important consideration in going to and in prosecuting war is that it is the only way to correct a grave injustice and bring about a more just and lasting peace. Correcting this grave injustice must outweigh the death and destruction unavoidable in any war. Defending against the unjust attack of an aggressor and repelling the attacker’s forces from the territory captured in that attack is, perhaps the only clear justification, although there is debate about the use of military force to stop grave violations of international law, and particularly those which could be considered crimes against humanity. Again, this must be done with the clear end state in view of restoring peace.  Once the iron dice of war are rolled, however, Clausewitz’s trinity of passion, reason, and chance can lead us to places we did not intend to go.  These closing episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare we explore the transition from the violence of war to that more just peace.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</p>
<p>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Lennon, J, (1969) performed by COL C Mayer, USA RET; Maj. D. Mayer, CAP; 2d Lt M. Mayer, USAF; and PFC C. Mayer, USA (2024) Give Peace a Chance (Fair use for educational purposes.)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My podcasts on The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare presented the elements of war that I think every citizen should know in holding our elected representatives responsible for decisions about going to and prosecuting war. The time has come in this series to move from war to peace. The most important consideration in going to and in prosecuting war is that it is the only way to correct a grave injustice and bring about a more just and lasting peace. Correcting this grave injustice must outweigh the death and destruction unavoidable in any war. Defending against the unjust attack of an aggressor and repelling the attacker’s forces from the territory captured in that attack is, perhaps the only clear justification, although there is debate about the use of military force to stop grave violations of international law, and particularly those which could be considered crimes against humanity. Again, this must be done with the clear end state in view of restoring peace.  Once the iron dice of war are rolled, however, Clausewitz’s trinity of passion, reason, and chance can lead us to places we did not intend to go.  These closing episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare we explore the transition from the violence of war to that more just peace.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) <em>Fanfare for the Common Man</em>. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</p>
<p>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Lennon, J, (1969) performed by COL C Mayer, USA RET; Maj. D. Mayer, CAP; 2d Lt M. Mayer, USAF; and PFC C. Mayer, USA (2024) <em>Give Peace a Chance</em> (Fair use for educational purposes.)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/z672ieed9ff3x3fa/E91_From_War_to_Peace.mp3" length="12132436" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[My podcasts on The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare presented the elements of war that I think every citizen should know in holding our elected representatives responsible for decisions about going to and prosecuting war. The time has come in this series to move from war to peace. The most important consideration in going to and in prosecuting war is that it is the only way to correct a grave injustice and bring about a more just and lasting peace. Correcting this grave injustice must outweigh the death and destruction unavoidable in any war. Defending against the unjust attack of an aggressor and repelling the attacker’s forces from the territory captured in that attack is, perhaps the only clear justification, although there is debate about the use of military force to stop grave violations of international law, and particularly those which could be considered crimes against humanity. Again, this must be done with the clear end state in view of restoring peace.  Once the iron dice of war are rolled, however, Clausewitz’s trinity of passion, reason, and chance can lead us to places we did not intend to go.  These closing episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare we explore the transition from the violence of war to that more just peace.
 
Music:
Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Lennon, J, (1969) performed by COL C Mayer, USA RET; Maj. D. Mayer, CAP; 2d Lt M. Mayer, USAF; and PFC C. Mayer, USA (2024) Give Peace a Chance (Fair use for educational purposes.)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>379</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>91</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E91_wartopeace.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Thucydudes and the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare</title>
        <itunes:title>Thucydudes and the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/thucydudes-and-the-ancient-art-of-modern-warfare/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/thucydudes-and-the-ancient-art-of-modern-warfare/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 21 Mar 2024 18:01:17 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/c8e28208-79ac-399c-855f-b3c640436fd7</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.” So begins L.P. Hartley’s book, The Go-Between. Although the way people do things changes over time, what they do remains largely the same. War and politics are human endeavors, and human nature is unchanging. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the nature of war and politics is also unchanging. That is the point of these podcasts. The first objective history of war, the war between Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BC was chronicled by the Greek general Thucydides. Although the way the armies and navies fought then are much different than today, the overall campaigns and reasons for those campaign are strikingly similar to modern strategy. Thucydides’ observations provide lessons for us, even today, if we are just willing to learn from them. This why his work is still studied in our war colleges.  </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Rodgers and R.R. Bennett, Fire on the Water/Victory at Sea Suite (Public Domain/Fair use for educational purposes)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.” So begins L.P. Hartley’s book, <em>The Go-Between</em>. Although the way people do things changes over time, what they do remains largely the same. War and politics are human endeavors, and human nature is unchanging. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the nature of war and politics is also unchanging. That is the point of these podcasts. The first objective history of war, the war between Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BC was chronicled by the Greek general Thucydides. Although the way the armies and navies fought then are much different than today, the overall campaigns and reasons for those campaign are strikingly similar to modern strategy. Thucydides’ observations provide lessons for us, even today, if we are just willing to learn from them. This why his work is still studied in our war colleges.  </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Rodgers and R.R. Bennett, <em>Fire on the Water</em>/Victory at Sea Suite (Public Domain/Fair use for educational purposes)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/4giw7d/E90_Thucydides.mp3" length="14937779" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.” So begins L.P. Hartley’s book, The Go-Between. Although the way people do things changes over time, what they do remains largely the same. War and politics are human endeavors, and human nature is unchanging. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the nature of war and politics is also unchanging. That is the point of these podcasts. The first objective history of war, the war between Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BC was chronicled by the Greek general Thucydides. Although the way the armies and navies fought then are much different than today, the overall campaigns and reasons for those campaign are strikingly similar to modern strategy. Thucydides’ observations provide lessons for us, even today, if we are just willing to learn from them. This why his work is still studied in our war colleges.  
Music:
Rodgers and R.R. Bennett, Fire on the Water/Victory at Sea Suite (Public Domain/Fair use for educational purposes)
 
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
 
Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>466</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>90</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E90_Thucydides.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E89 Sun Who?</title>
        <itunes:title>E89 Sun Who?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e89-sun-who/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e89-sun-who/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 10 Mar 2024 16:58:42 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/adbe1821-fdc4-39e7-8066-043244af3b92</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>“Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.” My purpose in my podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. But who is Sun Tzu, and how is what he said relevant to modern warfare?</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.” My purpose in my podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. But who is Sun Tzu, and how is what he said relevant to modern warfare?</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G., <em>The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War</em> (Internet Archives)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ef8ibg/E89_Sun_Who.mp3" length="16127290" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[“Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.” My purpose in my podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. But who is Sun Tzu, and how is what he said relevant to modern warfare?
Music:
Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>503</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>89</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E89_Sun_Who.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E88: Who is thes Clausewitz Guy?</title>
        <itunes:title>E88: Who is thes Clausewitz Guy?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e88-who-is-thes-clausewitz-guy/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e88-who-is-thes-clausewitz-guy/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 2024 21:33:46 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/c7205299-5e76-3f88-9bfc-32bba356ab92</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Who is this Clausewitz guy?</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The Army War College studies many different theories and theorists of war, from Thucydides of ancient Athens, Sun Tzu of Wu Dynasty in China, to Machiavelli, Mitchell, and present day theorists. One name stands out among the others, the early 19th century enlightenment era military philosopher, the Prussian Major General and War College Director, Carl von Clausewitz. It is not just the US Army War College. Russian and Chinese military teaching also centers on his ideas. Why? Who was he and why do I cite him so often in my podcasts (and in conversation, my papers, etc.) Working within my self-imposed limit of eight minutes, I try to explain this as best I can.</p>
<p>These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way. The opinions expressed in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily reflect any organization I am or have ever been associated with – and fall far short of doing justice to Carl and Marie von Clausewitz.</p>
<p>Reference: Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Piefke, J.G. Preussens Gloria, Internet Archive, <a href='https://archive.org/details/PreussensGloria_201708'>https://archive.org/details/PreussensGloria_201708</a></li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Who is this Clausewitz guy?</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The Army War College studies many different theories and theorists of war, from Thucydides of ancient Athens, Sun Tzu of Wu Dynasty in China, to Machiavelli, Mitchell, and present day theorists. One name stands out among the others, the early 19th century enlightenment era military philosopher, the Prussian Major General and War College Director, Carl von Clausewitz. It is not just the US Army War College. Russian and Chinese military teaching also centers on his ideas. Why? Who was he and why do I cite him so often in my podcasts (and in conversation, my papers, etc.) Working within my self-imposed limit of eight minutes, I try to explain this as best I can.</p>
<p>These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way. The opinions expressed in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily reflect any organization I am or have ever been associated with – and fall far short of doing justice to Carl and Marie von Clausewitz.</p>
<p>Reference: Clausewitz, C, <em>On War</em>, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Piefke, J.G. <em>Preussens Gloria</em>, Internet Archive, <a href='https://archive.org/details/PreussensGloria_201708'>https://archive.org/details/PreussensGloria_201708</a></li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/9vd2a5/E88_Who_is_Clausewitz.mp3" length="15818837" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Who is this Clausewitz guy?
 
The Army War College studies many different theories and theorists of war, from Thucydides of ancient Athens, Sun Tzu of Wu Dynasty in China, to Machiavelli, Mitchell, and present day theorists. One name stands out among the others, the early 19th century enlightenment era military philosopher, the Prussian Major General and War College Director, Carl von Clausewitz. It is not just the US Army War College. Russian and Chinese military teaching also centers on his ideas. Why? Who was he and why do I cite him so often in my podcasts (and in conversation, my papers, etc.) Working within my self-imposed limit of eight minutes, I try to explain this as best I can.
These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way. The opinions expressed in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily reflect any organization I am or have ever been associated with – and fall far short of doing justice to Carl and Marie von Clausewitz.
Reference: Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984
Music:
Piefke, J.G. Preussens Gloria, Internet Archive, https://archive.org/details/PreussensGloria_201708
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>494</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>88</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E88_Who_is_CvC.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E87: Identifying the End State</title>
        <itunes:title>E87: Identifying the End State</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e87-identifying-the-end-state/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e87-identifying-the-end-state/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 27 Jan 2024 16:36:42 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/7c2bea38-f617-3eee-bd88-0c4024d5f4f7</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>There are more than 110 armed conflicts in the world today.<a href='#_ftn1'>[1]</a> Ending any one of them requires more than a simple cease fire, it requires knowing what each side intends to achieve by the conflict. This is even true when the participants may not fully understand the end state they are seeking. This includes the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Without addressing those desired end states any ceasefire merely gives time for the warring parties to refit for the next battles. Whenever our country starts on the path to armed conflict, the citizens must demand that our government know and tell us, “How does this end?”</p>
<p>These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are more than 110 armed conflicts in the world today.<a href='#_ftn1'>[1]</a> Ending any one of them requires more than a simple cease fire, it requires knowing what each side intends to achieve by the conflict. This is even true when the participants may not fully understand the end state they are seeking. This includes the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Without addressing those desired end states any ceasefire merely gives time for the warring parties to refit for the next battles. Whenever our country starts on the path to armed conflict, the citizens must demand that our government know and tell us, “How does this end?”</p>
<p>These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G., <em>The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War</em> (Internet Archives)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ztatgj/E87_Identifying_the_End_State.mp3" length="15508711" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[There are more than 110 armed conflicts in the world today.[1] Ending any one of them requires more than a simple cease fire, it requires knowing what each side intends to achieve by the conflict. This is even true when the participants may not fully understand the end state they are seeking. This includes the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Without addressing those desired end states any ceasefire merely gives time for the warring parties to refit for the next battles. Whenever our country starts on the path to armed conflict, the citizens must demand that our government know and tell us, “How does this end?”
These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.
Music:
Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>484</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>87</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E87_Identify_End_State.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E86: Is an End State Important?</title>
        <itunes:title>E86: Is an End State Important?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e86-is-an-end-state-important/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e86-is-an-end-state-important/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 21 Jan 2024 14:07:44 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/c0bb37b7-d7f1-3b2b-b86d-4793986d417e</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>If I initiate a war, it seems logical that I would know why I am starting that war and what I expect to achieve by it. It might also be helpful if I let my opponent know that, too, as it may help limit the intensity duration, and long-term effects of that war. Why that is and how that does or doesn’t reflect reality is the subject of this and following episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p>These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.</p>
<p>Reference: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book One, Chapter One</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If I initiate a war, it seems logical that I would know why I am starting that war and what I expect to achieve by it. It might also be helpful if I let my opponent know that, too, as it may help limit the intensity duration, and long-term effects of that war. Why that is and how that does or doesn’t reflect reality is the subject of this and following episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p>These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.</p>
<p>Reference: Carl von Clausewitz, <em>On War</em>, Book One, Chapter One</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Holst, G., <em>The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War</em> (Internet Archives)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/cjpefm/E86_Is_the_End_State_Important.mp3" length="15271310" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[If I initiate a war, it seems logical that I would know why I am starting that war and what I expect to achieve by it. It might also be helpful if I let my opponent know that, too, as it may help limit the intensity duration, and long-term effects of that war. Why that is and how that does or doesn’t reflect reality is the subject of this and following episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.
Reference: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book One, Chapter One
Music:
Holst, G., The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War (Internet Archives)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>477</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>86</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E86_Is_and_End_State_Important.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E85: Naming the Rose Part 5 -- Why don’t we take action?</title>
        <itunes:title>E85: Naming the Rose Part 5 -- Why don’t we take action?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e85-naming-the-rose-part-5-why-don-t-we-take-action/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e85-naming-the-rose-part-5-why-don-t-we-take-action/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 14 Jan 2024 14:52:10 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/91d36db6-2b40-38eb-b45a-051ba2289593</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The Wagner Group is only one of about two dozen Russian sponsored semi-private military companies conducting combat operations in Ukraine, Africa, and elsewhere. If the operations of the companies violate relevant national and international laws, why aren’t criminal charges being filed against Wagner, affiliated entities, and its operatives? I believe that the answer is more political than legal. I address what some of these political considerations may be in this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Wagner Group is only one of about two dozen Russian sponsored semi-private military companies conducting combat operations in Ukraine, Africa, and elsewhere. If the operations of the companies violate relevant national and international laws, why aren’t criminal charges being filed against Wagner, affiliated entities, and its operatives? I believe that the answer is more political than legal. I address what some of these political considerations may be in this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/teyqh5/E85_Naming_The_Rose_P5.mp3" length="15984348" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The Wagner Group is only one of about two dozen Russian sponsored semi-private military companies conducting combat operations in Ukraine, Africa, and elsewhere. If the operations of the companies violate relevant national and international laws, why aren’t criminal charges being filed against Wagner, affiliated entities, and its operatives? I believe that the answer is more political than legal. I address what some of these political considerations may be in this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
Disclaimer: These podcasts are not monetized or subsidized in any way, nor do they represent anyone’s opinion but my own.
Music:
Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>499</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>85</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E85_Name_the_Rose_P5.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E84: Naming the Rose, Part 4 -- Tools for Accountability</title>
        <itunes:title>E84: Naming the Rose, Part 4 -- Tools for Accountability</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e84-naming-the-rose-part-4-tools-for-accountability/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e84-naming-the-rose-part-4-tools-for-accountability/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jan 2024 14:38:46 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/83cc73fc-1220-3285-9c59-cf21ee39ed99</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>If we can agree that Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the legal criteria of being mercenaries, nor are they legitimate members of the armed forces, then their participation in combat must be illegitimate and their actions criminal. The question remains how to hold those criminal combatants accountable under law. This episode explores the tools for such accountability.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts do not represent the positions of any organization I am or ever have been associated with. They represent no one's opinions but my own.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References</p>
<ul><li>Geneva Convention Relative to The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949</li>
<li>International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities</li>
<li>Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control; Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions Program</li>
</ul>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If we can agree that Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the legal criteria of being mercenaries, nor are they legitimate members of the armed forces, then their participation in combat must be illegitimate and their actions criminal. The question remains how to hold those criminal combatants accountable under law. This episode explores the tools for such accountability.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts do not represent the positions of any organization I am or ever have been associated with. They represent no one's opinions but my own.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References</p>
<ul><li>Geneva Convention Relative to The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949</li>
<li>International Committee of the Red Cross, <em>Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities</em></li>
<li>Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control; <em>Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions Program</em></li>
</ul>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/h6kmpb/E84_Naming_The_Rose_P4.mp3" length="15365769" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[If we can agree that Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the legal criteria of being mercenaries, nor are they legitimate members of the armed forces, then their participation in combat must be illegitimate and their actions criminal. The question remains how to hold those criminal combatants accountable under law. This episode explores the tools for such accountability.
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts do not represent the positions of any organization I am or ever have been associated with. They represent no one's opinions but my own.
 
References
Geneva Convention Relative to The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949
International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control; Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions Program
Music:
Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>480</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>84</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E84_Naming_the_Rose_P4.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Naming the Rose Part 3</title>
        <itunes:title>Naming the Rose Part 3</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/naming-the-rose-part-3/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/naming-the-rose-part-3/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 15 Dec 2023 13:52:59 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/46be17b0-d517-3f9b-ae82-bece324ffc65</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>If the Wagner Group and two dozen or so similar Russian paramilitary forces are not mercenaries, not PMSCs, not militia or volunteer corps, then what are they? If the term terrorist to too vague and a criminal organization insufficient, then what can we call them that facilitates accountability for their criminal behavior? Maybe, jut calling them criminals is enough. In Part 3 I propose calling them for what they are, criminals. I will follow this in the next and final episode of this series by examining the means and methods to hold these criminals accountable and bring them to justice.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p>References:</p>
<ul><li>Dinstein, Y., Unlawful Combatancy, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1312&amp;context=ils</li>
<li>Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18, October 1907, Annex, Chapter 1, Article 1</li>
<li>Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment Of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If the Wagner Group and two dozen or so similar Russian paramilitary forces are not mercenaries, not PMSCs, not militia or volunteer corps, then what are they? If the term terrorist to too vague and a criminal organization insufficient, then what can we call them that facilitates accountability for their criminal behavior? Maybe, jut calling them criminals is enough. In Part 3 I propose calling them for what they are, criminals. I will follow this in the next and final episode of this series by examining the means and methods to hold these criminals accountable and bring them to justice.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<ul><li>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</li>
<li>Kiilstofte, P., <em>Mercenaries</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</li>
</ul>
<p>References:</p>
<ul><li>Dinstein, Y., <em>Unlawful</em> <em>Combatancy</em>, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1312&amp;context=ils</li>
<li>Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18, October 1907, Annex, Chapter 1, Article 1</li>
<li>Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment Of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/5jwdsm/E83_Naming_The_Rose_P3.mp3" length="13796750" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[If the Wagner Group and two dozen or so similar Russian paramilitary forces are not mercenaries, not PMSCs, not militia or volunteer corps, then what are they? If the term terrorist to too vague and a criminal organization insufficient, then what can we call them that facilitates accountability for their criminal behavior? Maybe, jut calling them criminals is enough. In Part 3 I propose calling them for what they are, criminals. I will follow this in the next and final episode of this series by examining the means and methods to hold these criminals accountable and bring them to justice.
 
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.
Music:
Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)
References:
Dinstein, Y., Unlawful Combatancy, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1312&amp;context=ils
Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18, October 1907, Annex, Chapter 1, Article 1
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment Of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4
 
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>431</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>83</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E83_Name_Rose_p3.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Naming the Rose, Part 2</title>
        <itunes:title>Naming the Rose, Part 2</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/naming-the-rose-part-2/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/naming-the-rose-part-2/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 09 Dec 2023 14:17:25 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/0f286b88-fb2a-3967-a459-b6d033da9f50</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>If Wagner and similar Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the internationally accepted criteria for being mercenaries or Private Military and Security Companies, then what are they? This podcast explores the suitability of other terms, including militia, volunteer corps, terrorist, and criminal organizations. The challenge is to find a term that accurately describes what they are in a way that offers the possibility for accountability under the law.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.</p>
<p>(In response to comments received, I am trying to keep each podcast down to about 8 minutes.)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<p>Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18, October 1907, Annex, Chapter 1, Article 1</p>
<p>Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment Of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfrieds Funeral (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If Wagner and similar Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the internationally accepted criteria for being mercenaries or Private Military and Security Companies, then what are they? This podcast explores the suitability of other terms, including militia, volunteer corps, terrorist, and criminal organizations. The challenge is to find a term that accurately describes what they are in a way that offers the possibility for accountability under the law.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.</p>
<p>(In response to comments received, I am trying to keep each podcast down to about 8 minutes.)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<p>Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18, October 1907, Annex, Chapter 1, Article 1</p>
<p>Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment Of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, <em>Siegfrieds Funeral</em> (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/z8zdmv/E82_Naming_The_Rose_P2.mp3" length="15556358" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[If Wagner and similar Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the internationally accepted criteria for being mercenaries or Private Military and Security Companies, then what are they? This podcast explores the suitability of other terms, including militia, volunteer corps, terrorist, and criminal organizations. The challenge is to find a term that accurately describes what they are in a way that offers the possibility for accountability under the law.
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.
(In response to comments received, I am trying to keep each podcast down to about 8 minutes.)
 
References:
Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18, October 1907, Annex, Chapter 1, Article 1
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment Of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4
 
Music:
Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfrieds Funeral (Public Domain)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>486</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>82</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E82_Naming_the_Rose_P2.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E81: Naming the Rose</title>
        <itunes:title>E81: Naming the Rose</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e81-naming-the-rose/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e81-naming-the-rose/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2023 18:59:40 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/281db170-ec49-3dbb-a476-8b12804187b2</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Whether the infamous Wagner continues to exist or not, the problem they created is only growing. There may be more than 30 Russian paramilitary organizations operating across the world, many of them fighting in Ukraine. At least one has a reputation from brutality and criminal conduct rivaling Wagner’s. But what do we call them? They do not fulfil the definition of mercenary in some international conventions, and they are not PMSCs as understood in internationally agreed frameworks or by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries. Holding them accountable under law requires proper definition of what they are and the legal regime to hold them accountable. This problem is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Listzt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)</p>
<p>References:</p>
<p>Article 47, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. <a href='https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-47#:~:text=Article%2047%20-%20Mercenaries,-1.&amp;text=A%20mercenary%20shall%20not%20have,or%20a%20prisoner%20of%20war'>https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-47#:~:text=Article%2047%20%2D%20Mercenaries,-1.&amp;text=A%20mercenary%20shall%20not%20have,or%20a%20prisoner%20of%20war</a></p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Whether the infamous Wagner continues to exist or not, the problem they created is only growing. There may be more than 30 Russian paramilitary organizations operating across the world, many of them fighting in Ukraine. At least one has a reputation from brutality and criminal conduct rivaling Wagner’s. But what do we call them? They do not fulfil the definition of mercenary in some international conventions, and they are not PMSCs as understood in internationally agreed frameworks or by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries. Holding them accountable under law requires proper definition of what they are and the legal regime to hold them accountable. This problem is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Listzt, F. and the USMC Band, <em>Les Preludes</em> (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Traditional, The Army Strings, <em>Garryowen</em> (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, P., <em>Mercenaries</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</p>
<p>References:</p>
<p>Article 47, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. <a href='https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-47#:~:text=Article%2047%20-%20Mercenaries,-1.&amp;text=A%20mercenary%20shall%20not%20have,or%20a%20prisoner%20of%20war'>https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-47#:~:text=Article%2047%20%2D%20Mercenaries,-1.&amp;text=A%20mercenary%20shall%20not%20have,or%20a%20prisoner%20of%20war</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/swgbu7/E81_Naming_the_Rose.mp3" length="19217681" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Whether the infamous Wagner continues to exist or not, the problem they created is only growing. There may be more than 30 Russian paramilitary organizations operating across the world, many of them fighting in Ukraine. At least one has a reputation from brutality and criminal conduct rivaling Wagner’s. But what do we call them? They do not fulfil the definition of mercenary in some international conventions, and they are not PMSCs as understood in internationally agreed frameworks or by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries. Holding them accountable under law requires proper definition of what they are and the legal regime to hold them accountable. This problem is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
 
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.
 
Music:
Listzt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domain)
Traditional, The Army Strings, Garryowen (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)
References:
Article 47, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-47#:~:text=Article%2047%20%2D%20Mercenaries,-1.&amp;text=A%20mercenary%20shall%20not%20have,or%20a%20prisoner%20of%20war]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>600</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>81</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E81_Naming_the_Rose.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E80: Rules for the Use of Force for Private Security Companies</title>
        <itunes:title>E80: Rules for the Use of Force for Private Security Companies</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e80-rules-for-the-use-of-force-for-private-security-companies/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e80-rules-for-the-use-of-force-for-private-security-companies/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Wed, 15 Nov 2023 13:50:31 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e4c15281-6d43-3241-a62f-08640981646c</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The presence of Private Security Companies, or PSCs, in conditions of armed conflict continues to be an item of concern to the international community. PSCs seem to blur the distinction between combatants and civilians. They use force, but are not members of the armed forces. Rules for the Use of Force, appropriate to PSC tasks and restrictions under international and local national law, issued by a competent authority and properly enforced, can clarify this murky condition. This episode describes procedures and considerations for developing Rules for the Use of Force relevant to PSCs operating in conditions of armed conflict, post-conflict, and complex emergencies. </p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about drafting RUF came from experience doing that, the wise counsel from experts in the US Department of Justice and the DoD Office of the General Counsel, along with some memorable debates in various international negotiations. Once again, special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Thanks also to Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC USN (Ret.)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Listzt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<p>The Montreux Document On pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict, available at <a href='https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html'>https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html</a></p>
<p> Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College, available at <a href='https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils'>https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils</a></p>
<p>Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, available at <a href='https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449'>https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449</a></p>
<p>DODD 5210.56 w C1, Arming and the Use of Force, available at <a href='https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3D%3D'>https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3d%3d</a></p>
<p>UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Handbook on the Use of Force by Private Security Companies available at <a href='https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/19-02086_Private_Security_Company_Handbook_Maritime_Crime_ebook.pdf'>https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/19-02086_Private_Security_Company_Handbook_Maritime_Crime_ebook.pdf</a></p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The presence of Private Security Companies, or PSCs, in conditions of armed conflict continues to be an item of concern to the international community. PSCs seem to blur the distinction between combatants and civilians. They use force, but are not members of the armed forces. Rules for the Use of Force, appropriate to PSC tasks and restrictions under international and local national law, issued by a competent authority and properly enforced, can clarify this murky condition. This episode describes procedures and considerations for developing Rules for the Use of Force relevant to PSCs operating in conditions of armed conflict, post-conflict, and complex emergencies. </p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about drafting RUF came from experience doing that, the wise counsel from experts in the US Department of Justice and the DoD Office of the General Counsel, along with some memorable debates in various international negotiations. Once again, special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Thanks also to Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC USN (Ret.)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Listzt, F. and the USMC Band, <em>Les Preludes</em> (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, P., <em>Mercenaries</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>References:</p>
<p><em>The</em> <em>Montreux Document On pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict,</em> available at <a href='https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html'>https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html</a></p>
<p><em> </em><em>Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook</em>, U.S. Naval War College, available at <a href='https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils'>https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils</a></p>
<p><em>Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement</em>, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, available at <a href='https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449'>https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449</a></p>
<p>DODD 5210.56 w C1, <em>Arming and the Use of Force</em>, available at <a href='https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3D%3D'>https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3d%3d</a></p>
<p>UN Office of Drugs and Crime, <em>Handbook on the Use of Force by Private Security Companies </em>available at <a href='https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/19-02086_Private_Security_Company_Handbook_Maritime_Crime_ebook.pdf'>https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/19-02086_Private_Security_Company_Handbook_Maritime_Crime_ebook.pdf</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/xaivtd/E80_PSC_RUF.mp3" length="21548221" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The presence of Private Security Companies, or PSCs, in conditions of armed conflict continues to be an item of concern to the international community. PSCs seem to blur the distinction between combatants and civilians. They use force, but are not members of the armed forces. Rules for the Use of Force, appropriate to PSC tasks and restrictions under international and local national law, issued by a competent authority and properly enforced, can clarify this murky condition. This episode describes procedures and considerations for developing Rules for the Use of Force relevant to PSCs operating in conditions of armed conflict, post-conflict, and complex emergencies. 
 
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about drafting RUF came from experience doing that, the wise counsel from experts in the US Department of Justice and the DoD Office of the General Counsel, along with some memorable debates in various international negotiations. Once again, special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Thanks also to Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC USN (Ret.)
 
Music:
Listzt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)
 
References:
The Montreux Document On pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict, available at https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html
 Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College, available at https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils
Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449
DODD 5210.56 w C1, Arming and the Use of Force, available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3d%3d
UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Handbook on the Use of Force by Private Security Companies available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/19-02086_Private_Security_Company_Handbook_Maritime_Crime_ebook.pdf]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>673</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>80</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E80_RUF_PSC.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E79: Rules for the Use of Force</title>
        <itunes:title>E79: Rules for the Use of Force</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e79-rules-for-the-use-of-force/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e79-rules-for-the-use-of-force/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 03 Nov 2023 13:43:02 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/cba5ea73-ba1d-3994-91b3-7ca3245ff8f8</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The mission of the US Army is to fight and win our nation’s wars. That, however, is not the only task we ask the Army to perform in potentially hostile environments. Missions such as military support to civil authority, humanitarian assistance missions, and disaster relief are not governed by the law of war, but by human rights law. In this context, military use of force is regulated by Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), rather than the combat-oriented Rules of Engagement (ROE). This episode describes the difference between ROE and RUF, the challenges in drafting RUF that can accomplish peacetime missions and protect our troops, while complying with applicable civilian law regarding use of force and firearms.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about drafting RUF came from experience doing that, the wise counsel from experts in the US Department of Justice and the DoD Office of the General Counsel, along with some memorable debates in various international negotiations. Once again, special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Thanks also to Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC USN (Ret.)</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Bagley, E. and The US Army Ceremonial Band, National Emblem, Public Domain</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)</p>
<p>References:</p>
<p>Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College <a href='https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils'>https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils</a></p>
<p>Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law <a href='https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449'>https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449</a></p>
<p>CJCSI 33121.01B Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force, declassified version available at: <a href='https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_Staff/20-F-1436_FINAL_RELEASE.pdf'>https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_Staff/20-F-1436_FINAL_RELEASE.pdf</a></p>
<p>DODD 5210.56 w C1, Arming and the Use of Force, available at <a href='https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3D%3D'>https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3d%3d</a></p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The mission of the US Army is to fight and win our nation’s wars. That, however, is not the only task we ask the Army to perform in potentially hostile environments. Missions such as military support to civil authority, humanitarian assistance missions, and disaster relief are not governed by the law of war, but by human rights law. In this context, military use of force is regulated by Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), rather than the combat-oriented Rules of Engagement (ROE). This episode describes the difference between ROE and RUF, the challenges in drafting RUF that can accomplish peacetime missions and protect our troops, while complying with applicable civilian law regarding use of force and firearms.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about drafting RUF came from experience doing that, the wise counsel from experts in the US Department of Justice and the DoD Office of the General Counsel, along with some memorable debates in various international negotiations. Once again, special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Thanks also to Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC USN (Ret.)</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Bagley, E. and The US Army Ceremonial Band, <em>National Emblem</em>, Public Domain</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, P., <em>Mercenaries</em>, Machinamasound (Licensed)</p>
<p>References:</p>
<p><em>Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook</em>, U.S. Naval War College <a href='https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils'>https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils</a></p>
<p><em>Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement</em>, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law <a href='https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449'>https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449</a></p>
<p>CJCSI 33121.01B <em>Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force</em>, declassified version available at: <a href='https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_Staff/20-F-1436_FINAL_RELEASE.pdf'>https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_Staff/20-F-1436_FINAL_RELEASE.pdf</a></p>
<p>DODD 5210.56 w C1, <em>Arming and the Use of Force</em>, available at <a href='https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3D%3D'>https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3d%3d</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/qpfa2q/E79_RUF.mp3" length="29252045" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The mission of the US Army is to fight and win our nation’s wars. That, however, is not the only task we ask the Army to perform in potentially hostile environments. Missions such as military support to civil authority, humanitarian assistance missions, and disaster relief are not governed by the law of war, but by human rights law. In this context, military use of force is regulated by Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), rather than the combat-oriented Rules of Engagement (ROE). This episode describes the difference between ROE and RUF, the challenges in drafting RUF that can accomplish peacetime missions and protect our troops, while complying with applicable civilian law regarding use of force and firearms.
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about drafting RUF came from experience doing that, the wise counsel from experts in the US Department of Justice and the DoD Office of the General Counsel, along with some memorable debates in various international negotiations. Once again, special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret. Thanks also to Capt. Dennis Mandsager, JAGC USN (Ret.)
Music:
Bagley, E. and The US Army Ceremonial Band, National Emblem, Public Domain
Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinamasound (Licensed)
References:
Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils
Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449
CJCSI 33121.01B Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force, declassified version available at: https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Joint_Staff/20-F-1436_FINAL_RELEASE.pdf
DODD 5210.56 w C1, Arming and the Use of Force, available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/521056p.PDF?ver=PIvIb3eht0obgolnD0UCEw%3d%3d]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>913</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>79</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E79_RUF.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E78: ROE and the Law of War</title>
        <itunes:title>E78: ROE and the Law of War</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e78-roe-and-the-law-of-war/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e78-roe-and-the-law-of-war/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 26 Oct 2023 19:49:02 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/55531caf-68ff-36da-b4c1-eda690069933</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>How do rules of engagement promote compliance with the laws of war when those fighting war seem to do so without any basic consideration of humanity? I think that to answer this question, we must revisit the laws and customs of war, sometimes called International Humanitarian Law. This includes understanding that not every act of violence in war is a war crime. Effective ROE is a control to manage the risk that the violence inherent to war does not become an excuse for war crimes.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about law of war came from staff judge advocates telling me what I couldn’t do or how to do the things I wanted to do without going to jail. Special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret.</p>
<p>Music: Holst, G: The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War (Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul><li>The ICRC Casebook, glossary: <a href='https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/war-crimes'>https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/war-crimes</a></li>
<li>18 U.S. Code § 2441 - War crimes</li>
</ul>
<ul><li>Geneva Conventions of 1949: <a href='https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/geneva-conventions-1949additional-protocols-and-their-commentaries'>https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/geneva-conventions-1949additional-protocols-and-their-commentaries</a></li>
</ul>
<ul><li>Operational Law Handbook, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School Charlottesville, Virginia, Chapter 5 (2022)</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How do rules of engagement promote compliance with the laws of war when those fighting war seem to do so without any basic consideration of humanity? I think that to answer this question, we must revisit the laws and customs of war, sometimes called International Humanitarian Law. This includes understanding that not every act of violence in war is a war crime. Effective ROE is a control to manage the risk that the violence inherent to war does not become an excuse for war crimes.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about law of war came from staff judge advocates telling me what I couldn’t do or how to do the things I wanted to do without going to jail. Special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret.</p>
<p>Music: Holst, G: <em>The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War </em>(Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry,</em> Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul><li><em>The ICRC Casebook,</em> glossary: <a href='https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/war-crimes'>https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/war-crimes</a></li>
<li>18 U.S. Code § 2441 - <em>War crimes</em></li>
</ul>
<ul><li>Geneva Conventions of 1949: <a href='https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/geneva-conventions-1949additional-protocols-and-their-commentaries'>https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/geneva-conventions-1949additional-protocols-and-their-commentaries</a></li>
</ul>
<ul><li><em>Operational Law Handbook</em>, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School Charlottesville, Virginia, Chapter 5 (2022)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/wkz3f9/E78_ROE_and_LOW.mp3" length="20929642" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[How do rules of engagement promote compliance with the laws of war when those fighting war seem to do so without any basic consideration of humanity? I think that to answer this question, we must revisit the laws and customs of war, sometimes called International Humanitarian Law. This includes understanding that not every act of violence in war is a war crime. Effective ROE is a control to manage the risk that the violence inherent to war does not become an excuse for war crimes.
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with. I am not a military lawyer. Everything I know about law of war came from staff judge advocates telling me what I couldn’t do or how to do the things I wanted to do without going to jail. Special thanks to the memory of Col. Hays Parks, USMC Ret.
Music: Holst, G: The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War (Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)
References:
The ICRC Casebook, glossary: https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/war-crimes
18 U.S. Code § 2441 - War crimes
Geneva Conventions of 1949: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/geneva-conventions-1949additional-protocols-and-their-commentaries
Operational Law Handbook, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School Charlottesville, Virginia, Chapter 5 (2022)
]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>653</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>78</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E78_ROE_LOW.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E77: Rules of Engagement</title>
        <itunes:title>E77: Rules of Engagement</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e77-rules-of-engagement/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e77-rules-of-engagement/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 14 Oct 2023 19:12:07 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/a7a23cf2-ab59-359e-80b3-18769907e250</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Rules of engagement, or ROE, often get a bad reputation. But what are rules of engagement and why do we need them?  If well constructed, ROE focus military action, manage risk of unintended consequences, such as escalation of the conflict and violations of the law of war, and as an economy of force, by minimizing unproductive action. On the other hand, poorly constructed, complex, or difficult to understand ROE, can result in the death of persons who pose no military threat or can surrender tactical advantages leading to unnecessary loss of friendly lives and mission failure. This episode describes what Rules of Engagement are, how they are constructed, and the important role they serve in modern armed conflict.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.</p>
<p>Music: Holst, G: The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War (Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
<p>References: Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College <a href='https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils'>https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils</a></p>
<p>Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law <a href='https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449'>https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449</a></p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rules of engagement, or ROE, often get a bad reputation. But what are rules of engagement and why do we need them?  If well constructed, ROE focus military action, manage risk of unintended consequences, such as escalation of the conflict and violations of the law of war, and as an economy of force, by minimizing unproductive action. On the other hand, poorly constructed, complex, or difficult to understand ROE, can result in the death of persons who pose no military threat or can surrender tactical advantages leading to unnecessary loss of friendly lives and mission failure. This episode describes what Rules of Engagement are, how they are constructed, and the important role they serve in modern armed conflict.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.</p>
<p>Music: Holst, G: <em>The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War </em>(Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry,</em> Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
<p>References: <em>Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook</em>, U.S. Naval War College <a href='https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils'>https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils</a></p>
<p>Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law <a href='https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449'>https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/xxd5fq/E77_ROE.mp3" length="28633466" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Rules of engagement, or ROE, often get a bad reputation. But what are rules of engagement and why do we need them?  If well constructed, ROE focus military action, manage risk of unintended consequences, such as escalation of the conflict and violations of the law of war, and as an economy of force, by minimizing unproductive action. On the other hand, poorly constructed, complex, or difficult to understand ROE, can result in the death of persons who pose no military threat or can surrender tactical advantages leading to unnecessary loss of friendly lives and mission failure. This episode describes what Rules of Engagement are, how they are constructed, and the important role they serve in modern armed conflict.
 
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been affiliated with.
Music: Holst, G: The Planets, Mars, the Bringer of War (Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)
References: Newport Rules of Engagement Handbook, U.S. Naval War College https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2998&amp;context=ils
Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjdtL7pue-BAxUovokEHS03DrAQFnoECBAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fiihl.org%2Fsanremo-handbook-rules-engagement%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2Mfr7ljzl1-c6EEgmxJCZ2&amp;opi=89978449]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>894</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>77</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E77_ROE_s9ycdz.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E76: Limited War with China</title>
        <itunes:title>E76: Limited War with China</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e76-limited-war-with-china/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e76-limited-war-with-china/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 07 Sep 2023 20:50:34 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/fb6abda2-50c4-3862-8c01-201a088dae49</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>It is probable that Russia’s lack of success in Ukraine gives the People’s Republic of China cause for reconsidering any existing plans for an invasion of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Perhaps, using the PRC’s unrestricted war model, they might instead resort to pursuing limited aims that will set conditions for later strategic victory. In other words, limited war. But what is limited war and is limited war even possible in the 21st Century?</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.</p>
<p>Music: List: Les Preludes; Abergavenny Symphony Orchestra (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It is probable that Russia’s lack of success in Ukraine gives the People’s Republic of China cause for reconsidering any existing plans for an invasion of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Perhaps, using the PRC’s unrestricted war model, they might instead resort to pursuing limited aims that will set conditions for later strategic victory. In other words, limited war. But what is limited war and is limited war even possible in the 21st Century?</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.</p>
<p>Music: List: Les Preludes; Abergavenny Symphony Orchestra (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry,</em> Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/29sgb9/E76_Limited_War.mp3" length="29537093" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[It is probable that Russia’s lack of success in Ukraine gives the People’s Republic of China cause for reconsidering any existing plans for an invasion of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Perhaps, using the PRC’s unrestricted war model, they might instead resort to pursuing limited aims that will set conditions for later strategic victory. In other words, limited war. But what is limited war and is limited war even possible in the 21st Century?
 
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.
Music: List: Les Preludes; Abergavenny Symphony Orchestra (Public Domain)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>922</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>77</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E76_Limited_War.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Wagner Decapitated?</title>
        <itunes:title>Wagner Decapitated?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/wagner-decapitated/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/wagner-decapitated/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 26 Aug 2023 21:23:51 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/de35b211-d496-3769-957c-c65c5f222258</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Wagner is dead, or apparently so. At least the senior leadership of PMC Wagner, along with Wagner himself, Dmitri Utkin. What does this mean? Anyone who says they know is either deluding you or deluding themselves. Although the specifics may be in doubt, I believe that Wagner will continue in some form if not in that name. Prigozhin’s statement from Mali last week is correct. The services Wagner type operations provide to Russian strategic interests are too valuable to set aside.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Wagner, R. and USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March, Public Domain.</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wagner is dead, or apparently so. At least the senior leadership of PMC Wagner, along with Wagner himself, Dmitri Utkin. What does this mean? Anyone who says they know is either deluding you or deluding themselves. Although the specifics may be in doubt, I believe that Wagner will continue in some form if not in that name. Prigozhin’s statement from Mali last week is correct. The services Wagner type operations provide to Russian strategic interests are too valuable to set aside.</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Wagner, R. and USMC Band, <em>Siegfried’s Funeral March</em>, Public Domain.</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, P., <em>Mercenaries,</em> Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ujphjr/E75_Wagner_Decapitation.mp3" length="19808675" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Wagner is dead, or apparently so. At least the senior leadership of PMC Wagner, along with Wagner himself, Dmitri Utkin. What does this mean? Anyone who says they know is either deluding you or deluding themselves. Although the specifics may be in doubt, I believe that Wagner will continue in some form if not in that name. Prigozhin’s statement from Mali last week is correct. The services Wagner type operations provide to Russian strategic interests are too valuable to set aside.
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.
Music:
Wagner, R. and USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March, Public Domain.
Kiilstofte, P., Mercenaries, Machinimasound (Licensed)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>618</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>76</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E75_Wagner_Decapitated.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E74: Niger -- Military Coup as Hybrid Warfare?</title>
        <itunes:title>E74: Niger -- Military Coup as Hybrid Warfare?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e74-niger-military-coup-as-hybrid-warfare/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e74-niger-military-coup-as-hybrid-warfare/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 19 Aug 2023 15:34:33 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/9217c791-d0d2-3ed9-96f2-dc100470c985</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Does the recent coup in Niger affect US security interests, or is it just one more coup on a coup plagued continent? Or is it something more than that? Could it be the next campaign in a Hybrid War? If so, who are the contestants?</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Liszt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes, Public Domain</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., Mercenaries, Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Does the recent coup in Niger affect US security interests, or is it just one more coup on a coup plagued continent? Or is it something more than that? Could it be the next campaign in a Hybrid War? If so, who are the contestants?</p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Liszt, F. and the USMC Band, <em>Les Preludes</em>, Public Domain</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., <em>Mercenaries,</em> Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/gs65n2/E74_Niger.mp3" length="28778079" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Does the recent coup in Niger affect US security interests, or is it just one more coup on a coup plagued continent? Or is it something more than that? Could it be the next campaign in a Hybrid War? If so, who are the contestants?
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with
Music:
Liszt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes, Public Domain
Kiilstofte, J., Mercenaries, Machinimasound (Licensed)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>899</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>75</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E74_Niger.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E73 Triumph of the Will</title>
        <itunes:title>E73 Triumph of the Will</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/triumph-of-the-will/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/triumph-of-the-will/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 10:44:24 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/134422dd-a90d-394f-9e77-e103e5597260</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Clausewitz wrote that war is an act of violence to force the enemy to do our will. But what is that “will?” A 2019 Rand Study found that there is no official or agreed definition of “will” in the context of warfighting. In this episode, I tackle the question of what will means, why it is important, and the dangers going to war without a national will for victory.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>(Note: I am full aware of the title. It just sounded more catchy than "The Will to Fight.")</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, <a href='https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709'>https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709</a></p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Clausewitz wrote that war is an act of violence to force the enemy to do our will. But what is that “will?” A 2019 Rand Study found that there is no official or agreed definition of “will” in the context of warfighting. In this episode, I tackle the question of what will means, why it is important, and the dangers going to war without a national will for victory.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>(Note: I am full aware of the title. It just sounded more catchy than "The Will to Fight.")</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, <a href='https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709'>https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709</a></p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry,</em> Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/annkq3/E73_Triumph_of_the_Will.mp3" length="28539007" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Clausewitz wrote that war is an act of violence to force the enemy to do our will. But what is that “will?” A 2019 Rand Study found that there is no official or agreed definition of “will” in the context of warfighting. In this episode, I tackle the question of what will means, why it is important, and the dangers going to war without a national will for victory.
 
(Note: I am full aware of the title. It just sounded more catchy than "The Will to Fight.")
 
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with
 
Music:
Holst, G. The Planets: Mars, Bringer of War, Internet Archives, https://archive.org/details/GustavHolstThePlanetsMarsTheBringerOfWar_201709
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>891</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>74</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E73_Will_to_Fight.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E72: Warfighting Capabilities</title>
        <itunes:title>E72: Warfighting Capabilities</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e72-warfighting-capabilities/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e72-warfighting-capabilities/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 05 Aug 2023 21:21:48 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/b85ab949-32a5-35fc-ae38-f5a278318ca2</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Strategy is the application of ways and means to achieve an end. But what are means? This podcast describes the need to look beyond the weapons and other warfighting platforms to, instead, identify the capabilities needed to fight wars. Weapons systems and other elements of national power are resources to enable those capabilities.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Liszt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domian)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Strategy is the application of ways and means to achieve an end. But what are means? This podcast describes the need to look beyond the weapons and other warfighting platforms to, instead, identify the capabilities needed to fight wars. Weapons systems and other elements of national power are resources to enable those capabilities.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with</p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Liszt, F. and the USMC Band, <em>Les Preludes</em> (Public Domian)</p>
<p>Kiilstofte, J., <em>The Cavalry,</em> Machinimasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/8vcddy/E72_Warfighting_Capabilities.mp3" length="24972143" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Strategy is the application of ways and means to achieve an end. But what are means? This podcast describes the need to look beyond the weapons and other warfighting platforms to, instead, identify the capabilities needed to fight wars. Weapons systems and other elements of national power are resources to enable those capabilities.
 
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with
Music:
Liszt, F. and the USMC Band, Les Preludes (Public Domian)
Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinimasound (Licensed)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>780</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>73</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E72_Warfighting_Capabilities.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E71: War College for Civilians</title>
        <itunes:title>E71: War College for Civilians</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e71-war-college-for-civilians/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e71-war-college-for-civilians/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 30 Jul 2023 10:35:20 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/5e6d39b5-6aa3-3115-813d-0061244276f8</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>What if I told you that civilians can attend the US Army War College? Not US Government employees, but civilians from all walks of life and professions? Two times each year, the Army War College offers that opportunity through its National Security Seminar and Commandant's National Security Program. In this podcast, I describe that program and interview faculty and guests during  Battlefield Staff Ride.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in this podcast is purely my own and does not represent the official position of the US Army War College or the Department of Defense. In keeping with the non-attribution policy of the War College (Chatham House Rules) the names of persons interviewed are withheld.</p>
<p>For official information about these programs, visit: <a href='https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dde/cnsp/index.cfm'>https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dde/cnsp/index.cfm</a></p>
<p>https://usawc.org/commandants-national-security-program-cnsp/</p>
<p><a href='https://www.csl.army.mil/nss/'>https://www.csl.army.mil/nss/</a></p>
<p><a href='https://usawc.org/national-security-seminar-nss/'>https://usawc.org/national-security-seminar-nss/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</p>
<p>Sousa, J.P., &amp; The US Amy Ceremonial Band. National Emblem (Public Domain)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What if I told you that civilians can attend the US Army War College? Not US Government employees, but civilians from all walks of life and professions? Two times each year, the Army War College offers that opportunity through its National Security Seminar and Commandant's National Security Program. In this podcast, I describe that program and interview faculty and guests during  Battlefield Staff Ride.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in this podcast is purely my own and does not represent the official position of the US Army War College or the Department of Defense. In keeping with the non-attribution policy of the War College (Chatham House Rules) the names of persons interviewed are withheld.</p>
<p>For official information about these programs, visit: <a href='https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dde/cnsp/index.cfm'>https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dde/cnsp/index.cfm</a></p>
<p>https://usawc.org/commandants-national-security-program-cnsp/</p>
<p><a href='https://www.csl.army.mil/nss/'>https://www.csl.army.mil/nss/</a></p>
<p><a href='https://usawc.org/national-security-seminar-nss/'>https://usawc.org/national-security-seminar-nss/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)</p>
<p>Sousa, J.P., &amp; The US Amy Ceremonial Band. <em>National Emblem</em> (Public Domain)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/g7nvjc/E71_CNSP.mp3" length="24876848" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[What if I told you that civilians can attend the US Army War College? Not US Government employees, but civilians from all walks of life and professions? Two times each year, the Army War College offers that opportunity through its National Security Seminar and Commandant's National Security Program. In this podcast, I describe that program and interview faculty and guests during  Battlefield Staff Ride.
 
Disclaimer: The information in this podcast is purely my own and does not represent the official position of the US Army War College or the Department of Defense. In keeping with the non-attribution policy of the War College (Chatham House Rules) the names of persons interviewed are withheld.
For official information about these programs, visit: https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dde/cnsp/index.cfm
https://usawc.org/commandants-national-security-program-cnsp/
https://www.csl.army.mil/nss/
https://usawc.org/national-security-seminar-nss/
 
Music:
Copland, A. &amp; United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)
Sousa, J.P., &amp; The US Amy Ceremonial Band. National Emblem (Public Domain)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>777</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>72</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E71_CNSP2.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E70: Why We Shouldn’t Help Ukraine</title>
        <itunes:title>E70: Why We Shouldn’t Help Ukraine</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e70-why-we-shouldn-t-help-ukraine/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e70-why-we-shouldn-t-help-ukraine/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 22 Jul 2023 17:14:18 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/b2daf61d-bcef-3463-b1f4-77395c6b668b</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The decision whether to help Ukraine is not as black and white as it may appear. Episode 69 described reasons the United States and other nations should help Ukraine. In this episode, I address the other side, reasons why helping Ukraine is either wrong or dangerous. Choosing the right path forward requires us to understand both sides of the argument.</p>
<p>As is the case with all of these podcasts, the views expressed are solely my own and do not represent the Department of Defense, the US Army War College, or any other organization I am associated with.</p>
<p>Music: Wagner, Siegfried Funeral March, recorded by the USMC Band (Public Domain.)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The decision whether to help Ukraine is not as black and white as it may appear. Episode 69 described reasons the United States and other nations should help Ukraine. In this episode, I address the other side, reasons why helping Ukraine is either wrong or dangerous. Choosing the right path forward requires us to understand both sides of the argument.</p>
<p>As is the case with all of these podcasts, the views expressed are solely my own and do not represent the Department of Defense, the US Army War College, or any other organization I am associated with.</p>
<p>Music: Wagner, Siegfried Funeral March, recorded by the USMC Band (Public Domain.)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ujz5md/E70_Reasons_against_involvement.mp3" length="26537818" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The decision whether to help Ukraine is not as black and white as it may appear. Episode 69 described reasons the United States and other nations should help Ukraine. In this episode, I address the other side, reasons why helping Ukraine is either wrong or dangerous. Choosing the right path forward requires us to understand both sides of the argument.
As is the case with all of these podcasts, the views expressed are solely my own and do not represent the Department of Defense, the US Army War College, or any other organization I am associated with.
Music: Wagner, Siegfried Funeral March, recorded by the USMC Band (Public Domain.)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>829</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>71</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E70_Why_we_shouldnt_help.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E69: Ukraine -- Why Should We Care?</title>
        <itunes:title>E69: Ukraine -- Why Should We Care?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e69-ukraine-why-should-we-care/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e69-ukraine-why-should-we-care/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jul 2023 20:38:12 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/6a8da0fd-799f-38ae-8e57-5b38f1647ab2</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Why does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine affect us, or other nations? Isn’t that a matter between Russia and Ukraine? Isn’t our involvement only risking escalation and perhaps a global war? In short, why should we care? This episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare address the first part, why we should care. The next episode will describe and evaluate reasons for staying out of it.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine affect us, or other nations? Isn’t that a matter between Russia and Ukraine? Isn’t our involvement only risking escalation and perhaps a global war? In short, why should we care? This episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare address the first part, why we should care. The next episode will describe and evaluate reasons for staying out of it.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/qdim7w/E69_Why_should_we_care.mp3" length="23592878" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Why does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine affect us, or other nations? Isn’t that a matter between Russia and Ukraine? Isn’t our involvement only risking escalation and perhaps a global war? In short, why should we care? This episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare address the first part, why we should care. The next episode will describe and evaluate reasons for staying out of it.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>737</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>70</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E69_Why_Should_we_care.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E68: Whither Wagner?</title>
        <itunes:title>E68: Whither Wagner?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e68-whither-wagner/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e68-whither-wagner/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 24 Jun 2023 15:34:08 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/377cb9f9-725a-3fba-a7cc-1dc9236641b7</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>What is going on in Russia? Has Prigozhin lost his mind? Or is Wagner merely chess pieces being manipulated by a political chess master? I offer this special podcast in the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare to review points from previous podcasts on Wagner and military coups in light of breaking events in Russia. Even if this is all over by the time you see this, it may be worthwhile to look and see where Prigozhin did what was needed for success or where he missed the mark.</p>
<p>Again, the views presented in these podcasts are my own and do not represent any organization I am currently or previously affiliated with.</p>
<p>Music: List: Les Preludes; Abergavenny Symphony Orchestra (Public Domain)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What is going on in Russia? Has Prigozhin lost his mind? Or is Wagner merely chess pieces being manipulated by a political chess master? I offer this special podcast in the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare to review points from previous podcasts on Wagner and military coups in light of breaking events in Russia. Even if this is all over by the time you see this, it may be worthwhile to look and see where Prigozhin did what was needed for success or where he missed the mark.</p>
<p>Again, the views presented in these podcasts are my own and do not represent any organization I am currently or previously affiliated with.</p>
<p>Music: List: Les Preludes; Abergavenny Symphony Orchestra (Public Domain)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/wffgxn/E68_Whither_Wagner.mp3" length="12084789" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[What is going on in Russia? Has Prigozhin lost his mind? Or is Wagner merely chess pieces being manipulated by a political chess master? I offer this special podcast in the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare to review points from previous podcasts on Wagner and military coups in light of breaking events in Russia. Even if this is all over by the time you see this, it may be worthwhile to look and see where Prigozhin did what was needed for success or where he missed the mark.
Again, the views presented in these podcasts are my own and do not represent any organization I am currently or previously affiliated with.
Music: List: Les Preludes; Abergavenny Symphony Orchestra (Public Domain)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>377</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>69</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E68_Whither_Wagner.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E67: Is Russia at War?</title>
        <itunes:title>E67: Is Russia at War?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e67-is-russia-at-war/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e67-is-russia-at-war/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 17 Jun 2023 16:01:01 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/70684f57-4a16-37fe-80e3-ad4ca6ee4be9</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>On February 23, 2022, the Russian Federation violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine – for the second time in a decade – calling it a “special military operation.” It certainly looks more like a war, but is it really a war? This podcast looks at the current Russian invasion in light of the definitions of war in Episode 7, which include war in theory, practice, and in international law.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>These podcasts do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Army War College, or any other organization I am associated with (but they should!)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Holst, “The Planets: Mars Bringer of War,” downloaded from the Internet Archive <a href='https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles'>https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>(Once again, my move conflicts with proper recording equipment.)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On February 23, 2022, the Russian Federation violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine – for the second time in a decade – calling it a “special military operation.” It certainly looks more like a war, but is it really a war? This podcast looks at the current Russian invasion in light of the definitions of war in Episode 7, which include war in theory, practice, and in international law.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>These podcasts do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Army War College, or any other organization I am associated with (but they should!)</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Holst, “The Planets: Mars Bringer of War,” downloaded from the Internet Archive <a href='https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles'>https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>(Once again, my move conflicts with proper recording equipment.)</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/sr5aii/E67_Is_Russia_at_War9d3qo.mp3" length="26921505" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[On February 23, 2022, the Russian Federation violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine – for the second time in a decade – calling it a “special military operation.” It certainly looks more like a war, but is it really a war? This podcast looks at the current Russian invasion in light of the definitions of war in Episode 7, which include war in theory, practice, and in international law.
 
These podcasts do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Army War College, or any other organization I am associated with (but they should!)
 
Music: Holst, “The Planets: Mars Bringer of War,” downloaded from the Internet Archive https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles
 
(Once again, my move conflicts with proper recording equipment.)
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>841</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>68</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E67_Is_Russia_at_war.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E66: The Role of Citizens in Going to War</title>
        <itunes:title>E66: The Role of Citizens in Going to War</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e66-the-role-of-citizens-in-going-to-war/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e66-the-role-of-citizens-in-going-to-war/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 08 Jun 2023 12:48:39 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/f3842e32-121f-3ce7-8aa0-1f464a636be8</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The United States of America is a republic founded on democratic principles. Not a democracy, but a republic. That means that, except in rare circumstances, the citizens do not vote on issues at the national level. Instead, we elect representatives of the people and of the component states of the United States to make those decisions. That does not, however, absolve those citizens for decisions about war, peace, what goes before, and what comes after. This episode addresses the role of the citizenry in national military strategy and how to properly exercise that role.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Traditional folksong, “Garryowen,” recorded by the U.S. Army Strings</p>
<p>Copland, "Fanfare for the Common Man"</p>
<p>Holst, “The Planets: Mars Bringer of War,” downloaded from the Internet Archive <a href='https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles'>https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles</a></p>
<p>Richard Wagner, “Siegfried Fantasie,” recorded by the USMC Band</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States of America is a republic founded on democratic principles. Not a democracy, but a republic. That means that, except in rare circumstances, the citizens do not vote on issues at the national level. Instead, we elect representatives of the people and of the component states of the United States to make those decisions. That does not, however, absolve those citizens for decisions about war, peace, what goes before, and what comes after. This episode addresses the role of the citizenry in national military strategy and how to properly exercise that role.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Traditional folksong, “Garryowen,” recorded by the U.S. Army Strings</p>
<p>Copland, "Fanfare for the Common Man"</p>
<p>Holst, “The Planets: Mars Bringer of War,” downloaded from the Internet Archive <a href='https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles'>https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles</a></p>
<p>Richard Wagner, “Siegfried Fantasie,” recorded by the USMC Band</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/3anrph/E66_Capstone.mp3" length="18932633" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The United States of America is a republic founded on democratic principles. Not a democracy, but a republic. That means that, except in rare circumstances, the citizens do not vote on issues at the national level. Instead, we elect representatives of the people and of the component states of the United States to make those decisions. That does not, however, absolve those citizens for decisions about war, peace, what goes before, and what comes after. This episode addresses the role of the citizenry in national military strategy and how to properly exercise that role.
 
Music:
Traditional folksong, “Garryowen,” recorded by the U.S. Army Strings
Copland, "Fanfare for the Common Man"
Holst, “The Planets: Mars Bringer of War,” downloaded from the Internet Archive https://archive.org/details/lp_holst-the-planets_gustav-holst-leopold-stokowski-los-angeles
Richard Wagner, “Siegfried Fantasie,” recorded by the USMC Band]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>591</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>67</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E66_Capstone.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E65: The Battlefield Staff Ride</title>
        <itunes:title>E65: The Battlefield Staff Ride</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e65-the-battlefield-staff-ride/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e65-the-battlefield-staff-ride/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 20 May 2023 20:36:04 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/9332561b-b79f-3aa2-9784-763a9c9c5e64</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Why do we study old battles? Historic examples of strategy help us to understand enduring lessons about why nations win or don’t win wars. But historic battles and campaigns were fought using weapons, tactics, and other technology that have little relevance to modern warfare. What is the value in studying them and if we should, then how should we go about it? This episode describes one technique: the Battlefield Staff Ride.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The views in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or any other organization I have been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why do we study old battles? Historic examples of strategy help us to understand enduring lessons about why nations win or don’t win wars. But historic battles and campaigns were fought using weapons, tactics, and other technology that have little relevance to modern warfare. What is the value in studying them and if we should, then how should we go about it? This episode describes one technique: the Battlefield Staff Ride.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The views in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or any other organization I have been associated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/y7jztk/E65_Staff_Ride.mp3" length="20977289" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Why do we study old battles? Historic examples of strategy help us to understand enduring lessons about why nations win or don’t win wars. But historic battles and campaigns were fought using weapons, tactics, and other technology that have little relevance to modern warfare. What is the value in studying them and if we should, then how should we go about it? This episode describes one technique: the Battlefield Staff Ride.
 
The views in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or any other organization I have been associated with.
 
Music: Liszt, Les Preludes, perfomed by the USMC Band. Public Domain]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>655</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>66</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E65_Staff_Ridea60cz.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E64 Military Coup d’États</title>
        <itunes:title>E64 Military Coup d’États</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e64-military-coup-d-etats/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e64-military-coup-d-etats/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 12 Mar 2023 16:59:19 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/3ead7351-05bc-39f0-8b8b-67834cd338b5</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>In Episode 64, Why Wagner, I said one possible risk associated the Wagner Group is the potential that, like previous elite and ostensibly politically reliable mercenary forces, Wagner could be a threat to the Russian government. But what is the likelihood of that happening? This episode explores how military or paramilitary forces might turn on their own governments in a coup d’état.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The views in these podcasts are my own and do not represent the official position of any organization I might be affiliated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Liszt: Les Preludes, recorded by the USMC Band. Public Domain</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In Episode 64, Why Wagner, I said one possible risk associated the Wagner Group is the potential that, like previous elite and ostensibly politically reliable mercenary forces, Wagner could be a threat to the Russian government. But what is the likelihood of that happening? This episode explores how military or paramilitary forces might turn on their own governments in a coup d’état.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The views in these podcasts are my own and do not represent the official position of any organization I might be affiliated with.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Liszt: Les Preludes, recorded by the USMC Band. Public Domain</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/c9cqp8/E64_Military_Coups.mp3" length="43899007" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[In Episode 64, Why Wagner, I said one possible risk associated the Wagner Group is the potential that, like previous elite and ostensibly politically reliable mercenary forces, Wagner could be a threat to the Russian government. But what is the likelihood of that happening? This episode explores how military or paramilitary forces might turn on their own governments in a coup d’état.
 
Disclaimer: The views in these podcasts are my own and do not represent the official position of any organization I might be affiliated with.
 
Music: Liszt: Les Preludes, recorded by the USMC Band. Public Domain]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1371</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>65</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E64_Military_Coups.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E63: Why Wagner?</title>
        <itunes:title>E63: Why Wagner?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e63-why-wagner/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e63-why-wagner/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 24 Jan 2023 11:13:45 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/d581214a-817c-3d1a-9206-d3623ff882bd</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>In the past few months, Moscow has used the Wagner Group as the centerpiece in recent military operations in Ukraine.  This is very different from how Wagner has been used in Africa. Why is Putin giving a quasi-mercenary organization such a central and visible role in its war with Ukraine? There could be different reasons, each of which present advantages and significant risks: risks for Putin, for Russia, for Ukraine, and for future conflict and conflict resolution.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Liszt, Les Preludes; recorded by the USMC Band. Music and recording in Public Domain.</p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the past few months, Moscow has used the Wagner Group as the centerpiece in recent military operations in Ukraine.  This is very different from how Wagner has been used in Africa. Why is Putin giving a quasi-mercenary organization such a central and visible role in its war with Ukraine? There could be different reasons, each of which present advantages and significant risks: risks for Putin, for Russia, for Ukraine, and for future conflict and conflict resolution.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music: Liszt, Les Preludes; recorded by the USMC Band. Music and recording in Public Domain.</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/qn96xm/E63_Why_Wagner.mp3" length="31106948" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[In the past few months, Moscow has used the Wagner Group as the centerpiece in recent military operations in Ukraine.  This is very different from how Wagner has been used in Africa. Why is Putin giving a quasi-mercenary organization such a central and visible role in its war with Ukraine? There could be different reasons, each of which present advantages and significant risks: risks for Putin, for Russia, for Ukraine, and for future conflict and conflict resolution.
 
Music: Liszt, Les Preludes; recorded by the USMC Band. Music and recording in Public Domain.
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>971</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>64</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E63_Why_Wagner.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E62: Mercenaries, Terrorism, and War Crimes</title>
        <itunes:title>E62: Mercenaries, Terrorism, and War Crimes</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e62-mercenaries-terrorism-and-war-crimes/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e62-mercenaries-terrorism-and-war-crimes/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jan 2023 17:54:42 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/45cbc3ea-071c-3287-a387-0a7e5be503d8</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The difference between war and terrorism is that war is, in theory, governed by international law, whereas terrorism is criminal in nature and execution. So where does that leave the use of mercenaries in modern warfare, and particularly the infamous Wagner Group? Are they terrorists? Are they legitimate combatants? Are they both or something else? Can official designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization close an accountability gap?</p>
<p>These episodes are not monetized or sponsored, so if you would like these episodes to continue, if you think these are worthwhile, then hit the like button and share the podcast.</p>
<p>For more information see:</p>
<p>The Department of Defense Law of War Manual, 2015</p>
<p>The Lawfare Blog: It’s Time to Designate the Wagner as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, June 30, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-designate-wagner-group-foreign-terrorist-organization</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Les Preludes: Liszt; Recorded by USMC Band (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Mecenaries: Per Killstofte/Machinasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The difference between war and terrorism is that war is, in theory, governed by international law, whereas terrorism is criminal in nature and execution. So where does that leave the use of mercenaries in modern warfare, and particularly the infamous Wagner Group? Are they terrorists? Are they legitimate combatants? Are they both or something else? Can official designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization close an accountability gap?</p>
<p>These episodes are not monetized or sponsored, so if you would like these episodes to continue, if you think these are worthwhile, then hit the like button and share the podcast.</p>
<p>For more information see:</p>
<p><em>The Department of Defense Law of War Manual,</em> 2015</p>
<p>The Lawfare Blog: <em>It’s Time to Designate the Wagner as a Foreign Terrorist Organization</em>, June 30, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-designate-wagner-group-foreign-terrorist-organization</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Music:</p>
<p>Les Preludes: Liszt; Recorded by USMC Band (Public Domain)</p>
<p>Mecenaries: Per Killstofte/Machinasound (Licensed)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/7naxi4/E62_Mercenaries_Terrorism_War_Crimes.mp3" length="27255036" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The difference between war and terrorism is that war is, in theory, governed by international law, whereas terrorism is criminal in nature and execution. So where does that leave the use of mercenaries in modern warfare, and particularly the infamous Wagner Group? Are they terrorists? Are they legitimate combatants? Are they both or something else? Can official designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization close an accountability gap?
These episodes are not monetized or sponsored, so if you would like these episodes to continue, if you think these are worthwhile, then hit the like button and share the podcast.
For more information see:
The Department of Defense Law of War Manual, 2015
The Lawfare Blog: It’s Time to Designate the Wagner as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, June 30, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-designate-wagner-group-foreign-terrorist-organization
 
Music:
Les Preludes: Liszt; Recorded by USMC Band (Public Domain)
Mecenaries: Per Killstofte/Machinasound (Licensed)]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>851</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>63</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E62_Merc_Terror_WarCrime.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E61: War and Terrorism</title>
        <itunes:title>E61: War and Terrorism</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e61-war-and-terrorism/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e61-war-and-terrorism/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jan 2023 21:19:59 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/29ea2225-7efb-3e6f-bdfd-674ea0d2f03b</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>If there is one thing that pacifists and generals agree on, it is that war is terrible. The dictionary definition of terrible is “causing terror.” If war, by its very nature, causes terror, then what is the difference between war and terrorism? I explore that in this episode, leading up to the next episode, where I will apply this information to the war in Ukraine. That is the subject of the next few episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. If you think these podcasts are worth listening to, please hit like.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own analysis and opinion and does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or any organization I am or have been affiliated with.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If there is one thing that pacifists and generals agree on, it is that war is terrible. The dictionary definition of terrible is “causing terror.” If war, by its very nature, causes terror, then what is the difference between war and terrorism? I explore that in this episode, leading up to the next episode, where I will apply this information to the war in Ukraine. That is the subject of the next few episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. If you think these podcasts are worth listening to, please hit like.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own analysis and opinion and does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or any organization I am or have been affiliated with.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/8ckewh/E61_War_and_Terrorism.mp3" length="22886527" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[If there is one thing that pacifists and generals agree on, it is that war is terrible. The dictionary definition of terrible is “causing terror.” If war, by its very nature, causes terror, then what is the difference between war and terrorism? I explore that in this episode, leading up to the next episode, where I will apply this information to the war in Ukraine. That is the subject of the next few episodes of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. If you think these podcasts are worth listening to, please hit like.
 
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own analysis and opinion and does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or any organization I am or have been affiliated with.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>715</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>62</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E61_War_and_Terrorism_5wsknk.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E60: The Myth of Limited War</title>
        <itunes:title>E60: The Myth of Limited War</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e60-the-myth-of-limited-war/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e60-the-myth-of-limited-war/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Wed, 21 Dec 2022 22:20:02 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/44f36231-340b-343a-b08a-be9b22abc659</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>What if I told you that neither Total War or Limited War reflect reality? Further that the West's concept of limited war only limits the ability of states to achieve the only acceptable goal of any war?</p>
<p> </p>
<p>For further reading:</p>
<p>Stoker, Donald, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the present, ISBN978-1-009-22086-6</p>
<p>Summers, Harry, , On Strategy ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0891415637</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What if I told you that neither Total War or Limited War reflect reality? Further that the West's concept of limited war only limits the ability of states to achieve the only acceptable goal of any war?</p>
<p> </p>
<p>For further reading:</p>
<p>Stoker, Donald, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the present, ISBN978-1-009-22086-6</p>
<p>Summers, Harry, , <em>On Strategy</em> ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0891415637</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/h8nrqv/E60_The_Myth_of_Limited_War.mp3" length="29917436" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[What if I told you that neither Total War or Limited War reflect reality? Further that the West's concept of limited war only limits the ability of states to achieve the only acceptable goal of any war?
 
For further reading:
Stoker, Donald, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the present, ISBN978-1-009-22086-6
Summers, Harry, , On Strategy ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0891415637]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>934</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>61</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E60_Limited_war_h52swx.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E59: Conventional Warfare is NOT Dead</title>
        <itunes:title>E59: Conventional Warfare is NOT Dead</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e59-conventional-warfare-is-not-dead/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e59-conventional-warfare-is-not-dead/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 20 Nov 2022 22:43:52 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/c1fd474e-1a87-32e8-a0bd-0564ca11fed3</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>With the current war in Ukraine, it may seem obvious that conventional war is still important. But less than a year ago, many prominent military experts said otherwise. Some writers and opinion leaders still maintain that the current conflict is an exception, an aberration, and focusing on conventional war, or traditional warfare does not prepare us for future conflict. They are wrong.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With the current war in Ukraine, it may seem obvious that conventional war is still important. But less than a year ago, many prominent military experts said otherwise. Some writers and opinion leaders still maintain that the current conflict is an exception, an aberration, and focusing on conventional war, or traditional warfare does not prepare us for future conflict. They are wrong.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/umgq9k/E59_Conventional_Warfare_not_dead.mp3" length="33246899" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[With the current war in Ukraine, it may seem obvious that conventional war is still important. But less than a year ago, many prominent military experts said otherwise. Some writers and opinion leaders still maintain that the current conflict is an exception, an aberration, and focusing on conventional war, or traditional warfare does not prepare us for future conflict. They are wrong.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1038</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>60</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E59_Conv_War_di6zax.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E58: Is Combat Aviation Still Relevant?</title>
        <itunes:title>E58: Is Combat Aviation Still Relevant?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e58-is-combat-aviation-still-relevant/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e58-is-combat-aviation-still-relevant/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 24 Oct 2022 14:22:20 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/7ddab0b5-016e-3c26-b614-0edafce37b97</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Twitter and You Tube can present an inaccurate picture of modern warfare. In the previous Podcast, I described how the tank continues to be relevant on the modern battlefield, despite social media images. This same social media depicts Combat aviation of all varieties falling from the sky on a daily basis, without apparent battlefield effect. Col. Jayson Altieri, US Army Retired, and instructor at the US Air War College joins me for an open discussion on the use and misuse of combat aviation in modern warfare.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Twitter and You Tube can present an inaccurate picture of modern warfare. In the previous Podcast, I described how the tank continues to be relevant on the modern battlefield, despite social media images. This same social media depicts Combat aviation of all varieties falling from the sky on a daily basis, without apparent battlefield effect. Col. Jayson Altieri, US Army Retired, and instructor at the US Air War College joins me for an open discussion on the use and misuse of combat aviation in modern warfare.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/5bpua6/E58_The_relevance_of_Combat_Aviation.mp3" length="48939595" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Twitter and You Tube can present an inaccurate picture of modern warfare. In the previous Podcast, I described how the tank continues to be relevant on the modern battlefield, despite social media images. This same social media depicts Combat aviation of all varieties falling from the sky on a daily basis, without apparent battlefield effect. Col. Jayson Altieri, US Army Retired, and instructor at the US Air War College joins me for an open discussion on the use and misuse of combat aviation in modern warfare.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1529</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>59</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E58_Combat_Aviation.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>The Tank is NOT Dead, Long Live the Tank!</title>
        <itunes:title>The Tank is NOT Dead, Long Live the Tank!</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-tank-is-not-dead-long-live-the-tank/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-tank-is-not-dead-long-live-the-tank/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 02 Sep 2022 20:29:17 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/ca74760b-8246-31c9-9fed-836699bf01be</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Video clips show Russian tanks in Ukraine blowing up after being hit by various anti-tank guided missiles. Moscow has lost so many tanks that some reports say they are forced to pull obsolete models from reserve stocks or even museums. The conclusion in popular media is that the tank is dead, obsolete as a weapon of modern combat. I think that the tank is as important today as any time in history. Like all previous times in history, it is a matter of how it is used -- or misused.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Also please check out "No the Tank is Not Dead" by "The Chieftan: at <a href='https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8'>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8</a></p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Video clips show Russian tanks in Ukraine blowing up after being hit by various anti-tank guided missiles. Moscow has lost so many tanks that some reports say they are forced to pull obsolete models from reserve stocks or even museums. The conclusion in popular media is that the tank is dead, obsolete as a weapon of modern combat. I think that the tank is as important today as any time in history. Like all previous times in history, it is a matter of how it is used -- or misused.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Also please check out "No the Tank is Not Dead" by "The Chieftan: at <a href='https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8'>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ihmpxc/E57_Tanks_in_Ukraine.mp3" length="27349495" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Video clips show Russian tanks in Ukraine blowing up after being hit by various anti-tank guided missiles. Moscow has lost so many tanks that some reports say they are forced to pull obsolete models from reserve stocks or even museums. The conclusion in popular media is that the tank is dead, obsolete as a weapon of modern combat. I think that the tank is as important today as any time in history. Like all previous times in history, it is a matter of how it is used -- or misused.
 
Also please check out "No the Tank is Not Dead" by "The Chieftan: at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>854</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>58</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E57_The_Tank.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E56: The Law of War; I’m not dead yet!</title>
        <itunes:title>E56: The Law of War; I’m not dead yet!</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e56-the-law-of-war-i-m-not-dead-yet/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e56-the-law-of-war-i-m-not-dead-yet/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 12 Jun 2022 18:49:05 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/85cf2325-5cc7-37ac-87e6-c1dc897cf745</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine disproves many recent predictions about the future of war. This includes the predictions about the death of the law of war. The perception of the legitimacy of war depends in large part on seemingly ancient notions of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello. The war in Ukraine shows that legitimacy, or loss of legitimacy, has serious consequences.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>For more information on the material in this podcast see:</p>
<p> </p>
<p>“The End of History”: <a href='https://www.c-span.org/video/?24282-1/the-end-history-man'>https://www.c-span.org/video/?24282-1/the-end-history-man</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>“The Laws of War on Land”: <a href='https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=B06FB334DC14CBD1C12563CD00515767'>https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=B06FB334DC14CBD1C12563CD00515767</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>“Should the Laws of War Apply to Terrorists?” <a href='https://www.jstor.org/stable/25658249'>https://www.jstor.org/stable/25658249</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>“On the Nature of War”: Helmuth von Moltke: <a href='http://www.gwpda.org/1914m/moltke.html'>http://www.gwpda.org/1914m/moltke.html</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Defense Department Law of War Manual: https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD Law of War Manual - June 2015 Updated Dec 2016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190</p>
<p> </p>
<p>"Russia’s military is incompetent. That makes it more dangerous." <a href='https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/17/russia-military-failing-dangerous/'>https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/17/russia-military-failing-dangerous/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Col. Christopher T. Mayer, US Army Retired, is a former instructor of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College, guest lecturer on national security at academic institutions in the United States and Europe, and developed operational and organizational concepts for future warfare. He is a veteran of combat operations in Iraq and peacekeeping operations in Africa and the Balkans.</p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine disproves many recent predictions about the future of war. This includes the predictions about the death of the law of war. The perception of the legitimacy of war depends in large part on seemingly ancient notions of <em>Jus Ad Bellum</em> and <em>Jus in Bello</em>. The war in Ukraine shows that legitimacy, or loss of legitimacy, has serious consequences.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>For more information on the material in this podcast see:</p>
<p> </p>
<p>“The End of History”: <a href='https://www.c-span.org/video/?24282-1/the-end-history-man'>https://www.c-span.org/video/?24282-1/the-end-history-man</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>“The Laws of War on Land”: <a href='https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=B06FB334DC14CBD1C12563CD00515767'>https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=B06FB334DC14CBD1C12563CD00515767</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>“Should the Laws of War Apply to Terrorists?” <a href='https://www.jstor.org/stable/25658249'>https://www.jstor.org/stable/25658249</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>“On the Nature of War”: Helmuth von Moltke: <a href='http://www.gwpda.org/1914m/moltke.html'>http://www.gwpda.org/1914m/moltke.html</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p><em>Defense Department Law of War Manual</em>: https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD Law of War Manual - June 2015 Updated Dec 2016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190</p>
<p> </p>
<p>"Russia’s military is incompetent. That makes it more dangerous." <a href='https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/17/russia-military-failing-dangerous/'>https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/17/russia-military-failing-dangerous/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Col. Christopher T. Mayer, US Army Retired, is a former instructor of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College, guest lecturer on national security at academic institutions in the United States and Europe, and developed operational and organizational concepts for future warfare. He is a veteran of combat operations in Iraq and peacekeeping operations in Africa and the Balkans.</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/dbhk7t/E56_Law_of_War.mp3" length="19883908" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine disproves many recent predictions about the future of war. This includes the predictions about the death of the law of war. The perception of the legitimacy of war depends in large part on seemingly ancient notions of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello. The war in Ukraine shows that legitimacy, or loss of legitimacy, has serious consequences.
 
For more information on the material in this podcast see:
 
“The End of History”: https://www.c-span.org/video/?24282-1/the-end-history-man
 
“The Laws of War on Land”: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=B06FB334DC14CBD1C12563CD00515767
 
“Should the Laws of War Apply to Terrorists?” https://www.jstor.org/stable/25658249
 
“On the Nature of War”: Helmuth von Moltke: http://www.gwpda.org/1914m/moltke.html
 
Defense Department Law of War Manual: https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD Law of War Manual - June 2015 Updated Dec 2016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190
 
"Russia’s military is incompetent. That makes it more dangerous." https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/17/russia-military-failing-dangerous/
 
Col. Christopher T. Mayer, US Army Retired, is a former instructor of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College, guest lecturer on national security at academic institutions in the United States and Europe, and developed operational and organizational concepts for future warfare. He is a veteran of combat operations in Iraq and peacekeeping operations in Africa and the Balkans.
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>621</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>57</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E56_Law_of_War.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E55 Other Roles for the Military Instrument of National Power</title>
        <itunes:title>E55 Other Roles for the Military Instrument of National Power</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e55-other-roles-for-the-military-instrument-of-national-power/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e55-other-roles-for-the-military-instrument-of-national-power/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2022 19:08:21 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/a216a427-1a43-318e-a9ef-b834b2f24876</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The primary purpose of any nation’s military force is to fight and win its wars. However, the military instrument of national power does much more than that. Most of those things keep the nation from having to fight wars. US and NATO support to Ukraine provides examples of the non-conflict roles of the military instrument.  </p>
<p>If you think this material is worthwhile, please hit the like button, leave a comment, or share it with someone.</p>
<p>For more information about the role of Mercenaries in war and non-conflict situations please listen to these podcasts in the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare:</p>
<p>Episode 2: Who are these Russian quasi-mercenaries? <a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/who-are-these-russian-quasi-mercenaries/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/who-are-these-russian-quasi-mercenaries/</a></p>
<p>Episode 3: The role of mercenaries in hybrid warfare</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-role-of-mercenaries-in-hybrid-warfare/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-role-of-mercenaries-in-hybrid-warfare/</a></p>
<p>Episode 4: Why are Russian PMCs different from Western PMSCs?</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/why-are-russian-pmcs-different-from-western-pmscs-with-dr-jovana-ranito/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/why-are-russian-pmcs-different-from-western-pmscs-with-dr-jovana-ranito/</a></p>
<p>Episode 6: Meeting the Challenge of Russian Private Military Companies</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/meeting-the-challenge-of-russian-private-military-companies/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/meeting-the-challenge-of-russian-private-military-companies/</a></p>
<p>Episode 12: Mercenary: What is in a name?</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e12-mercenary-whats-in-a-name/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e12-mercenary-whats-in-a-name/</a></p>
<p>Episode 19: The rise of Quasi-Mercenary Organizations</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e19-the-rise-of-quasi-mercenary-organizations/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e19-the-rise-of-quasi-mercenary-organizations/</a></p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The primary purpose of any nation’s military force is to fight and win its wars. However, the military instrument of national power does much more than that. Most of those things keep the nation from having to fight wars. US and NATO support to Ukraine provides examples of the non-conflict roles of the military instrument.  </p>
<p>If you think this material is worthwhile, please hit the like button, leave a comment, or share it with someone.</p>
<p>For more information about the role of Mercenaries in war and non-conflict situations please listen to these podcasts in the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare:</p>
<p>Episode 2: Who are these Russian quasi-mercenaries? <a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/who-are-these-russian-quasi-mercenaries/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/who-are-these-russian-quasi-mercenaries/</a></p>
<p>Episode 3: The role of mercenaries in hybrid warfare</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-role-of-mercenaries-in-hybrid-warfare/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-role-of-mercenaries-in-hybrid-warfare/</a></p>
<p>Episode 4: Why are Russian PMCs different from Western PMSCs?</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/why-are-russian-pmcs-different-from-western-pmscs-with-dr-jovana-ranito/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/why-are-russian-pmcs-different-from-western-pmscs-with-dr-jovana-ranito/</a></p>
<p>Episode 6: Meeting the Challenge of Russian Private Military Companies</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/meeting-the-challenge-of-russian-private-military-companies/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/meeting-the-challenge-of-russian-private-military-companies/</a></p>
<p>Episode 12: Mercenary: What is in a name?</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e12-mercenary-whats-in-a-name/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e12-mercenary-whats-in-a-name/</a></p>
<p>Episode 19: The rise of Quasi-Mercenary Organizations</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e19-the-rise-of-quasi-mercenary-organizations/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e19-the-rise-of-quasi-mercenary-organizations/</a></p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/d8tzuh/E55_Mootw.mp3" length="22308907" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The primary purpose of any nation’s military force is to fight and win its wars. However, the military instrument of national power does much more than that. Most of those things keep the nation from having to fight wars. US and NATO support to Ukraine provides examples of the non-conflict roles of the military instrument.  
If you think this material is worthwhile, please hit the like button, leave a comment, or share it with someone.
For more information about the role of Mercenaries in war and non-conflict situations please listen to these podcasts in the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare:
Episode 2: Who are these Russian quasi-mercenaries? https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/who-are-these-russian-quasi-mercenaries/
Episode 3: The role of mercenaries in hybrid warfare
https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-role-of-mercenaries-in-hybrid-warfare/
Episode 4: Why are Russian PMCs different from Western PMSCs?
https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/why-are-russian-pmcs-different-from-western-pmscs-with-dr-jovana-ranito/
Episode 6: Meeting the Challenge of Russian Private Military Companies
https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/meeting-the-challenge-of-russian-private-military-companies/
Episode 12: Mercenary: What is in a name?
https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e12-mercenary-whats-in-a-name/
Episode 19: The rise of Quasi-Mercenary Organizations
https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e19-the-rise-of-quasi-mercenary-organizations/
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>697</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>56</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E55_MOOTW.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E54: The Military Element of National Power, Part 3 -- Mercenaries</title>
        <itunes:title>E54: The Military Element of National Power, Part 3 -- Mercenaries</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e54-the-military-element-of-national-power-part-3-mercenaries/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e54-the-military-element-of-national-power-part-3-mercenaries/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 10 May 2022 20:19:18 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/301cf1fa-09fe-3be0-b404-1294fa00b271</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Since 2014, Moscow has used mercenaries in Ukraine, Syria, Africa, and other places to exert military power without accountability. Although these mercenaries, commonly referred to as the Wagner Group, never left Eastern Ukraine, they are now active again with the Russian invasion. Why? What is their value in a conventional war? What dangers do they present? That is the subject of this episode.</p>
<p>If you find this information useful, please his LIKE or send a comment!</p>
<p>For more information about the role of Mercenaries in war and non-conflict situations please listen to these podcasts in the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p>Episode 2: Who are these Russian quasi-mercenaries? <a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/who-are-these-russian-quasi-mercenaries/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/who-are-these-russian-quasi-mercenaries/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Episode 3: The role of mercenaries in hybrid warfare</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-role-of-mercenaries-in-hybrid-warfare/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-role-of-mercenaries-in-hybrid-warfare/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Episode 4: Why are Russian PMCs different from Western PMSCs?</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/why-are-russian-pmcs-different-from-western-pmscs-with-dr-jovana-ranito/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/why-are-russian-pmcs-different-from-western-pmscs-with-dr-jovana-ranito/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Episode 6: Meeting the Challenge of Russian Private Military Companies</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/meeting-the-challenge-of-russian-private-military-companies/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/meeting-the-challenge-of-russian-private-military-companies/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Episode 12: Mercenary: What is in a name?</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e12-mercenary-whats-in-a-name/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e12-mercenary-whats-in-a-name/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Episode 19: The rise of Quasi-Mercenary Organizations</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e19-the-rise-of-quasi-mercenary-organizations/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e19-the-rise-of-quasi-mercenary-organizations/</a></p>
<p> </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since 2014, Moscow has used mercenaries in Ukraine, Syria, Africa, and other places to exert military power without accountability. Although these mercenaries, commonly referred to as the Wagner Group, never left Eastern Ukraine, they are now active again with the Russian invasion. Why? What is their value in a conventional war? What dangers do they present? That is the subject of this episode.</p>
<p>If you find this information useful, please his LIKE or send a comment!</p>
<p>For more information about the role of Mercenaries in war and non-conflict situations please listen to these podcasts in the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
<p>Episode 2: Who are these Russian quasi-mercenaries? <a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/who-are-these-russian-quasi-mercenaries/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/who-are-these-russian-quasi-mercenaries/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Episode 3: The role of mercenaries in hybrid warfare</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-role-of-mercenaries-in-hybrid-warfare/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-role-of-mercenaries-in-hybrid-warfare/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Episode 4: Why are Russian PMCs different from Western PMSCs?</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/why-are-russian-pmcs-different-from-western-pmscs-with-dr-jovana-ranito/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/why-are-russian-pmcs-different-from-western-pmscs-with-dr-jovana-ranito/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Episode 6: Meeting the Challenge of Russian Private Military Companies</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/meeting-the-challenge-of-russian-private-military-companies/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/meeting-the-challenge-of-russian-private-military-companies/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Episode 12: Mercenary: What is in a name?</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e12-mercenary-whats-in-a-name/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e12-mercenary-whats-in-a-name/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Episode 19: The rise of Quasi-Mercenary Organizations</p>
<p><a href='https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e19-the-rise-of-quasi-mercenary-organizations/'>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e19-the-rise-of-quasi-mercenary-organizations/</a></p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/mxbgih/E54_Russian_Mercs.mp3" length="28824055" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Since 2014, Moscow has used mercenaries in Ukraine, Syria, Africa, and other places to exert military power without accountability. Although these mercenaries, commonly referred to as the Wagner Group, never left Eastern Ukraine, they are now active again with the Russian invasion. Why? What is their value in a conventional war? What dangers do they present? That is the subject of this episode.
If you find this information useful, please his LIKE or send a comment!
For more information about the role of Mercenaries in war and non-conflict situations please listen to these podcasts in the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
Episode 2: Who are these Russian quasi-mercenaries? https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/who-are-these-russian-quasi-mercenaries/
 
Episode 3: The role of mercenaries in hybrid warfare
https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/the-role-of-mercenaries-in-hybrid-warfare/
 
Episode 4: Why are Russian PMCs different from Western PMSCs?
https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/why-are-russian-pmcs-different-from-western-pmscs-with-dr-jovana-ranito/
 
Episode 6: Meeting the Challenge of Russian Private Military Companies
https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/meeting-the-challenge-of-russian-private-military-companies/
 
Episode 12: Mercenary: What is in a name?
https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e12-mercenary-whats-in-a-name/
 
Episode 19: The rise of Quasi-Mercenary Organizations
https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e19-the-rise-of-quasi-mercenary-organizations/
 ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>900</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>55</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E54.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E53 The Military Elelemt of Power Part 2 Russian Militias</title>
        <itunes:title>E53 The Military Elelemt of Power Part 2 Russian Militias</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e53-the-military-elelemt-of-power-part-2-russian-militias/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e53-the-military-elelemt-of-power-part-2-russian-militias/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Fri, 29 Apr 2022 16:32:06 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/4a073da6-9235-3e78-86db-c760cbe9d6a6</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Russia's use of Militias in the ongoing war has been very different than Ukraine's. The way these militias and auxiliaries act as an element of a nation’s military power will reflect the goals, objectives, and strategic vision of the nation that is using them. The danger is that forces that do not fulfill the criteria of a legitimate belligerent under the law of war undermines disciplined and efficient use of military force and threaten the restoration of a just and lasting peace.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia's use of Militias in the ongoing war has been very different than Ukraine's. The way these militias and auxiliaries act as an element of a nation’s military power will reflect the goals, objectives, and strategic vision of the nation that is using them. The danger is that forces that do not fulfill the criteria of a legitimate belligerent under the law of war undermines disciplined and efficient use of military force and threaten the restoration of a just and lasting peace.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/crjncm/E53_Russian_Militias.mp3" length="33089747" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Russia's use of Militias in the ongoing war has been very different than Ukraine's. The way these militias and auxiliaries act as an element of a nation’s military power will reflect the goals, objectives, and strategic vision of the nation that is using them. The danger is that forces that do not fulfill the criteria of a legitimate belligerent under the law of war undermines disciplined and efficient use of military force and threaten the restoration of a just and lasting peace.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1033</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>54</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E53.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E52 The Military Element of Power, Part 1 Militias</title>
        <itunes:title>E52 The Military Element of Power, Part 1 Militias</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e52-the-military-element-of-power-part-1-militias/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e52-the-military-element-of-power-part-1-militias/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 21 Apr 2022 10:33:40 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/09cfc99c-f352-354d-b977-a71b3e26a73a</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The military element of national power is not just regular armed forces fighting on the battlefield. This episode begins to look at the varied means and methods of using military power, once again drawing observations from the current war in Ukraine. I  begin with the use of militias and mercenaries.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The military element of national power is not just regular armed forces fighting on the battlefield. This episode begins to look at the varied means and methods of using military power, once again drawing observations from the current war in Ukraine. I  begin with the use of militias and mercenaries.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/8qcjqt/E52_Militias.mp3" length="42056643" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The military element of national power is not just regular armed forces fighting on the battlefield. This episode begins to look at the varied means and methods of using military power, once again drawing observations from the current war in Ukraine. I  begin with the use of militias and mercenaries.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1314</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>53</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E52_Militias_vnju82.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E51: Information Warfare</title>
        <itunes:title>E51: Information Warfare</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e51-information-warfare/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e51-information-warfare/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 14 Apr 2022 22:34:17 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/b43f589d-e1fb-372e-92f8-e1d91a814aa5</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>We live in an information age. How can the use of information, in all its forms, be a decisive tool in warfare? I look at the war in Ukraine to describe how the West is being influenced by Information as a tool of national power.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We live in an information age. How can the use of information, in all its forms, be a decisive tool in warfare? I look at the war in Ukraine to describe how the West is being influenced by Information as a tool of national power.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/kd2ndq/E51_Info_War.mp3" length="31283327" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[We live in an information age. How can the use of information, in all its forms, be a decisive tool in warfare? I look at the war in Ukraine to describe how the West is being influenced by Information as a tool of national power.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>977</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>52</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E51.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E50: Economic Warfare</title>
        <itunes:title>E50: Economic Warfare</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e50-economic-warfare/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e50-economic-warfare/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Wed, 02 Mar 2022 21:16:32 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/63fa6e5c-9ffe-30af-b213-525eb7602657</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>If war is a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means, what are those other means? How do we apply them for success in war and operations short of war? What does that mean for Ukraine?  This podcast begins to answer those questions by looking at Economic Warfare.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If war is a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means, what are those other means? How do we apply them for success in war and operations short of war? What does that mean for Ukraine?  This podcast begins to answer those questions by looking at Economic Warfare.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/t8rp3k/E50_Economic_Warfare.mp3" length="29211921" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[If war is a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means, what are those other means? How do we apply them for success in war and operations short of war? What does that mean for Ukraine?  This podcast begins to answer those questions by looking at Economic Warfare.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>912</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>51</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E50_Economic_Warfare.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E49: Do we learn from history?</title>
        <itunes:title>E49: Do we learn from history?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e49-do-we-learn-from-history/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e49-do-we-learn-from-history/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 24 Feb 2022 09:31:02 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/8d605050-e812-3e09-901c-9bc6511168f3</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>In 1938 the Western powers allowed Nazi Germany to annex the border regions of Czechoslovakia and, a few months later, dismember the rest of that country. Some people say that this model is replaying itself today. Have we learned from history? Have others learned lessons we have not?</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 1938 the Western powers allowed Nazi Germany to annex the border regions of Czechoslovakia and, a few months later, dismember the rest of that country. Some people say that this model is replaying itself today. Have we learned from history? Have others learned lessons we have not?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/hdmski/E49_Do_we_learn_from_history_8s0dq.mp3" length="25561465" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[In 1938 the Western powers allowed Nazi Germany to annex the border regions of Czechoslovakia and, a few months later, dismember the rest of that country. Some people say that this model is replaying itself today. Have we learned from history? Have others learned lessons we have not?]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>798</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>50</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E49_Do_We_Learn.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E48 The American Way of War w Col Jayson Altieri</title>
        <itunes:title>E48 The American Way of War w Col Jayson Altieri</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e48-the-american-way-of-war-w-col-jayson-altieri/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e48-the-american-way-of-war-w-col-jayson-altieri/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:24:39 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/6671c83d-a2ac-3f92-988a-4ddc9daa9df7</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Initiative, Imagination, Independence. These principles seem more important than ever in today’s vague, ambiguous, complex, and uncertain strategic environment. But, has the United States gone in another direction? COL Jayson Altieri of the USAF Air War College joins me to discuss this.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Initiative, Imagination, Independence. These principles seem more important than ever in today’s vague, ambiguous, complex, and uncertain strategic environment. But, has the United States gone in another direction? COL Jayson Altieri of the USAF Air War College joins me to discuss this.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/cpikky/E48_American_Way_of_War.mp3" length="39477835" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Initiative, Imagination, Independence. These principles seem more important than ever in today’s vague, ambiguous, complex, and uncertain strategic environment. But, has the United States gone in another direction? COL Jayson Altieri of the USAF Air War College joins me to discuss this.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1233</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>49</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E48_AmWayWar.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E47:Great Commander Pt 3 - von Moltke and the General Staff</title>
        <itunes:title>E47:Great Commander Pt 3 - von Moltke and the General Staff</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e47great-commander-pt-3-von-moltke-and-the-general-staff/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e47great-commander-pt-3-von-moltke-and-the-general-staff/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jan 2022 19:32:51 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/be854f43-ff7b-3a81-ad22-15c2ec5716fa</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>What does a Prussian general, a product of the enlightenment, have in common with a Greek commander who studied under Aristotle? More important, how does that continue to affect warfare in the 21st century?</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What does a Prussian general, a product of the enlightenment, have in common with a Greek commander who studied under Aristotle? More important, how does that continue to affect warfare in the 21st century?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ww22uf/E47_von_Moltke.mp3" length="29061456" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[What does a Prussian general, a product of the enlightenment, have in common with a Greek commander who studied under Aristotle? More important, how does that continue to affect warfare in the 21st century?]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>908</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>48</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E47_von_Moltke.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E46 Great Commanders Part 2: Alexander</title>
        <itunes:title>E46 Great Commanders Part 2: Alexander</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e46-great-commanders-part-2-alexander/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e46-great-commanders-part-2-alexander/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 04 Jan 2022 21:28:42 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/56c07d0b-a64d-3fa9-a162-43a017d0d4c7</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Can one man change warfare, or history? I asked colleagues for their recommendations. Everyone's list included the same name. Alexander of Macedon. His vision changed warfare and the world, with effects that continue to this day.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Can one man change warfare, or history? I asked colleagues for their recommendations. Everyone's list included the same name. Alexander of Macedon. His vision changed warfare and the world, with effects that continue to this day.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/7dqcev/E46_Commanders_Pt2.mp3" length="34578517" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Can one man change warfare, or history? I asked colleagues for their recommendations. Everyone's list included the same name. Alexander of Macedon. His vision changed warfare and the world, with effects that continue to this day.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1080</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>47</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E46_ALEXANDER.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E45: Commanders Part 1</title>
        <itunes:title>E45: Commanders Part 1</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e45-commanders-part-1/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e45-commanders-part-1/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 20 Nov 2021 08:55:47 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/8427cfe8-7e3c-38ce-8cf7-845c6dc0d416</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>If war is a human endeavor, can the actions of one person, against all odds, change the course of a battle or a war? Times may bring out the man, but sometimes one person can change history.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If war is a human endeavor, can the actions of one person, against all odds, change the course of a battle or a war? Times may bring out the man, but sometimes one person can change history.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/dzcyff/E45_Great_Commanders.mp3" length="28679441" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[If war is a human endeavor, can the actions of one person, against all odds, change the course of a battle or a war? Times may bring out the man, but sometimes one person can change history.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>896</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>46</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E45_Great_Commanders.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E44: Cultural Warfare</title>
        <itunes:title>E44: Cultural Warfare</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e44-cultural-warfare/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e44-cultural-warfare/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 01 Nov 2021 18:41:28 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/b468ffc5-0b3e-3713-ad96-c04c5e5a421d</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>War is a human endeavor and, by its nature, a social activity. Success in war depends on understanding the enemy's cultures to identify strategic weakness and red-lines that must not be crossed. </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>War is a human endeavor and, by its nature, a social activity. Success in war depends on understanding the enemy's cultures to identify strategic weakness and red-lines that must not be crossed. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/pqzf7b/E44_Cultural_Warfare.mp3" length="22451849" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[War is a human endeavor and, by its nature, a social activity. Success in war depends on understanding the enemy's cultures to identify strategic weakness and red-lines that must not be crossed. ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>701</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>45</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E44_Culture_War_vaja7x.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E43: How to Lose a War</title>
        <itunes:title>E43: How to Lose a War</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e43-how-to-lose-a-war/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e43-how-to-lose-a-war/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sat, 09 Oct 2021 15:13:52 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/0045096e-2b8f-3ffe-9a85-8458e1b0e338</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>In the previous episode I proposed that Tolstoy’s statement that all happy families are alike and that all unhappy families are unhappy in their own way, might also apply to success and failure in war. In that podcast, I asserted that that all successful wars are alike. Now I will explore the idea that every unsuccessful war is unsuccessful in its own way.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the previous episode I proposed that Tolstoy’s statement that all happy families are alike and that all unhappy families are unhappy in their own way, might also apply to success and failure in war. In that podcast, I asserted that that all successful wars are alike. Now I will explore the idea that every unsuccessful war is unsuccessful in its own way.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/fmvxqy/E43_How_to_Lose_a_War_-_10_9_21_160366mo4.mp3" length="35624251" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[In the previous episode I proposed that Tolstoy’s statement that all happy families are alike and that all unhappy families are unhappy in their own way, might also apply to success and failure in war. In that podcast, I asserted that that all successful wars are alike. Now I will explore the idea that every unsuccessful war is unsuccessful in its own way.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1113</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>44</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E43_How_to_lose_a_War.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E42 All Successful Wars Are Alike</title>
        <itunes:title>E42 All Successful Wars Are Alike</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e42-all-successful-wars-are-alike/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e42-all-successful-wars-are-alike/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 06 Sep 2021 18:36:23 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/9262dc36-85bb-3b90-9f34-cf165f3cc0b4</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Tolstoy's novel Anna Karenina begins: "All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Could this line from the author of “War and Peace” also apply to war? That is the topic of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Tolstoy's novel Anna Karenina begins: "All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Could this line from the author of “War and Peace” also apply to war? That is the topic of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/5579r6/E42_Are_All_Successful_Wars_Alike_-_9_6_21_17267zcq9.mp3" length="37668908" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Tolstoy's novel Anna Karenina begins: "All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Could this line from the author of “War and Peace” also apply to war? That is the topic of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1177</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>43</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E42_art9112g.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E41: Mercenary Risk Management</title>
        <itunes:title>E41: Mercenary Risk Management</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e41-mercenary-risk-management/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e41-mercenary-risk-management/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 26 Aug 2021 09:02:33 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/12220a0f-eff8-309c-b80d-8a1ab6fdfe2e</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Prior episodes described what Quasi-mercenary forces are, what they do, how they get their support, and who controls them. The big question is what – if anything -- we can do about them? I am joined by Dr. Deborah Avant of the University of Denver, Dr. Sorcha McLeod of the UN Working Group on Mercenaries, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gary Motsek </p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Prior episodes described what Quasi-mercenary forces are, what they do, how they get their support, and who controls them. The big question is what – if anything -- we can do about them? I am joined by Dr. Deborah Avant of the University of Denver, Dr. Sorcha McLeod of the UN Working Group on Mercenaries, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gary Motsek </p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/q27g7k/E41_Risk_Management.mp3" length="104153677" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Prior episodes described what Quasi-mercenary forces are, what they do, how they get their support, and who controls them. The big question is what – if anything -- we can do about them? I am joined by Dr. Deborah Avant of the University of Denver, Dr. Sorcha McLeod of the UN Working Group on Mercenaries, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gary Motsek ]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>3254</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>42</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E41_On_Merc_War_6.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E40: Interlude</title>
        <itunes:title>E40: Interlude</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e40-interlude/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e40-interlude/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 15 Aug 2021 21:04:24 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/880f5db5-ad03-3be7-9421-b56c3c39e199</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Why does the United States seem to ignore the basic tenets of strategy in our military interventions? What does our abandoning Afghanistan mean for international security? I am interrupting the discussion on mercenaries to address this issue.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why does the United States seem to ignore the basic tenets of strategy in our military interventions? What does our abandoning Afghanistan mean for international security? I am interrupting the discussion on mercenaries to address this issue.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/78qz33/E40_Interlude.mp3" length="21880917" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Why does the United States seem to ignore the basic tenets of strategy in our military interventions? What does our abandoning Afghanistan mean for international security? I am interrupting the discussion on mercenaries to address this issue.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>683</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>41</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E40_Interlude.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E39: On Mercenary Warfare Paragraph 5 -- Command and Control</title>
        <itunes:title>E39: On Mercenary Warfare Paragraph 5 -- Command and Control</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e39-on-mercenary-warfare-paragraph-5-command-and-control/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e39-on-mercenary-warfare-paragraph-5-command-and-control/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Tue, 20 Jul 2021 20:45:09 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/1c184300-1a3e-313e-bbae-f36805c90435</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Who commands or controls modern mercenary activity? Who really calls the shots for the Wagner Group or other mercenary organizations? Accountability depends not just on knowing who, but being able to prove it.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Who commands or controls modern mercenary activity? Who really calls the shots for the Wagner Group or other mercenary organizations? Accountability depends not just on knowing who, but being able to prove it.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/bahibs/E39_QMO_5_CmdCtl.mp3" length="39758703" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Who commands or controls modern mercenary activity? Who really calls the shots for the Wagner Group or other mercenary organizations? Accountability depends not just on knowing who, but being able to prove it.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1242</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>40</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E39_On_Merc_War_5.jpeg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E38: On Mercenary Warfare, Paragraph 4: Logistics</title>
        <itunes:title>E38: On Mercenary Warfare, Paragraph 4: Logistics</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e38-on-mercenary-warfare-paragraph-4-logistics/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e38-on-mercenary-warfare-paragraph-4-logistics/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 08 Jul 2021 21:38:34 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/3643ce53-409e-344c-85e2-c28e99b2c3ad</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>It is said, "Tactics wins battles, logistics wins wars." This is just as true for mercenaries and regular armies. Studying mercenary logistics can identify potential areas where we can bring pressure on them.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It is said, "Tactics wins battles, logistics wins wars." This is just as true for mercenaries and regular armies. Studying mercenary logistics can identify potential areas where we can bring pressure on them.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/eew4m9/E38_QMO_Logistics.mp3" length="55057682" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[It is said, "Tactics wins battles, logistics wins wars." This is just as true for mercenaries and regular armies. Studying mercenary logistics can identify potential areas where we can bring pressure on them.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1720</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>39</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E38_On_Merc_War_4.jpeg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E37: On Mercenary Warfare, Paragraph 3: Execution</title>
        <itunes:title>E37: On Mercenary Warfare, Paragraph 3: Execution</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e37-on-mercenary-warfare-paragraph-3-execution/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e37-on-mercenary-warfare-paragraph-3-execution/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jun 2021 13:24:09 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/bedcbb15-9336-3320-929a-4031af071e7a</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Moving from what mercenary-like organization are and where they operate, we need to know how today’s mercenary-like activities threaten peace and security in Africa, the Middle East, and even Europe? How do they threaten the vital interests of the United States, in particular, and Western interests in general? In other words, why should we care?</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Moving from what mercenary-like organization are and where they operate, we need to know how today’s mercenary-like activities threaten peace and security in Africa, the Middle East, and even Europe? How do they threaten the vital interests of the United States, in particular, and Western interests in general? In other words, why should we care?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/hkjr4b/E37_QMO3_execution_210615.mp3" length="40076352" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Moving from what mercenary-like organization are and where they operate, we need to know how today’s mercenary-like activities threaten peace and security in Africa, the Middle East, and even Europe? How do they threaten the vital interests of the United States, in particular, and Western interests in general? In other words, why should we care?]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1252</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>38</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E37_On_Merc_War_3.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E36 On Mecernary Warfare Paragraph 2, The Mission</title>
        <itunes:title>E36 On Mecernary Warfare Paragraph 2, The Mission</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e36-on-mecernary-warfare-paragraph-2-the-mission/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e36-on-mecernary-warfare-paragraph-2-the-mission/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 06 Jun 2021 09:12:22 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/aa9a2168-d044-3f3d-8279-bb9510bb5d30</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Why do governments choose to use mercenaries rather than their own armed forces or those of partner national armies or international organizations? More important, why do some governments invite mercenaries into their countries? The answers may surprise you.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why do governments choose to use mercenaries rather than their own armed forces or those of partner national armies or international organizations? More important, why do some governments invite mercenaries into their countries? The answers may surprise you.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/nrinnn/E36_QMO_Series_2_6_2_21.mp3" length="34197338" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Why do governments choose to use mercenaries rather than their own armed forces or those of partner national armies or international organizations? More important, why do some governments invite mercenaries into their countries? The answers may surprise you.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1068</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>37</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E36_On_Merc_War_2.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E35: On Mercenary Warfare, Paragraph 1 - The Situation</title>
        <itunes:title>E35: On Mercenary Warfare, Paragraph 1 - The Situation</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e35-on-mercenary-warfare-paragraph-1-the-situation/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e35-on-mercenary-warfare-paragraph-1-the-situation/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 31 May 2021 20:30:59 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/74873a18-2363-34a5-b0d8-8fcc9f7de503</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>In Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, new reports emerge of mercenary-like activity. Why do governments seek help from mercenaries? How can some governments and even media consider them a force for good? This episode begins a series on that subject.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, new reports emerge of mercenary-like activity. Why do governments seek help from mercenaries? How can some governments and even media consider them a force for good? This episode begins a series on that subject.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/4tddra/QMO_Series_1_5_22_21.mp3" length="30683973" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[In Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, new reports emerge of mercenary-like activity. Why do governments seek help from mercenaries? How can some governments and even media consider them a force for good? This episode begins a series on that subject.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>958</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>36</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E35_On_Merc_War_1.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E34: War in the East?</title>
        <itunes:title>E34: War in the East?</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e34-war-in-the-east/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e34-war-in-the-east/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Sun, 16 May 2021 10:14:01 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/77278102-81a8-395c-b93a-09336712b44a</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>The Chinese idea of unrestricted warfare orchestrates all elements of national power, with military power as the bass line, but only dominating as a last resort. If a shooting war happens, why, how, and where will it start?</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Chinese idea of unrestricted warfare orchestrates all elements of national power, with military power as the bass line, but only dominating as a last resort. If a shooting war happens, why, how, and where will it start?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/hbkz5t/War_in_the_East_051621.mp3" length="24781554" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[The Chinese idea of unrestricted warfare orchestrates all elements of national power, with military power as the bass line, but only dominating as a last resort. If a shooting war happens, why, how, and where will it start?]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>774</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>35</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E34_War_in_the_East.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E33: Cancelling History</title>
        <itunes:title>E33: Cancelling History</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e33-cancelling-history/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e33-cancelling-history/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 26 Apr 2021 09:50:35 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/049f71df-4e0c-3849-9de5-47ae232d0c2f</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Current movements to cancel certain historical persons risks cancelling our history, leaving us without a map of our past and guidance for our future. We should not ignore the importance of historical persons' thoughts and achievements, nor the faults which made them human.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Current movements to cancel certain historical persons risks cancelling our history, leaving us without a map of our past and guidance for our future. We should not ignore the importance of historical persons' thoughts and achievements, nor the faults which made them human.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ztn7sj/E33_Cancelling_History80bqp.mp3" length="12132227" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Current movements to cancel certain historical persons risks cancelling our history, leaving us without a map of our past and guidance for our future. We should not ignore the importance of historical persons' thoughts and achievements, nor the faults which made them human.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>505</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>34</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E33_Cancel_Historyapgwg.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>E32: Unrestricted Warfare</title>
        <itunes:title>E32: Unrestricted Warfare</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e32-unrestricted-warfare/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/e32-unrestricted-warfare/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2021 20:44:17 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/66c055ad-b896-3556-ba61-cb50b8647221</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>Sun Tzu said: “If one party is at war with another, and the other party does not realize it is at war, the party who knows it is at war almost always has the advantage and usually wins.” Is the United States already at war with China, and we just don’t know it? Chinese military doctrine indicates that we are.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sun Tzu said: “If one party is at war with another, and the other party does not realize it is at war, the party who knows it is at war almost always has the advantage and usually wins.” Is the United States already at war with China, and we just don’t know it? Chinese military doctrine indicates that we are.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ys4j3h/E32_Unrestricted_warfare9v8bz.mp3" length="12952263" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[Sun Tzu said: “If one party is at war with another, and the other party does not realize it is at war, the party who knows it is at war almost always has the advantage and usually wins.” Is the United States already at war with China, and we just don’t know it? Chinese military doctrine indicates that we are.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>539</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>33</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E32UnrestrictedWarfare.jpg" />    </item>
    <item>
        <title>Holding PMSCs Accountable</title>
        <itunes:title>Holding PMSCs Accountable</itunes:title>
        <link>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/holding-pmscs-accountable/</link>
                    <comments>https://mayhemxpc.podbean.com/e/holding-pmscs-accountable/#comments</comments>        <pubDate>Wed, 20 Jan 2021 13:08:33 -0500</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">mayhemxpc.podbean.com/edf75a1d-6736-37e9-af69-fe13894dc054</guid>
                                    <description><![CDATA[<p>A lot has happened since the Nisour Square Tragedy to hold PMSCs accountable under the law. Doug Brooks and I discuss some of the initiatives of the past dozen years and what still needs to be done.</p>
]]></description>
                                                            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A lot has happened since the Nisour Square Tragedy to hold PMSCs accountable under the law. Doug Brooks and I discuss some of the initiatives of the past dozen years and what still needs to be done.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
                                    
        <enclosure url="https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/vsj6se/E31_PMSC_Accountability8gx2s.mp3" length="28930425" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        <itunes:summary><![CDATA[A lot has happened since the Nisour Square Tragedy to hold PMSCs accountable under the law. Doug Brooks and I discuss some of the initiatives of the past dozen years and what still needs to be done.]]></itunes:summary>
        <itunes:author>Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant</itunes:author>
        <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
        <itunes:block>No</itunes:block>
        <itunes:duration>1205</itunes:duration>
                <itunes:episode>32</itunes:episode>
        <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
        <itunes:image href="https://pbcdn1.podbean.com/imglogo/ep-logo/pbblog5935439/E31_PMSC_Accountability6l8pl.jpg" />    </item>
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